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BY NATHANIEL MICKLEM, M.A.

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CHRISTIAN REVOLUTION SERIES
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BY

NATHANIEL MICKLEM, M.A.

Professor of Old Testament Literature and Theology at the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham,

AND

HERBERT MORGAN, M.A.

Director of Extra-Mural Studies, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.

Reddite, ait, quæ sunt Cæsaris Cæsari, et quæ sunt Dei Deo, id est imaginem Cæsaris Cæsari, quæ in nummo est, et imaginem Dei Deo, quæ in homine est, ut Cæsari quidem pecuniam reddas, Deo temetipsum. Alioquin, quid erit Dei, si omnia Cæsaris?—TERTULLIAN.

(Render, says he, what is Cæsar's to Cæsar and what is God's to God, that is, the image of Cæsar which is on the coin to Cæsar and the image of God which is in man to God, so that thou render to Cæsar money, to God thyself. Else what shall be God's, if all belong to Cæsar?)

THE SWARTHMORE PRESS LTD.
40, MUSEUM STREET, LONDON, W.C.1

First Published in 1921

University of Southern California Library

PREFACE

THIS book is an enquiry into social obligation and is addressed to all who look for a new world, especially to our fellow Christians.

"Public calamity," said Burke, "is a mighty leveller, and there are occasions when any, even the slightest, chance of doing good must be laid hold on, even by the most inconsiderable person." This may serve as our excuse for an else presumptuous attempt.

We cannot well exaggerate the sorrows of this time, for no human imagination can grasp them. After so great sacrifices gladly made and such high hopes formed of the new world "after the war" the result appears so little worth the price. How comes it that all the good will in the world should be so impotent, and that in spite of all efforts civilisation seems like a great locomotive that has jumped the rails and is now tearing its way down a steep place to destruction? The old lines seem to have been written for our day:

> Quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas, tot bella per orbem,
> Tam multæ scelerum facies. Non ullus aratro
> Dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
> Hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum;
> Vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
> Arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe.*

* For right and wrong are all confounded; so many wars there are throughout the world, so many forms of crime. oN

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That which has hitherto divided the progressive and constructive forces of the world seems to us on the whole to have been rather a difference of method than an antagonism of ideal. Christian reformers and idealists and the various schools of the Socialists all share, in so far as they are disinterested, very largely the same social ideal of equality and brotherhood; but some look to "Evolution," some to political action, some to education and some to violent revolution as the means to their common end. Thus our book may be regarded as a contribution to the study of method. In other words, we are concerned with the old problem of "compromise," how far those who see a great ideal and are pledged to it may "compromise" with an order that conflicts with and largely negates that ideal. We have called our book "Christ *and* Cæsar" not "Christ *or* Cæsar," because, while we have maintained the position that the discipleship of Christ involves a following of His way without compromise and without tarrying for any, we have yet sought to appraise the real value, and even religious significance, of "Cæsar." We have inevitably been involved in a discussion of some of the most perplexing of human problems; such discussions need no apology, for only by a clear grasp of first

---

worthy honour remains for the plough; the fields are wasted, for the farmers have been called away. On the one side Mesopotamia, on the other Germany provokes war; breaking their treaties city fights against city; the whole world rages with impious war.

principles can we hope to find a solution and to avoid mere opportunism and expediency in our citizenship. We certainly have not succeeded in making politics easy, but we hope that we have introduced no difficulties but those that are inherent in the subject matter, and that we may not deserve the reproach levelled by Stevenson against the fog-horn, that, while it proclaims the existence of a fog, it does nothing to dispel it.

It is throughout with a *moral* problem that we are concerned; political problems are not questions of convenience but of principle and duty. We hope in the course of our book to show that the good of the individual and the good of society ultimately coincide, but that this is only true if we hold a sufficiently high idea of both.

It does not occur to us that we have solved all the problems we raise, but if, as we hope, in one particular, and that not unimportant, we have a little advanced our subject, at least on the theoretical side, we shall be very satisfied.

> As the sea
> Waits ages in its bed till some one wave,
> One of the multitudinous mass, extends
> The empire of the whole, some feet perhaps,
> Over the strip of sand which could confine
> Its fellows so long time: thenceforth the rest,
> Even to the meanest, hurry in at once,
> And so much is clear gained. I shall be glad
> If all my labours, failing of aught else,
> Suffice to make such inroad and procure
> A wider range for thought.

In the preparation of this book we have to thank Mrs. Micklem, Mr. Nathaniel Micklem, K.C., and the Rev. W. Fearon Halliday, M.A., for great help in different ways.

The times are black indeed. We are persuaded that in the way of Christ and in no other lies the hope of humanity, and we have tried in this book, over against the political, the revolutionary and the ecclesiastical, to show what that way is. In spite of all the sadness and disillusionment of these days we yet would say, *in pace in idipsum dormiam et requiescam: quoniam tu, Domine, singulariter in spe constituisti me.*

N.M.
H.M.

Oxford,
August, 1920.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	PREFACE - - - - -	7
	PART I—CRITICAL	
I	THE WAY OF THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES—I - - - -	13
	DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION. KARL MARX. "THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE PROLETARIAT," JOSEPH DIETZGEN	
II	THE WAY OF THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES—II - - - -	49
	THE CLASS WAR. GEORGES SOREL	
III	THE WAY OF THE ECCLESIASTICS -	79
	"CHURCH AND NATION." THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER	
	PART II—CONSTRUCTIVE	
IV	NATIONALITY AND HUMANITY -	105
V	THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY -	140
VI	THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM -	179
VII	COMPROMISE AND PROGRESS - -	208
	INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS -	249

PART I

Chapter I

THE WAY OF THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES

"Democracy and Revolution."

"The Philosopher of the Proletariat."

It will be convenient to make clear at the beginning the course this book will take. Following ancient and good custom we shall begin our enquiry from the opinions commonly held. To this end we shall summon four witnesses in particular, Karl Marx, Joseph Dietzgen and Georges Sorel as representing in the clearest way the underlying notions of advanced "Labour," and the Bishop of Manchester as representing, as well as any one man may, the Christian Churches. We shall attempt as fairly as we can to state their position so far as it concerns our enquiry, and then to raise what seem to us the difficulties and contradictions involved. This enquiry will cover our first three chapters. In the fourth chapter we shall turn to our own tentative construction and seek to appraise the nature and significance of nationality. In the fifth chapter we shall discuss the obligation of the individual to the State and the obligation of the State to the

individual; in the next we shall be concerned with the place and function in society of such groups as Churches which have a higher ideal than the majority has attained, whether of individual conduct or social life or both. In the last chapter we shall come to the perplexing problems which may be summed up under the head of "compromise": how far should one, who sees a higher ideal than his contemporaries, compromise with the traditions and institutions of his day?

I

For the purposes of this discussion Cæsar stands as the short general title for the political organisation of human groups. The word comes to us from antiquity, but it may be conveniently used to refer to modern States; for though an institution like the British Empire may boast of its wide dominion over "regions Cæsar never knew," it may be doubted whether the shade of Augustus would be so bewildered by the spirit and methods of our rule as was Rip Van Winkle when he awoke in his new world. Empires have a remarkable family likeness, and so long as we disregard the demand of such men as General Smuts, that we should establish a commonwealth instead of the existing imperial system, it will not be such a very far cry to modern Britain from "Rome's thrice-hammered hardihood." In spite of manifest differences we refer therefore to our political system as the realm of Cæsar.

Our parliamentary system constitutes in the eyes of many the greatest political achievement

of the modern spirit, and it has long been our pride and our boast that other democratic communities have profited from our experience by adopting our "Mother of Parliaments" as their model. The growth of Parliamentary institutions makes a radiant chapter in the story of modern progress; the principle of representative government on which Parliament rests is constantly denominated as the last word in political wisdom, in as much as it is the most trustworthy instrument of democracy, insuring growing liberty and equality on the one hand and general order and stability on the other. Hence it has been generally regarded as the wiser part for other peoples to entrust their fortunes to a Parliamentary system, while those who already enjoy this goodly heritage can look for nothing beyond certain modifications and developments of it. Up to quite recent times there has been an almost universal and unquestioned faith in this instrument of government. It was no doubt possible to question the wisdom of policies pursued by the government for the time being, but the remedy for all this might be looked for at some futu e election. Those who indulged in the severest criticism of the practical defects and abuses of Parliament had no alternative institution to suggest in its place; there might be discussion on secondary issues, such as the merits of single or double-chamber Parliaments, but hardly any one questioned the value of the Parliamentary method itself. There might be conflicting opinions as to what should be regarded as unconstitutional action, but that the Constitution itself should be respected and defended

as the Palladium of our liberties was common ground between all parties and was regarded as the foundation of political virtue. Behind all this lay the conviction that Parliament is the surest guarantee of social progress. Intense and widespread discontent with the slow and obstructive procedure that normally governs parliamentary activities is a thing of comparatively recent growth. It is apt, however, to grow into a sense of the futility of all Parliamentary action, and in our day the complacent faith in Parliamentary institutions has been sternly challenged to justify itself from two quarters. The world has the promise of a different type of government, that by soviets, in Russia, and nearer home we hear the cry of the disillusioned for "direct action."*

In a large section of the working classes there has developed a strong suspicion, hardening into definite conviction, that in spite of all its professions Parliamentary government does not further real and fundamental democracy. The contention is that the extension of the franchise and the partial removal of such anomalies as plural voting together with a certain amount of legislation to improve social and industrial conditions has served to delude the less thoughtful section of the proletariat into thinking that there is a serious approach towards liberty and equality. "One section of the bourgeoisie desires to redress social grievances in order to secure a

* The demand for direct action, it should be noted, does not merely come from "Labour"; it also underlies the policy of such different rebels as Sir Edward Carson on the one side and the "Passive Resister" and the "Conscientious Objector" on the other, though in different degrees.

continuance of bourgeois society. To this section belong: economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, reformers of working class conditions, charity organisers, temperance fanatics, and all the motley variety of reformers of every description."* But those who claim to be less easily hoodwinked realise that in spite of such superficial changes of machinery and policy the disproportion of political power and of social privilege still remains; the disparity in political power is seen by them to be due to the disparity in social and industrial status, and the former cannot be dealt with until the latter is abolished. By a clever use of the press and by a subtle and sinister confusion of electoral issues the middle classes have hitherto so managed to exploit the unsuspecting proletariat as to keep the real power of control in their own hands; the proletariat, though numerically superior, have been outmanœuvred by those who have gained the lion's share of power through superior wealth and superior education. "Political power, properly speaking, is the organised power of one class for the purpose of oppressing another."† The parties in power might condescend to make occasional concessions to the unhappy proletariat, but never would they do anything more than was barely necessary to keep its discontent within safe limits, taking good care that the balance of political power should be in their own favour. Though the proletariat have had a larger number of votes,

* *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels, Section II., 1848. It should be borne in mind that this *Communist Manifesto* is widely regarded as the sheet-anchor of modern Socialism.

† *Ib.*, Section II.

this advantage is nullified so long as the Cabinet, which increasingly takes the initiative in legislation, is chosen by the well-to-do classes, so long as the majority of those elected to Parliament belongs to the bourgeois section. Gradually, through more or less continuous disillusionment, some of the shrewder leaders of the proletariat have come to the conviction that Parliament in its present form merely reflects the social and economic inequalities of the industrial system.

Our present social divisions are based upon the economic order : the middle classes rose to power with the growth of our present industrial system : in the old days the bulk of political power remained with those whose wealth consisted in the possession of land. Nowadays this power is shared by the industrial and commercial magnates, who are fast displacing the landed gentry from their pre-eminence, if indeed they have not already done so. The electoral unit is nominally a geographical one ; a member of Parliament is still supposed to represent a whole area, but what he really does is to champion the interests of the wealthy or professional class to which he belongs. This has been the case all along, but it is only recently that it has been clearly and generally recognised. Those who passed the Reform Bill supposed themselves to be establishing political democracy by doing away with the monopoly which " pocket boroughs " conferred upon a limited class. This, however, did not seriously disturb the existing balance of power as between rich and poor. How can the producers be truly represented, it is asked, by those whose interest it is to exploit them ? Is it not as if a community

of mice were to elect a parliament of cats? "The modern State is but an executive Committee for administering the affairs of the whole bourgeois class."* Real redress must therefore be looked for by a drastic change of the industrial and economic order upon which the political system really rests. "Each step in the evolution of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political progress." "Into their (the feudal lords') place stepped free competition, with its corresponding social and political constitution, with the economic and political rule of the bourgeois class."*

It is the practice of bourgeois apologists to plead that no great breach should be hastily made in tradition on the ground that there is common to all classes of the citizens a general body of political and cultural interests. To this it is replied that these interests are derivative from and intimately bound up with the economic order. Law, religion and morality, as we know them, are a bourgeois creation, and it is of little use to ask an open-eyed proletariat to show any great affection for them. The new civilisation must create its own cultural values. "The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every profession previously venerated and regarded as honourable. It has turned the doctor, lawyer, priest, poet and philosopher into its paid wage workers."* "Law, morality, religion, are for him (the proletarian) merely so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which as many bourgeois interests are concealed."* "Your very ideas themselves (freedom, culture) are but the products of bourgeois conditions of production and property,

* *Communist Manifesto*, Section I.

as your justice is but the will of your class uplifted into law; a will whose character is determined by the material conditions of existence of your class."* What really matters, therefore, is the economic order from which the present class distinctions take their rise. Social and political inequality can only be eliminated by a transformation of the industrial order in which the proletarian lives and moves and has his uneasy being. Political action can only be expected to touch life at its surface, and at best it will only aim at comparatively slow and unimportant changes. It is in the economic order therefore that the proletarian must work out his real salvation, and here he must aim at a complete bouleversement: a socialist or co-operative system must be set up on the ruins of the present competitive and capitalistic system. The classes who derive power and prestige from their wealth will cling to these privileges, and it is idle to look to them for drastic changes by consent; power, therefore, must be wrested from them by violence; hence the talk of direct action, class war and the general strike. Thus we are brought face to face with the policy of revolution which is gaining favour in many quarters. It is a strange compound of idealism and pessimism; its advocates, whose *bête noir* is "Utopianism," would claim that they are open-eyed realists, whereas the protagonists of the existing order and those who favour a policy of progress by gradual reform are mere sentimentalists posing as idealists. Some of these champions of revolt have the greatest contempt for those Socialists who look to Parliamentary

* *Communist Manifesto*, Section II.

action for social salvation, treating them as the victims of delusion and the tools of reaction. It is the economic order that is primary and fundamental; this is the citadel that must be stormed; this is the Bastille of the social revolution.

II

Here we turn our attention to three outstanding champions of revolution whose writings have influenced in various degrees the minds of those who lead the army of revolt. These heralds of the fiery dawn are Karl Marx, Joseph Dietzgen and Georges Sorel.

Karl Marx.

As our references to the Communist manifesto suggest, much of what has been said above is the doctrine of Marx as it has passed into the current speech of social revolutionaries. "Das Kapital" may be described as an elaborate commentary on the main thesis laid down in this manifesto.

Marx is reported to have said "Je ne suis pas Marxiste, moi," but there can be no doubt that the most influential and energetic propagandists of the Socialist ideal derive their inspiration from him The Russian Bolsheviks profess that from him they have learnt their main principles, and prominent proletarian leaders in other countries hark back to him for their economic and social doctrines. Marx is the most systematic exponent of what may be called a philosophy of social revolution. In his writings may be found a sustained attempt to combine a body of economic

doctrine with a philosophy of history. Here we shall consider some main principles that underlie his teaching.

Just as Buckle called attention to the great influence of climate and physical environment as a factor in human civilisation, so Marx emphasises the enormous and hitherto insufficiently recognised importance of our economic environment. Nothing determines the life of a people and the course of its civilisation in the same degree, he holds, as the system of economic production that prevails at any given time. "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without incessantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the methods of production, and consequently all social relations."* Marx' view is that under the modern capitalist *régime* the essential injustice is found in the fact that the industrial and commercial classes have gained wealth and power by exploiting the "*surplus value*" created by proletarian labour. Emerging out of serfdom great masses of men found themselves possessed of nothing but strength and skill for creative labour. This labour capacity, upon which industrial production chiefly depends, they have perforce to sell, much as if it were a mere commodity, to those who have obtained possession and control of land and machinery.

> Where fast and faster our iron master,
> The thing we made, for ever drives,
> Bids us grind treasure and fashion pleasure
> For other hopes and other lives.

They produced more than was necessary for their own maintenance, and this surplus was

* *Communist Manifesto*, Section I.

reaped by the possessing classes who wax increasingly rich and powerful. From a strictly economic point of view these capitalists are a parasitic class, for the basis of the whole economic system is the productive labour of the proletariat. The interest of employer and employed are not complementary and harmonious, but essentially antagonistic : class antagonisms are irreconcilable.* What goes on in the present industrial system is a more or less disguised warfare of rival classes, and it is a most necessary service to make this plain to the workers. Labour must realise that " there is a war on." To this end it must become " class-conscious," and to this it is being brought by the stern logic of facts and unhappy experience. It is not that Marx holds that Labour should declare or originate a class war; " the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."† The class war is already proceeding, and Labour is under a disadvantage so long as it fails to realise this essential meaning of the industrial *régime.* " They (Communists) have, theoretically, the advantage over the great mass of the proletariat of understanding the conditions and general results of the proletarian movement."‡ The proletariat is not, as is sometimes supposed, enjoined to create a class distinction ; for such exists already. " All society is more and more splitting up into two opposing camps, into two great hostile classes : the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."† " They (the Communist propositions) are but the general expression of actual

* See Lenin *The State and Revolution.* (George Allen & Unwin) pp. 9ff.

† *Communist Manifesto,* Section I. ‡ *Ib.,* Section II.

conditions of an existing class struggle, of an historical movement going on under our own eyes."* It only remains, therefore, for the proletariat to become class-conscious in order to wage this economic war both more effectively and in its own interest ; it must obtain possession and control of the instruments of economic production, for by every canon of justice the tools should belong to those who use them. "The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties—organisation of the proletariat on a class basis: overthrow of the supremacy of the bourgeois ; conquest of political power by the proletariat."* The class war will find its complete victory in the abolition of classes. "If the proletariat, forced in its struggle against the bourgeoisie to organise as a class, makes itself by a revolution the ruling class, and as the ruling class destroys by force the old conditions of production, it destroys along with these conditions of production the conditions of existence of class antagonism, classes in general, and, therewith, its own domination as a class. In the place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, an association appears in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."*

How is the change to be effected? "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can only be attained by the forcible overthrow of existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution."† It would appear, however, that Marx himself, as an

* *Communist Manifesto*, Section II. † *Ib.*, Section IV.

economist, did not look so much to a violent *coup d'état* as to a certain necessary and inevitable development of social and economic tendency. The value of realising the meaning of this process lies in the fact that the necessary trend of events may be facilitated and hastened. Things are predetermined to take this course by a kind of inner logical necessity, but the proletariat can co-operate with economic destiny and speed the march of events, if it be sufficiently enlightened. "The proletariat will use its political power to wrest *by degrees* all capital from the bourgeoisie."*

"In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things." "Finally, the Communists work everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries."† Lacking knowledge the proletariat is certain to be hoodwinked and exploited by those who are interested in prolonging the present system for their own comfort or convenience. They must refuse to go on believing or acting as if they believed that their enemies are their friends. A war of interests is in progress, sometimes under cover of friendship, and the sooner the proletariat knows it the better. "In sketching the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we have depicted the more or less concealed civil war within existing society."‡

At this point Marx's philosophy of history reveals itself.§ As a student of Hegel's philosophy he

* *Communist Manifesto*: Section II. (italics are ours).

† *Ib.*, Section IV. ‡ *Ib.*, Section I.

§ An objection to the phrase "a philosophy of history" in this connection has been raised by Benedetto Croce

believes in a dialectic process in history. Hegel's starting-point was idealist, for it was the unfolding of a spiritual principle that he saw in history. Marx is a materialist, and it is economic values that form his main concern, but he accepts Hegel's theory as to the method that reveals itself in history. These opposite principles or tendencies are to be found in history as parts of a continuous process; history, though at first sight it appears to be involved in self-contradiction, is seen on a deeper view to have its own strange but profound logic; through contradiction it moves towards a higher harmony and consistency. To use Hegelian terminology, by way of reaction thesis calls out antithesis to be united with it later in a higher synthesis. So Marx looking at history as the working out of an economic process sees private Capitalism set up as a necessary thesis only to work towards its own undoing by evoking Socialism as its antithesis. "The bourgeois system has become too narrow to contain the wealth which it creates. . . . But the bourgeoisie has not only forged the weapons

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("Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx," E.T., p. 3.) on the ground that historical materialism, so called, is not a philosophy of history but is rather a philosophising about history. We agree with this view. It would be strictly accurate to say that Marx cannot even philosophise about history without an implicit self-contradiction. If economic and material values are primary, there is no ultimate reason in history or elsewhere. No explanation therefore, as to why material beings should have reason, can be forthcoming. Marx, the materialist, in denying the primacy of spirit, which means that souls having reason, will and love are ultimate, that freedom, immortality and God are final, forfeits his right to use the faculties, which apart from this affirmation have no meaning, for the arrangement of a mere material mass.

that bring death to itself; it has also produced the men who will wield these weapons—the modern workers, the PROLETARIANS."* From this point of view it is possible for Marx to find a relative historical justification even for Capitalism; hateful and cruel though it be in its operation, it is yet a necessary stage towards something higher and better in this process of economic determinism. But though necessary as a transitory part of the process it cannot endure. The whole Capitalist *régime* is destined to crumble and fall into ruin, and its speedy downfall is prophesied. The growing misery of the proletariat, which accompanies the growing wealth and luxury of the capitalist classes, is to be seen bringing its own nemesis. In this respect Marx' philosophical doctrine was a blend of materialism and determinism.

From the foregoing summary it is easy to see that Marx was not a German for nothing. He brought to his task a mind capable of acute analysis and of wide generalisation, and the result of his labours has been acclaimed as the first formulation of a Socialism that may truly be called scientific. Since his day his doctrines have gone the round of the world. We are here not so much concerned with the details of his economic doctrine as with the larger and more philosophic presuppositions of his thought.

(*a*) With regard to the stress which he lays upon the importance of the economic aspects of our social life, it may be granted at once that it supplies a valuable corrective to the somewhat *â priori* historical and political ideas that were

* *Communist Manifesto*, Section I.

current in his day, and his economic interpretation of history has not been without great influence on subsequent thinkers. How true his contention was as to the intimate relation between economics and politics may be seen from the increasing attention demanded of Parliament by economic problems and from the growing conviction that many, if not most, political issues are governed by economic conditions. But like all protests it seems to depend for its effectiveness upon a certain initial exaggeration ; and when Marx proceeds to argue that the economic factor is not only a highly important one which has been unduly overlooked but is the only important one because it determines all else, he becomes an offender by excess of emphasis. Marx is inclined to forget that co-relation does not prove causality; that is to say, what he calls bourgeois morality may indeed reflect and be much influenced by the conventions of Capitalist society, but it is another matter to claim that current morality owes both its origin and its validity* to the contemporary organisation of society and to nothing else.

It may be true that in feudal times there is found a feudal moral code, in capitalist times a capitalist ; this amounts to no more than that much that passes for morality at any one time is mere convention ; but fundamental morality is based on universal principles. Strictly, therefore, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of class morality. To the circumstances of the time morality must be relevant, but in so far as it reflects the mental

* We do not wish to assert that Marx was himself concerned with the question of validity. To him, it would appear, morality had sanctions but not validity.

limitations of the age, it is defective. More than that, the idea of morality to which the bourgeois gives its assent is very different from that which it practises ; bourgeois morality asserts the Golden Rule, but in its dealings with negroes or Chinese or "enemies" it is often found to act upon a different principle. It is the ideal morality of the bourgeoisie with such notions as that of equality which has acted as one of the chief ferments in the proletariat. The proletarian appeal is constantly from what the bourgeois practise to what they preach. Further, this economic emphasis, if pushed to its extreme form, lands us in materialism ; for if economic values become our supreme concern, then physical needs and material goods gain the significance which they have for the materialist view of life. Thus Prof. Labriola asks, in one of his dithyrambic passages, "Had not Rousseau seen that ideas are born from needs ?"* Yes, we may answer, but which needs ? There are spiritual as well as physical needs. It is not by bread alone that man must live. In so far as he is an embodied spirit, by bread in part must man live, and with these lower needs, of which we read that Our Father is cognisant, true religion cannot be unconcerned ; but as man is also a moral personality, he has need of the bread that does not perish. A false spirituality has led to this equally false materialism : but let the materialist realise that a merely materialist view of life robs man of his dignity, action of its inspiration and history of its glory. If the materialist view were taken

* *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History.*" (Kerr & Co.), p. 76.

strictly, which rarely happens in the case of men of Marx' moral calibre, life would resolve itself into a scramble for material goods, like that of pigs for the pig-wash; for the assertion that the other pig should have an equal amount of wash is a spiritual assertion. A low view of man leads to a short and a petty view of life, but men who call upon their fellows for altruism and devotion and who are concerned about the just ordering of human affairs, as Marx manifestly was, are unconsciously and illogically acting on a higher and more spiritual view of life than they sometimes profess in their theories. From this point of view it is a serious blot upon the Communist Manifesto and a serious disloyalty to its own real meaning that almost the only explicit recognition of the moral and spiritual interests at stake is contained in the following passage: "In bourgeois society capital is independent and personal, while the living individual is dependent *and deprived of personality*."*

(*b*) With regard to Marx' doctrine of economic determinism it may be urged that in strict logic it would seem to lead to Quietism. If the process that leads to revolution is determined by an inner necessity, then a man might well infer that there is no great need to bestir himself with a view to reforming social and economic conditions; let him stand still and await the inevitable consummation. But as Calvinism led to great practical activity on the part of its devotees, whereas its logic might seem to point to the superfluity of human effort, so also by accepting Marx' doctrine men of active disposition might

* Section II. (italics ours).

be encouraged to bear themselves the more confidently in that they are ranged on the side of a destiny which cannot fail to be victorious. We might not altogether unworthily apply to many of the Socialists the words which Lord Morley uses of the Cromwellian Calvinists : " Well might it have been anticipated that fatalism as unflinching as this would have driven men headlong into ' desperation and wretchlessness of most unclean living.' Yet that was no more the actual effect of the fatalism of St. Paul, Augustine, and Calvin than it was of the fatalism of the Stoics or of Mohammed. On the contrary, Calvinism exalted its votaries to a pitch of heroic moral energy that has never been surpassed ; and men who were bound to suppose themselves moving in chains inexorably riveted, along a track ordained by a despotic and unseen Will before time began, have yet exhibited an active courage, a resolute endurance, a cheerful self-restraint, an exulting self-sacrifice, that men count among the highest glories of the human conscience."

(*c*) Another serious philosophical difficulty is raised by this notion of economic determinism, if we consider further its moral implications. A necessary process is not necessarily a good one, however sure it may be of reaching its goal, if goal it may be said to have. On the strictly materialist hypothesis this inner logical necessity of events would seem to be an impersonal or infra-personal one ; a seemingly moral and rational process is really the play of mechanical and physical forces or, as in the Marxian variant, of economic forces. The movement may be

regular, it cannot be purposive in the strict sense. Marx appears to think that the consummation towards which the economic process is moving inevitably is one devoutly to be wished. But if the next stage is merely one that is later in time and not also better in quality, there seems no serious reason for desiring it. If it is to be called better, then questions arise as to the origin and nature of the end that is pursued in the process, and it is difficult to avoid the religious and spiritual interpretation of life and of history. Once admit the idea of progress as apart from mere succession, and we have to admit teleological notions and moral purposes. This involves the idea of a goal that can have meaning and worth only for moral and rational personality. At the very least the goal must be conceived as one which is being pursued by finite personalities. And if, as seems inevitable, we follow the enquiry into the origin of these finite personalities, from the very fact that they are such, we seem to require the idea of a Supreme Personality to account for them. Put briefly and summarily, the notion of a purposive process in history leads to a spiritual view of the Universe, and that in its turn seems to demand a theistic interpretation both of man and of his world.* However distasteful certain traditional forms of religious belief may be to social revolutionaries, on the ground that they appear to be inimical to freedom and equality, they would do well to consider whether their own ideals do not involve a view of the world which

* For a fuller treatment of this proposition see further *The Open Light, An Enquiry into Faith and Reality*, N. Micklem. (The Swarthmore Press), pp. 28-32.

in the last resort is not to be described as other than religious.

(*d*) The problem presented by the class war we are postponing till we come to deal with Georges Sorel, who is its most uncompromising literary advocate. So far, then, we have briefly examined and appraised the view which we have connected with the great name of Marx, that economic, as opposed to political, status is a matter of far greater moment than is commonly recognised; but we have indicated the logical and moral difficulties that arise from an exclusive emphasis upon economics: any theory that leads to determinism and materialism defeats itself as a social gospel.

III

Joseph Dietzgen.*

It is said that Marx hailed Dietzgen at an International Congress held at the Hague in 1872 as "our philosopher," and the fact that he is so regarded by many followers of Marx is the main reason for giving some account of his writings here. Those who are responsible for the American edition of his works appear to send them forth with the oracular chant, "there is but one Karl Marx, and Dietzgen is his prophet-philosopher." Dietzgen's dates are 1828-1888. He was born near Cologne, and spent a large part of his life in small towns near the Rhine; his livelihood he

*This section (pp. 33-48) is inevitably technical and will be of little interest to those readers who are not somewhat conversant with metaphysics. By such it may profitably be omitted.

derived from a tannery and a kind of general stores. His family were tanners by tradition, and he himself would seem to have displayed considerable aptitude, though not overmuch liking, for the old established business. We hear of his making a journey to Denmark to help a brother tanner whose business was involved in some difficulty and of his receiving a Government appointment at St. Petersburg to superintend the development of the tanning industry in some part of Russia. In 1848 he read the Communist Manifesto and became a convinced Social Democrat. It was a troublesome time for propagandists, and at the age of twenty-one Dietzgen made the first of three journeys to the United States, where he ultimately settled in 1884. In spite of his intelligence and practical capacity his business in the Rhine-land had come to grief owing to the heavy drain upon his limited resources by impecunious relatives and friends, coupled with the severe competition of the larger industrial concerns that were already developing. "The comrades know that I am not an academician but a simple tanner who learnt philosophy by himself," is the interesting confession he makes in later life.* When things went fairly smoothly with him, he only gave half the day to business—the rest he devoted to philosophy. It was the problem of knowledge that fascinated him.

* That Dietzgen was no "academician" is somewhat painfully clear from his writings which are often confused and not free from those solecisms to which a beginner is prone. We think, however, that in the following pages we have fairly stated the main philosophical position which not without obscurity and occasional contradiction he worked out for himself, and largely by himself, in his intervals of leisure.

Writing to his son he says, " I have been haunted since the days of my youth by a logical problem, *viz.*, that of the ' last questions of all knowledge.' It presses on my brain like a stone. . . . For the last years I have had a hard time of it, for this problem rises with me and goes to bed with me, and the material cares do not permit me to pay much attention to it." Though a voluminous exponent of Marxian Socialism in German and American journals, Dietzgen undoubtedly regarded his philosophic writings, and more especially his *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, as his chief contribution to the revolutionary movement.

The bourgeoisie has its own philosophy made in its own image to express its prejudices and to defend its interests. The proletariat, too, must have a philosophy wherewith to confront its masters. Already it lies implicit in the revolutionary industrial programme, but it must be formulated and promulgated. It is a proletarian and democratic philosophy, but it is not a mere reflection of class prejudice like the older bourgeois philosophy ; it is scientific, comprehensive and anti-transcendental. " No system is perfect unless it has found a place for every phenomenon, has classified everything, and has made provisions for everything. Founders of religion as well as philosophers attempted to make such systems, but none stood the test. The stream of time has brought and is still bringing to light new phenomena, new experiences, new things for which no provision was made. They don't fit into the prevailing system, and therefore a new one was necessary, until social democracy was wise enough to construct a system of thought sufficiently

comprehensive for all present and future phenomena."* "We do not know everything, but we know the general form of all science and use it as a touchstone to find out all the tricks played against the people by the henchmen of our rulers. In natural science the inductive method is well known, but that there is in it a systematic philosophy which is destined to put an end to all religious, philosophical and political humbug, this is a social-democratic novelty and acquisition. Our opponents, the rulers and the rich, the progressives, liberals and freemasons are also advocates of induction—but only in so far as it suits their purpose. They divide everything: the people into masters and servants; life into an earthly and heavenly one; the person into body and soul; and science into induction and deduction."† "It may sound strange that that knowledge is due to our party standpoint, considering that a scientific result is a human affair. Yet, our assertion is easily comprehensible, for social democracy does not represent a party, but humanity. The party of the disinherited is the party of the disinterested, is the party of impartial truth. We social democrats have the easiest access to philosophy, for our mind is not dimmed by narrow selfishness."‡ In spite of a certain diffidence which is claimed for him there may be

* *Philosophical Essays.* (Kerr). pp. 145f.

† *Ib.*, pp. 146, 147. So stout a champion of the inductive method as Dietzgen claims to be can hardly object to this proceeding, for it is merely a statement of one of the facts regarding the capitalistic system of industry. Marx showed that it is of the very essence of the present economic *régime* to divide men up in this way.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 143.

detected, as our quotations show, a confident claim to finality in the view which he presents. His predecessors playing the *rôle* of intellectual pioneers strayed hither and thither into obscurity and confusion before reaching their goal, either because they had not seen or, as in the case of Kant, because they had not followed the sure path of science. From Greek times men had speculated on the great problems of human life, and their painful struggles had helped their successors to learn even from their failures. Not to any of them but to Dietzgen was it given to see clearly what is the positive outcome of philosophy. "It is of little consequence, how and by whose help I have arrived at the positive outcome of philosophy as here rendered. Whether it is the actual outcome or not can be judged only by the expert, and every opinion is necessarily very subjective. Under the circumstances I, as author, claim that my opinion is worth as much as any other, and the reader may therefore accept my assurance."*

The long sought secret he now makes plain to those who share his social aspirations. "As to the further value of that which I offer, it is a peculiarity of the subject under discussion that every reader carries it and its experiences within himself and may, without consulting any other author, at once draw his own conclusions about my views, provided he has acquired the necessary training in thought."†

For the sake of clearness it will be best at this

* *The Positive Outcome of Philosophy.* (Kerr). p. 382.

† *Ib.*

point to summarise, as far as we are able, the main heads of his doctrine, which we will explain later, showing its relation to social revolution.

(*a*) The methods to be followed in philosophy are those of scientific induction and dialectic.

(*b*) What these methods yield is a philosophy which may be described either as cosmic or materialistic Monism.

(*c*) The relativity of opposites.

(*a*) Dietzgen holds that the problem of philosophy is primarily a problem of method. "It is not the particular task of philosophy to furnish a true picture of the world, but rather to investigate the method by which the human mind arrives at its world pictures. That is its work, and it is the object of this book to sketch its outline."*

We may observe that the stress upon the importance of method in philosophy dates from the rise of the critical philosophy with Kant, who showed that the problem of knowledge is logically prior to the problem of reality. His desire was to find for metaphysics a way that should lead to such sure knowledge as had been attained by mathematics. It is in the realm of mathematics more than any other that we seem to attain to results which are demonstrable and universally certain. Here the mind reaches conclusions which seem necessary; they are not relative and contingent but true for all minds. We start with certain principles and postulates of a self-evidencing character; from these by a process of deduction we reach a knowledge that is sure and unassailable.

* *The Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, p. 413.

Kant shows by analysis that this is due to the fact that the mind is not at the mercy of any contingent element, for it operates by means of universal norms or principles which are inherent in its own nature. If this were not so, what passes for knowledge would be a mere private opinion. But can this method which has been so successful in mathematics be applied to the realm of metaphysics? Here a contingent element enters with the sense-data: how are we to correct the vagaries of individual perception? For the same thing appears differently to the same individual when viewed from different angles, and it may appear differently again to every individual. How, in that case, are the differences to be reconciled? How in spite of this do we attain to our common knowledge? This can only be due to the operation of universal factors; what sense-experience yields us is particulars; by an inherent necessity of nature the mind itself imposes universals.

Dietzgen asserts that all the mind can do is to classify phenomena; its data must be derived from perception, that is, must come to it from the outside world. But it does not come already classified; classification and comparison is an activity of the mind; the process involves the use of standards. Therefore Dietzgen does not in reality grapple seriously with the problem of knowledge. But his interest in ruling out the *à priori* factors of the mind is not far to seek: his concern in this is a desire to be rid of such transcendental notions as God, Freedom and Immortality; to these he contemptuously refers as "non-existent," as they do not consist of empirical

matter."* It is by such notions, he imagines, that the bourgeoisie, like a witch-doctor, keeps in subjection the proletariat through fear and superstition. It is for this reason that he regards Kant as the typical philosopher of the bourgeoisie. Transcendental notions lead to that dualism upon which modern society is founded.

We have seen that Social Democrats make great play with the word " scientific," in contrast with the abstract and deductive systems of Socialism presented by the Utopians. Marxian Socialism is " scientific " ; it professes to be based upon an observation of society as it is and of its inherent tendencies. The success of modern science is due to its use of the inductive methods based upon the observation of phenomena. Instead of imposing arbitrary and preconceived notions upon the data of experience we begin by carefully observing them, and only then can we proceed to classification. We have here two points with one of which we have dealt already, namely that our classifications are imposed by the mind ; the other is that the success of physical science depends in part upon the fact that it rests upon mathematics. Here we see that deduction enters. Only by a combination of the inductive and deductive methods is science, in so far as it depends upon mathematics, made possible. But, owing to his prejudice against the transcendental, Dietzgen rules out the deductive method entirely. He sees nothing in science but a result of pure

* " A Comtist . . who tells us that ' the family,' or that ' humanity,' is a reality, but who vehemently attacks the doctrine that ' the soul ' is anything but an abstraction, should look well to the security of the branch on which he is sitting." Caird's *Hegel*, Ed. I., p. 192.

induction. "The inductive method draws its mental conclusion from concrete facts. Scientific socialism considers our views dependent upon our material need, and our political standpoint dependent upon the economic position of the class we belong to. Moreover, this conception corresponds with the aspirations of the masses whose needs are in the first place material, while the ruling class must necessarily base itself on the deductive principle, on the pre-conceived unscientific notion that the spiritual salvation and the mental training of the masses are to precede the solution of the social question."* "The whole metaphysics, which Kant sums up as the question after God, free-will and immortality, finds its final solution in our system, through our knowledge that understanding and reason is an absolutely inductive faculty. That is, our comprehension of the world is perfect when we arrange and divide the empirical things according to their general qualities in species, classes, conceptions, etc. This is quite a truism which would hardly be worth discussing but for the superstitious and ideologues who are never tired of jabbering about deduction. They assert that our intellect possesses still a second method in ascertaining the truth, though simple, palpable truth is inductive. . . . They believe, so to speak, in an inner light which revealed to them the mysteries of mathematics, ethics, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, freedom of will and other transcendental moonshine."† If the inductive be the only method Dietzgen is logical in the following conclusion: "Idolatry, Religion and Philosophy

* *Philosophical Essays*, p. 89. † *Ib.*, p. 142.

have been evolved from one another in the course of time ; and now, in the time of Social democracy, we have arrived at the point when Philosophy, the 'last Mohican' of the metaphysical tribe, must be transformed into rational Physics."* But, do as he will, Dietzgen cannot rid himself completely of the transcendental, as witness the following words : "Only the Universe, but not any single thing, is absolute, imperishable, and impregnable."† Obviously two of these are inferences which can never be made good from a mere observation of finite particulars. Why does he object to eternal life as transcendental and superstitious, when in his own Universe there is an imperishable ? And if he may pass from a Universe of relative parts to a Universe which itself is absolute, why is it unpardonable for the religious mind to reach God in the same way ?

For purposes of criticism we may take (*b*) and (*c*) together.

Both these principles of Monism and the relativity of opposites Dietzgen has derived from Hegel, his own special modification being the substitution of Matter for Hegel's Spirit. Dietzgen's interest in putting forward a monistic view of the world is revealed in the following passage : "In dissolving the dualism of mind and matter, the theory of the scientific method of thinking destroys the last pillar which supports a society divided into rulers and ruled, into oppressors and oppressed."‡

Let us now see how he states his own view :

* *Philosophical Essays*, p. 211.
† *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, p. 429.
‡ *Philosophical Essays*, p. 132.

" The conscious and unconscious, the plants and animals, the good and bad, all diversity, all antagonisms of the world must be considered as diverse forms of one and the same being. . . . ."† We are not disposed to deny an element of truth in this, for the Universe may be regarded as a totality, and it is the aim of philosophy to explain the many in terms of the one ; but this does not involve us in denying that such a totality may consist of different orders of being. Dietzgen regards his view as peculiarly democratic : " Our conception of matter and force is, so to speak, democratic. One is of the same value as the other ; everything individual is but the property, appendix, predicate or attribute of the entire Nature as a whole."† To reduce all differences to a common level in the interests of democratic theory does not seem to suggest any great loyalty to a scientific and inductive method. Moreover, what is it but to land ourselves in the night in which, as Hegel says, " all cows are black " ?

It might appear that the difference between Hegel, who says that everything is a manifestation of Spirit, and Dietzgen, who says that everything is a manifestation of Matter, is greater than in fact is the case ; for Dietzgen's definition of Matter is all-comprehensive: " Socialist materialism understands by matter not only the ponderable and tangible, but the whole real existence. Everything that is contained in the Universe—and in it is contained everything, the All and the Universe being but two names for one thing—everything this Socialist materialism embraces in one conception, one name, one category, whether

* *Philosophical Essays*, p. 121. † *Ib.*, p. 301.

that category be called the actuality, reality, Nature or matter."* Who would not be a materialist on these terms, if by matter we may mean anything we like? It looks as if Dietzgen had confused materialism and naturalism, for he says: "The materialist theory of knowledge amounts, then, to this statement, that the human organ of cognition radiates no 'metaphysical' light, but is a piece of Nature which pictures other pieces of Nature."† "In the eyes of this latter kind of materialism the mind is a collective name for the mental phenomena, as matter is a collective name for the material phenomena, and the two together figure under the idea and name of the phenomena of Nature."‡

If in the last resort the Universe is to be reduced to a single principle, it follows that all the differences and diversities that appear in experience can only be limited and relative; as Dietzgen puts it: "In this sense we may say matter and mind, like all opposites, are logically but not really in opposition to each other, since all opposites are such only in way of comparison."§ "The relation between subject and object, spirit and Nature, thought and existence, which has puzzled so many people, becomes clear when we gain the understanding that the opposition is but a relative one, that these opposites differ only in degrees. It is the democratic equality of all things in Nature, of the body and the soul, which cannot enter the heads of the 'philosophers.'"‖ This, however, is a principle which requires to be very carefully handled; it is

* *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 300f. † *Ib.*, p. 309.
‡ *Ib.*, pp. 311f. § *Ib.*, p. 133. ‖ *Ib.*, p. 206.

dangerous at this point to be too democratic, for if all differences are to be reduced to a common level, then truth and error will be "hail fellow, well met." As a matter of fact, Dietzgen confuses actuality and truth. "We must never lose sight of the fact that there is only a moderate distinction of degree between purely imaginary things and so-called real things."* The inference would seem to be, that as both imaginary and real things may be said to exist, they are therefore both equally true. "Even error and lies are not opposed to truth in that exaggerated sense in which the old style logic represents them. . . . Truth is the absolute universal sum of all existing things, of all phenomena of the past, present, and future. Truth is the real Universe from which errors and lies are not excluded. In so far as stray thoughts, giants and brownies, lies and errors are really existing, though only in the imagination of men, to that extent they are true. . . . All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are not so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the other to eternal damnation. Let us remain human."† If we may borrow Nietzsche's words, this is not only human but all too human. It seems a big price to pay for the redemption of democracy. It may further be pointed out that the principle of the relativity of opposites would tend to minimise the harshness of the opposition which Dietzgen and others set up between bourgeois and proletarian interests, and so to lessen the passion which incites to social revolution; nor would it serve

* *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, p. 367.

† *Ib.*, p. 392.

his purpose to maintain that whereas the distinctions which figure in bourgeois thought and philosophy are unimportant, on the ground that they are artificial and unreal (for a democratic philosopher cannot admit such distinctions), the social and economic distinction of classes is more fundamental; for in that case he would be met by the logic of his cosmic Monism. Already on his principles there is a deep-seated and fundamental unity running through the whole structure of things.

In conclusion two fundamental moral issues must be raised, one regarding the empirical treatment of morality, the other the nature of personality. First then, as to the place of the ideal in morality: if, as Dietzgen holds, we are completely at the mercy of the actual, how comes it that we criticise the actual in the light of an ideal? On his principles we are merely able to compare the achieved moral results of past social experience. How in this case can we work towards such an ideal as the Socialist hopes to see realised by the social revolution, and how can we hold that it will be better before it actually arrives? In the moral realm the mind of man is able to anticipate and "to move in worlds unrealised." As this undoubtedly is the case, it is not for Dietzgen on his principles to deny its truth. To give his contention any show of truth, we must include under the data of experience the heart's desires and aspirations. Second, Dietzgen supplies us with no doctrine of personality which is adequate to rouse enthusiasm for social reconstruction. It often happens no doubt that men speak of the soul in such a way as to

suggest a ghostly abstraction. The cure for this is not to deny the existence of the soul, but to centre our thought on the idea of concrete personality. This, as recent philosophy is increasingly showing, is the key to the Universe. Dietzgen deals with personality as if it were a mere part of Nature, while his whole cosmos is really of a sub-personal order. If we are to speak of personality as a merely derivative and insignificant part of Nature, then there is to be found no sufficient fulcrum for the enormous effort required to effect a transformation of the world.

We have dealt with Dietzgen's doctrines at length because they represent the form in which Hegelianism and Materialism are presented to the proletariat rather than because of their intrinsic philosophical importance as stated by him. In view of the criticisms offered above, Labour should ask itself whether its quarrel with idealism and religion is a just and necessary one.

Before leaving Dietzgen it may be well to point a moral for the Christian reader. It would seem that Dietzgen's practical interest in dethroning the idea of God arises from the fact that this idea has been so presented as to make it appear to be a part of the stock-in-trade of the bourgeoisie. In an old catechism, now, we believe, no longer used, the question is asked, " What are laws for ? " The answer required is, " Laws are to preserve the rich in the possession of their riches and to restrain the vices of the poor." God is the patron of the bourgeoisie and of the *status quo ;* wealth and poverty and the social distinctions that spring from them are ordained by His will ; He rewards His pet children with wealth, privilege

and monopoly ; He is a respecter of persons in the bad sense rather than a lover of personalities. The remedy for this false doctrine is not atheism, but a true presentation of the Christian doctrine of God as Father whose chief concern it is to bring the whole race, rather than a mere section of it, into the blessedness of his family.

Chapter II

THE WAY OF THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES

II—The Class War

I

By an interesting coincidence our three revolutionaries all come from bourgeois circles. Marx' father was a government official; he himself was trained at the University and only narrowly escaped becoming a professor. Dietzgen belonged to the *petite bourgeoisie*. In earlier life Sorel was a prosperous engineer; he developed his syndicalist sympathies when he had already attained to comfortable circumstances.

"I am not a professor or a populariser or an aspiring party-leader; I am a self-taught man," says Sorel, in words that remind us of Dietzgen. The author of *Réflexions sur la Violence* is significant for our purpose as a clear and uncompromising exponent of Marxianism as expressed through the Syndicalist movement. For him Syndicalism, as opposed to the older Trade Unionism, is the appropriate instrument for the realisation of Marx' ideal. Trade Unionism and Reformist Socialism tend to be pacific and compromising, whereas Syndicalism is militant and revolutionary.

All Socialists look forward to a change of control in the economic sphere. Instead of the present system of control by private owners in the interests, primarily, of those who derive rent, interest and profits from the proceeds of industry, there must be set up a Socialist Commonwealth. According to the Syndicalist version of this programme the several industries are to be controlled and administered by the producers themselves: the workers in each industry must manage to obtain control of the instruments by which, thanks to their toil, wealth is created, and the present system of domination and exploitation must be replaced by a system having public service as its conscious function and co-operation as its main motive.

But how is this change to be effected? Can we look to peaceful evolution through gradual reform? Can we hope that the present holders of property and privilege will consent to a policy by which they are to be dispossessed of that which they value so highly? Is Parliament a fitting instrument to bring about so great a change as is demanded by Social Democrats? "Not peace, but a sword," is the answer of the revolutionaries of Sorel's school. The holders of privilege will cling to their advantages, entrenched behind their Parliament. Parliament loves concordats; only illusory makeshifts and palliatives may be expected from an institution which is nothing better than an instrument of the bourgeoisie to fight against change to the last. When resistance is shown to be futile, the aim of Parliament is always to make concessions as small and as little inconvenient to the possessing-

classes as may be. With its spurious show of democracy it blurs the great class-distinctions by appealing to common interests and a common citizenship. The proletariat must sharpen these distinctions with a view to the class-war, which, as Marx has already reminded us, is already proceeding. It must be accentuated; an end must be made of the pretence that the rival interests of classes can be composed by amicable agreement on the present economic basis.

Sorel definitely constitutes himself the apologist of class-war by violence and does not scruple to use the word in the title of his famous book, *Reflections on Violence*, which reached its third edition in France in 1912.* He has no patience with Parliamentary Socialists like Jaurès; against such his philippics are almost fiercer than those directed against the capitalists. To take part in Parliamentary action is to resort to a futile strategy; it obscures the real issue and contributes to the defeat of those Socialists who resort to it. "Thus there would be two reformist policies: the one patronised by the *Musée social*, . . . and Jaurès, which operates by solemn appeals to eternal justice, by maxims and by half-lies."† "The only difference which would exist between this sham Socialism [State Socialism] and Capitalism would consist in the use of more ingenious methods to secure discipline in the work-shop."‡ Parliamentary Socialists practically say that for them the main interests in life are those which

* Our references throughout are to the French edition of 1912. The work has been translated into English under the title of *"Reflections on Violence"* (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.).

† *Réflexions sur la Violence*, p. 64. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 367.

they have in common with all their fellow-members in the State, and that civil strife in its extremer forms must be avoided at all costs. Hence they aim at a peaceful victory in the political arena with speeches and votes as their weapons. On this ground and with these weapons the odds, Sorel would remind them, are all in favour of their opponents. "This experience of Parliamentarism is worth studying; trade unions, for their part also, should suspect the great solemn assemblies in which it is so easy for the government to prevent the carrying through of every strong proposal (*toute résolution virile*); war cannot be waged under the guidance of talking assemblies."*

The revolutionaries contend, on their side, that the main interests are those concerning which bourgeois and proletarian are fundamentally divided, and that redress can only be found through "direct action" of a most drastic kind in the economic arena. This direct action will involve violence owing to the temper of the possessing-classes. Taken alone this supplies a sufficient justification. When the co-operative commonwealth is set up we may look for peace and contentment, but in the meantime the Parliamentary Socialists are deluding themselves and others by making common cause with those whose interest it is to secure peace otherwise than as the fruit of righteousness.

William Morris thought that the transition would be effected by bloodshed such as is pictured in his *News from Nowhere*. Sorel will not commit himself to this view. "The passage from Capitalism to Socialism (is to be conceived) as a

* *Ib.*, p. 428.

catastrophe whose course evades description."* He is fully prepared, however, to justify what he calls violence as the means by which the Revolution is to be achieved. Violence he does not embrace as a counsel of despair but as a positive principle which has creative virtue in itself. The current morality on which the critics of violence base their censures is merely a set of conventions created by the bourgeoisie to defend their own interests; peace, therefore, is extolled by them, and moderation inculcated by all means that are available for the formation of public opinion. "We are thus led to consider arbitration in an entirely new light, and to understand it in a truly scientific manner, for, instead of allowing ourselves to be duped by abstractions, we explain it by means of the dominant ideas of the bourgeois society which has invented it and wishes to impose it upon the workers."† "The men who have received a primary education have, on the whole, the book-superstition, and they readily attribute genius to those people who largely occupy the attention of the world of letters; they imagine that they should have an enormous amount to learn from authors whose name is frequently quoted with praise in the papers; they hear with unusual respect the comments which literary prize-winners bring them. To fight these prejudices is not an easy thing; but it is to do a very useful work; we regard this work as being of

* *Réflexions sur la Violence*, p. 217. A fanciful prediction of the transition from Capitalism to Syndicalism is to be found in *Syndicalism and the Co-operative Commonwealth*," by Patand and Pouget. (E.T. New International Publishing Co.)

† *Ib.*, p. 309.

first-class importance (*tout à fait capitale*). . . . "*

The reigning morality, expressed in codes, conventions, standards and similar institutions, is a bourgeois creation, and its real function is to buttress the existing *régime*; it has no other sanction than the convenience of its advocates. "Great difficulty is experienced in understanding proletarian violence when one tries to reason by means of the ideas which bourgeois philosophy has spread abroad in the world; according to this philosophy, violence would be a relic of barbarism. . . ."† "Popular education, for example, appears to be entirely conducted in a bourgeois spirit; the whole historic effort of Capitalism has been to bring the masses to a willingness to be governed by the conditions of the capitalist economy, in such a way that society should become an organism; the whole revolutionary effort tends to create *free men;* but the democratic rulers take it as their mission to realise the *moral unity* of France. This moral unity is the automatic discipline of the producers who would be happy to work for the glory of their intellectual leaders."‡ "The codes take so many precautions against violence, and education is directed to lessening our tendencies to violence to such a degree that we are instinctively led to think that every act of violence is a manifestation of a throw-back in the direction of barbarism. If industrial societies have so often been contrasted with military societies, it is because peace has been regarded as the first among blessings and the essential condition of a material progress."§

* *Réflexions sur la Violence*, p. 52.
† *Ib.*, p. 99.
‡ *Ib.*, pp. 267f.
§ *Ib.*, p. 269.

Bourgeois morality rests upon no transcendental basis and therefore has no finality; it is for the proletariat then to work out a morality and a civilisation of producers which shall express and intensify the difference between them and the bourgeoisie. "The ethic of the proletariat springs from its revolutionary aspirations; it is these which give it the greater part of its power and elevation."* "It is extremely important to observe the analogies which exist between the revolutionary state of mind and that which corresponds to the morality of producers."† "The men who take a real share in the existing Labour Movement give an example of what has always been regarded as the highest virtues; they cannot, in fact, reap any of those things which the bourgeois world regards as specially desirable."‡ "The free producer in a highly progressive workshop . . . finds all the models that are presented to him to be mediocre, and wishes to pass beyond all that has been achieved before his time."§ "Morality is by no means destined to perish because its motives will be changed; it is by no means condemned to become a simple collection of precepts, if it can ally itself again with an enthusiasm capable of overcoming all the obstacles presented by routine, prejudices and the concern for immediate enjoyments. But it is certain that this sovereign power is not to be found by following the ways which contemporary philosophers, experts in social science and the inventors of *profound reforms*, would have us go."‖ To create the new and the higher morality is a main function

* *Réflexions sur la Violence*, p. 322. † *Ib.*, p. 50 note.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 351. § *Ib.*, p. 377. ‖ *Ib.*, pp. 387f.

of the general strike. " We have tried to show that a new culture could emerge from the struggle conducted by the revolutionary syndicates [*i.e.*, Labour groups] against the master-group (*patronat*) and against the State."* " There is but one force which is able to-day to produce this enthusiasm without the assistance of which no morality whatever is possible ; this is the force which results from the propaganda in favour of the general strike."†

Let the workers then spurn the compromises proposed by the capitalists when they are in the mood to relent and to lessen the severity of their domination and exploitation ; the Greeks are most to be feared when they are most lavish with their gifts, for their gifts are always bribes. " The same thing must not happen to the proletariat as happened to the Germans who conquered the Roman Empire ; they were ashamed of their barbarism, and set themselves to school to the teachers of rhetoric during the Latin decadence ; they had no reason to plume themselves on their willingness to be civilised ! "‡

It is better, in Sorel's view, for the furtherance of the Social Revolution that the master-class should pursue their proper task with the fierce concentration of the old captains of industry, now unhappily a vanishing type. " The race of daring chiefs who gave greatness to modern industry is disappearing to make room for an ultra-policed aristocracy which asks that it may live in peace."§ It is the disguise of benevolence that makes the employer-class most dangerous ; their true genius

* *Réflexions sur la Violence*, pp. 51f. † *Ib.*, p. 388.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 53. § *Ib.*, p. 109.

is expressed in ruthless efficiency. The present system is fundamentally unjust, but it is as well that it should be efficient while it lasts. Nothing is gained by the degeneracy of either of the parties. " Experience had not been slow in showing . . . that by entering into bourgeois institutions the revolutionaries became transformed through catching the spirit of these institutions ; all the deputies say that nothing resembles a representative of the bourgeoisie so much as a representative of the proletariat."* The cure for all this is to be found in proletarian violence. The distaste for violence is a mere squeamishness, a sort of social table-manners invented by the bourgeoisie ; it is not the mark of a healthy and vigorous community ; rather it is a sophistication that accompanies decadence. It is only when vigorous movements lose their initial virility and enthusiasm that they resort to what Lenin calls " this purely middle-class and philistine theory of conciliation."† Let both parties look to their weapons. The bourgeois weapon is force of the Parliamentary sort. The proletariat must forge one that is mightier, namely violence. " The study of the political strike leads us to a better understanding of a distinction which should always be present to the mind when it reflects upon contemporary social questions. Sometimes the terms *force* and *violence* are used in speaking of acts of authority, sometimes in speaking of acts of revolt. It is clear that the two cases give rise to very different consequences. I am of opinion that it would be a great advantage to adopt a

* *Réflexions sur la Violence*, p. 55.

† *The State and Revolution*, (Allen & Unwin). p. 12.

terminology which would not allow room for any ambiguity and that the term *violence* ought to be reserved for the second meaning; we should therefore say that force has for its object the imposition of the organisation of a certain social order in which a minority governs, whereas violence tends to the destruction of this order. The bourgeoisie has used force from the beginning of modern time, whereas the proletariat is now reacting against it and against the State by violence."*

If the proletariat resorts to such violence, by which Sorel seems to mean the adoption of an implacable and defiant attitude, the bourgeoisie will be compelled to recover their decaying class-consciousness. Classes will once again be clearly defined and resolutely opposed, and the class war will be waged under conditions favourable both to its continuance and to its ultimate success. "It is at this point that the *rôle* of violence appears as singularly great in history; for it can operate, in an indirect way, upon the bourgeois, so as to bring them back to the sentiment of their class."† The following advantages will accrue

(*a*) Morale will be restored to capitalist and proletarian, and decadence will be arrested.

(*b*) The essentially antagonistic structure of the capitalist *régime* will be made intolerably clear to the proletariat, who will thus learn to resist their exploitation by their present masters.

(*c*) A class-conscious bourgeoisie will once again become industrially efficient; the result

* Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 256f. † *Ib.*, p. 117.

will be the creation of a richer inheritance for the disinherited when the time comes to enter into possession of it. Such an inheritance will also be easier to maintain. If we may judge from the experience of the Christian conquest of the Empire and from that of the barbarian conquest, revolutions brought about during a period of economic decadence cannot succeed.*

Is it remarkable then that Sorel becomes lyrical in his praise of violence? "Proletarian violence, exercised as a pure and simple manifestation of the sentiment of the class struggle, appears thus as a very beautiful and a very heroic thing; it is at the service of the primordial interests of civilisation; it is not, perhaps, the most appropriate method of obtaining immediate material advantages, but it can save the world from barbarism. . . . Let us salute the revolutionaries as the Greeks saluted the Spartan heroes who defended Thermopylæ and helped to maintain the light in the ancient world."†

II

At the heart of Sorel's doctrine is the General Strike. In this, he contends, we advance beyond the mere bandying of words. "Many anarchists have ended up by growing tired of reading for ever the same high-sounding curses directed against the capitalist *régime*, and they have set themselves to seek a way which should lead them to acts of a truly revolutionary character; they entered into the 'Syndicates' which, thanks to

* Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 126 to 129. † *Ib.*, pp. 130f.

violent strikes, turned this social war of which they had so often heard men talk into a reality."* The strike is the economic analogue of war. Small strikes are chiefly valuable because they are a kind of preliminary training to ensure adequate morale for the great strike which is to come in due time ; they serve to keep the general strike as an ideal before the minds of the proletariat. " Where every strike creates the perspective of a complete catastrophe (*catastrophe totale*)."† An effete, sentimental society " brutalised by humanitarianism " can be re-invigorated by the violence of the general strike. Sorel indulges in a great flow of warlike metaphor, but it is not always easy to tell how far he intends it to be more than metaphor ; in much of his writing rhapsody is apt to take the place of definition. This, however, he would defend on principle ; for he holds that we do well to turn away from the intellectualist philosophy of the bourgeoisie with its clear-cut definitions to the warmer and more impulsive philosophy of Bergson with its intuitive perception and its *élan vital* ; mysticism is preferable to rationalism. " I wished to remove all control on the part of the intellectualist philosophy, which appears to me to be a great embarrassment to the historian who follows it."‡ He describes himself as " making use of the light which we owe to the Bergsonian philosophy."§ For practical purposes revolutionaries have no need of carefully elaborated theories and disquisitions. " One can talk indefinitely of revolts without ever

* Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 55f.

† *Ib.*, p. 193.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 35.

§ *Ib.*, p. 40.

provoking a revolutionary movement so long as there are no myths accepted by the masses."*

In the past Socialists have dealt largely in Utopias, in carefully worked-out anticipations and descriptions of the future society. "A Utopia is, on the contrary, the product of an intellectual labour; it is the work of theorists who, having observed and discussed facts, try to set up a model with which existing societies may be compared with a view to estimating the good and the evil which they contain."† What we really need, says Sorel, is a myth. The early Christians, he holds, had such a myth in the powerful, though illusory, notion of a Second Coming; and there have been others in the course of history. A myth is a rallying cry that has power to evoke mystical fervour in the rank and file. "But there have always existed, side by side with Utopias, myths that were capable of sweeping the workers off into revolt."‡ The general strike is the myth "in which Socialism is contained in its entirety, that is to say, a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments that correspond to the various manifestations of the war waged by Socialism against modern society. Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the most noble, the most profound, and the most stirring sentiments that it possesses; the general strike groups them in a picturesque whole and, by bringing them together, gives to each of them its maximum intensity; appealing to very vivid memories of particular conflicts, it colours with an intense life all the details of the composite whole presented to consciousness. We thus

* Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 45. † *Ib.*, p. 46. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 50.

obtain that intuition of Socialism which language could not give with perfect clearness—and we obtain it in a whole that is perceived instantaneously."*

Better than the intellectualist philosophy which is so often a merely doctrinaire and inactive trafficking in theory is the philosophy of action expounded by Ed. le Roy and other like-minded French philosophers. Sorel expresses contempt for the Intellectuals " who are, strictly speaking, people whose profession it is to exploit thought."† " The intellectualist philosophy is of a truth radically incompetent to explain the great historical movements."‡ " Likewise the objections which the philosopher urges against revolutionary myths can only make an impression upon those men who are happy to find an excuse for abandoning ' every active *rôle* ' and for being revolutionaries merely in words."§

Sorel holds that a detailed anticipation of future history such as doctrinaire intellectualists desire is not given to the human mind. " The problem which we shall now try to solve is the most difficult of all those with which the Socialist writer can grapple ; we are about to ask how it is possible to conceive the passing of the men of to-day into the condition of free producers working in a factory (*atelier*) that has been rid of masters. The question needs to be strictly limited ; we do not relate it to the world that has become Socialist but merely to our time and to the preparation of the passage from one world to another ; if

* Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 182.

† *Ib.*, p. 51.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 38.

§ *Ib.*, pp. 38f.

we did not make this limitation, we should lapse into a Utopia."*

Only through the myth of the general strike can that fine abandon be secured which comes with the pursuit of the sublime. The bourgeois utilitarianism which pursues an immediate personal advantage leads to the calculating temper of expediency and opportunism which is a blight upon current morality. The world must be spiritually renewed, and glory must be restored to human action by the new morality which has the sublime for its goal. Only far-reaching revolution as opposed to a mean-spirited bargaining for an immediate rise in wages can give us what we so badly need. " You know, as well as I do, that the better element in the modern mind is the torment of the infinite."† " When we examine the effects of violence, it is not the immediate results that it can produce that we are to take as our starting point, but its remote consequences. We must not ask whether it can secure more or less in the way of direct advantages for the actual workers than a skilful diplomacy, but ask rather what will be the result of introducing violence into the relations of the proletariat with society."‡ " In those working-class circles which are as *reasonable* as the professionals of sociology can wish, when the conflicts reduce themselves to contests regarding material interests, there cannot be anything more sublime at stake than when agricultural associations discuss the price of guano with manure merchants. It has never been considered that discussions bearing upon prices are of a nature to exercise a moralising influence

* Cf. *op cit.*, pp. 367f. † *Ib.*, p. 39. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 65.

upon men."* "In the countries where the notion of the general strike exists the blows exchanged during strikes by workers and representatives of the bourgeoisie have an entirely different scope; their consequences are remote, and they are capable of engendering the sublime."† "This effort towards the best which manifests itself in spite of the absence of all personal, immediate and proportionate recompence, constitutes the *secret virtue* which ensures continual progress in the world."‡ The emphasis laid by Sorel upon what he calls myth is of no little importance for the psychology of propaganda, and his insistence upon the pursuit of a remote and sublime end makes for a heroic and unselfish ethic of which it may be said that it is "not far from the kingdom."

In spite of the military associations of the language which Sorel employs, he is careful to point out that he is no lover of the excessive cruelties inflicted on individuals during the course of political revolutions. But it is not right, he protests, to argue from the actual behaviour of politicians in the past to the probable behaviour of industrial revolutionaries in the future. "We have the right to conclude that the syndicalist violence exercised during the course of strikes by proletarians who desire the overthrow of the State is not to be confused with these acts of savagery which the superstition of the State suggested to the revolutionaries of '93, when they had power in their hands and were in a position to exercise oppression upon the conquered. They followed the principles which they had

* Cf. *op cit.*, p. 324. † *Ib.*, p. 326. ‡ *Ib.*, pp. 384f.

received from the Church and the monarchy."* Realising that his task is to bring down a whole system, the industrial revolutionary will be the less tempted to look for individual scape-goats. Failures and disappointments will not be charged to the wickedness of individuals, but rather to the strength of the system under which we all live. This is one of the advantages of that wise pessimism which results from an understanding of economic determinism. "The pessimist regards social conditions as forming a system bound together by an iron law (*loi d'airain*), whose necessity, being all of a piece, has to be borne as such. It (the system) can only disappear through a catastrophe that shall bring it down as a complete whole. It would therefore be absurd, after admitting this theory, to make certain impious men bear the responsibility for the evils from which society suffers; the pessimist knows nothing of the sanguinary fits (*folies*) of the optimist who is enraged by the unforeseen resistance which his projects encounter; he does not dream of creating the happiness of future generations by slaughtering the egoists of to-day (*égoïstes actuels*)."† But in the last resort it is a hope—not a guarantee—that Sorel has to offer us. "We have the right to hope that a Socialist revolution pursued by pure Syndicalists will not be defiled by the abominations which defiled the bourgeois revolutions."‡

* Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 165f. † *Ib.*, p. 18.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 166.

III

What are we to say to the positions maintained by Sorel ?

1. Heed should be given to his contention that our social morality is conventional. To a larger extent than is commonly suspected it is a parasite of the dominant social tradition, aiming largely at the preservation of class interests—those of the bourgeoisie. That the present system of law is largely concerned with the defence and maintenance of private property and of all the other class privileges that rest upon it, is not difficult to see unless we be colour-blind. It is for Christians and the possessing classes to ask themselves whether their social and intellectual outlook is not derived from their social milieu rather than from the faith which they profess. When economic interests and religious principles clash, is the Christian capitalist more likely to maintain solidarity with his social class, his fellow-capitalists, than to make common cause with those Christians who are seeking relief from the hardships of the existing economic system ? Unless Christianity in the future exercises a profounder influence upon those who profess it, the suspicion cannot but be deepened either that wealthy Christians are hypocrites or that Christianity itself is a negligible factor in human affairs.

2. The possessing classes must realise that the resort to violence in some of its forms is advocated because the desired degree of social change is not regarded as likely to be secured without

stern resistance from the privileged classes. This it is that is considered to justify such a measure as the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is true that Sorel regards violence as being necessarily involved in the nature of the system itself, and that, from this point of view, a kindlier attitude on the part of the bourgeoisie is not to be desired ; but for the moment we are thinking rather of the way in which matters present themselves to those who feel driven to take extreme measures owing to the obstinacy of the possessing classes. Despair of the methods of reform seizes upon many owing to the slowness and smallness of the measures of redress that have to be wrung from an obstinate bourgeoisie.

Three things seem to be required of capitalist Christians: (*a*) Is it not for them, on the principle of *noblesse oblige*, to put themselves, in so far as they may, in the position of those who feel such resentment at what to them is the tyranny of the present *régime* ? The converse of this holds true for the proletariat as its power grows. (*b*) They should recognise that on their principles as Christians there should be no passionate clinging to material goods when the welfare of human personality is at stake. (*c*) There should be a further recognition that the personality of others matters at least as much as our own. Self-interest does not necessarily come before the interests of others in a true Christian !

Is there any adequate recognition of these great principles in the average Christian's attitude towards the demand for far-reaching economic reform ? Referring to negotiations between masters and men Sorel points the following

moral: "When it is all over, there are workers who do not fail to remind themselves that the masters affirmed at first that every concession was impossible; they are thus led to say to themselves that the latter are ignorant men or liars; these are not results that are capable of greatly furthering social peace!"*

3. Turning now to Sorel himself, we may say that the witness of history, such as it is, does not make it so certain that violence is preferable to reform by consent, for violent revolutions have so often called forth equally violent counter-revolutions. Violence has a fatal habit of depending upon hatred; hatred again is a powerful and an easily aroused passion which men are naturally tempted to invoke and exploit for revolutionary projects; but it would appear to have defiled whatever measure of idealism there may have been in the hopes associated with past revolutions and to have vitiated their results. As against this criticism Sorel contends that "everything which relates to war is carried on (*se produit*) without hatred and without a spirit of vengeance." But in discussing the nature of myth he makes the following admission: "Psychologists say that there is heterogeneity as between the ends realised and the ends proposed; the slightest experience of life reveals this law to us. . ."† Experience would also seem to show that there is apt to be a wide divergence between the motives proposed in theory and those adopted in practice. A war is very enlightening on this point; and though, as we have seen elsewhere, Sorel seeks to turn the edge of any criticism that

* See *infra*, p. 88. † *Ib.*, p. 179.

may be based on the history of revolutions by saying that there is a fundamental difference between the political revolutions of the past and the proletarian revolution of the future, still it must be admitted that the only evidence that is available is disquieting rather than reassuring. In view of this Sorel's dithyrambic praise of the virtues of violence will scarcely bring conviction to those who do not share his mystical faith in the virtues of his myth. On the other hand it must be admitted that his position appears to be immune from serious attack if he can prove that revolution in the industrial arena differs essentially from political revolution. It is obvious however, that he cannot do more than assert the difference, for we have never had experience of the kind of revolution which he advocates; at best it is a matter of faith for him, faith in his myth which by definition does not concern itself with definite and predictable consequences.

One other consideration deserves to be taken seriously to heart. It is not for Christians who urge the plea of necessity as a justification for resort to war between States to object with any show of cogency to the resort to violence for the settlement of class conflicts; for those who advocate the use of proletarian violence do so on the ground that they despair of any other effective alternative, and they claim the additional justification that they are fighting in the person of the capitalist an enemy whose tyranny they resent with much better cause. Let but a section of the proletariat urge in good faith that owing to the present system of land tenure they are forced to live huddled together in crowded rooms,

that owing to the industrial and economic system they exist under conditions that make the decencies of life impossible and send their children into the streets, let them but plead that it is their sacred duty to fight for the sanctity and inviolability of their homes, that their degraded position is a violation of every promise and every profession made when the State was in danger from a foreign enemy, and they will have at their disposal most of the arguments with which theologians have made their apologia for war during these past years. We are not arguing here that the proletariat would have a good case, but it is not irrelevant to point out that if ever the appeal to violence is made in this country on such lines as these, the Christian Churches may find that they have spiked their own guns before the battle.

4. A further objection to be urged against Sorel's doctrine is that it fails to recognise the supreme importance of personality.* Two main points may be dealt with here : (*a*) To treat a man as a capitalist and to wage war upon him as a member of a class (in the interests of another class) is to rob him of that real individuality which belongs to every personality. He becomes a case instead of a person. Mass treatment is not personal treatment ; at best it is barracks morality. Sorel and Marx would probably reply that they are dealing with facts and actualities, whereas the foregoing criticism is based upon an abstract theory as to the worth of individual personality ; men are actually organised in classes, and that is the situation with which we have to deal ;

* See *infra*, pp. 125ff.

the revolutionaries would eliminate classes later by accentuating them now. But how can we be sure that we are not thus moving in a circle? Are we not more likely to make an end of the present unjust division of men into masters and hirelings, if we proceed forthwith to disavow it by treating all men as moral personalities having worth in and for themselves? Persons are more than producers even now!

Sorel is somewhat contemptuous of abstract moralists like Kant and Proudhon, both because they direct their thoughts chiefly to the individual and because they have no means of giving practical effect to their excellent principles. "These facts set us in the way which leads us to an understanding of high moral convictions; these do not depend upon rational arguments or upon the education of the individual will; they depend upon a state of war in which men consent to take part, and which is translated into precise myths."*

It is important to remember that the individual will has to be related to the whole life of the community and to its common enterprises, but when the individual will is depreciated, it is hard to see where a basis is to be found for morality in any real sense of the word or for any social enterprise. To treat the individual as a sheer abstraction cut off from the community is indeed a grave error, and the moralists need to be rebuked when they fall into it; but to ignore the individual will on the other hand is to destroy the only ultimate foundation of a moral order.

(*b*) To treat a man with violence, though it be only economic violence, is to give him less than

* See *infra*, p. 319.

the respect that is due to a person. It is to substitute constraint for persuasion, to try to move him from without as a mere thing is moved rather than from within by consent as a person is moved. Nor is it enough to assert dogmatically that it is vain to hope for consent until it has been shown that adequate effort has been made to secure such consent. Salvation for man and for society is by faith : not faith in one's strong right arm, but in true ideas and in the power of man's moral nature to respond to them. This may savour of that optimism which Sorel holds to be characteristic of reformers as opposed to revolutionaries and to be very barren of moral results. But the faith of which we speak here is not maintained by shutting our eyes to the grim facts of life. Faith sees the disquieting facts, but it finds its comfort not in the stern necessities of economic determinism, but in the power of the ideal to lift men above their moral frailty and perverseness ; it looks therefore for an inner moral change. A change imposed from without unaccompanied by such an inner change of conviction and purpose is at best but superficial and illusory ; it is not likely to have a long history. The most hopeful method of effecting this inner change is to establish personal contact between individuals. Crowd organisation cannot help us here. To spurn the conciliatory advances of the capitalist and to drive him back to make common cause with his class looks like one of the ways of quenching the better spirit ; it seems valiant, but in reality it is foolish. It is to care more for industrial efficiency (for that as we have seen is one reason given for rejecting all conciliatory

advances) than for the growth of a more humane and spiritual outlook, to care more for the logical consistency of an economic and social theory than for the moral improvement of the capitalist. Our anti-intellectualist is apt to be just as rigidly doctrinaire as the bourgeois theorists against whom he so loudly declaims! To treat the rise of what at any rate appears to be a kindlier spirit as nothing but a symbol of economic decadence is to be obsessed by economic as opposed to spiritual values. It may be good Marxianism of the " new school " ; it is questionable morality. More than that, it defeats its own end because only by the universalising of such a spirit can any society whatever cohere and progress.

Nor will it do to say with some, that any unpleasant consequences that may result to the capitalist from the proletarian violence are justified because they afford him an opportunity of tasting his own tyranny. This becomes a measure of revenge which, as we have seen, is not a motive commended by Sorel. This tit-for-tat policy reflects a common view of justice sometimes dignified with the title of " poetic," but it is not a very helpful view either in theory or practice. Psychologically it may seem to be desirable that a man should be taught sympathy by drinking of the bitter cup which he has caused another to drink ; ethically it is impossible to justify the infliction of one wrong for another by those who know from their own experience how embittering and degrading it is for the victim.*

* We observe with disquiet that the arguments we have preferred against Sorel under headings three and four seem logically not to be at the disposal of the Christian apologist for war.

5. The only adequate justification of the demand for the Social Revolution consists in showing that it is required by justice. In this connection justice means not the bourgeois conventions that pass for justice, but real justice so far as we can apprehend it at any given time.

This involves two pre-suppositions. (*a*) Morality, though related to the existing social order, cannot be wholly derived from it. In more developed communities the moral ideal may become the foundation of the social order, otherwise there would appear to be no meaning in asking for a social change in the name of justice. At this stage of a community's growth the moral ideal is both logically and historically prior to its embodiment in the social order. At earlier stages it may be true, as is stated elsewhere,* that such morality is a traditional deposit of habit and custom. During those periods the main interest of society appears to be the conservation of existing values. But a time comes when the community feels a more conscious concern about progress, and turns its thoughts to reform as the instrument of progress. It must then be guided not so much by the tradition of the past as by the ideal of the future. The moral ideal becomes the creator of social forms and standards of conduct. Moral considerations are no longer secondary but primary. Social and economic organisation then subserves the moral end, but this is an end that embraces other interests and therefore creates other institutions. The moral life is thought of in too limited a fashion when attention is directed solely to economic

* See *infra*, pp. 144-146.

organisation. On our view, moral considerations become predominant even in dealing with the organisation of society for economic ends, and they are involved consciously or unconsciously in any pleas for social reform. The moral criterion has a wider range and a greater authority than the merely economic criterion. Only by recognising this truth can moral personality secure its due recognition ; else it suffers contempt through being treated as a mere part of the social machine whose main function is the production of material goods. This brings us to our second pre-supposition.

(*b*) Social and economic justice is an ideal for persons, a moral concept. A right ordering of the things that minister to certain of our human needs has human welfare as its goal. But, thanks to the Social Revolutionary, it is becoming increasingly clear that real justice does not primarily involve a more equal distribution of things ; rather its chief requirement is a fresh adjustment of human relationships with a view to greater liberty and a worthier status for the persons who by their toil maintain the economic order. From this point of view the world of industry exists not merely for the manufacture of things, but even more to provide an opportunity for the self-expression and self-development of persons. Spiritual equality is the basis of a real democracy. Hence the Social Revolution aims not so much at the possession of the industrial product as at the control of the industrial process itself. This demand for economic autonomy for the workers is a part of the larger claim to spiritual autonomy. It can only be made by persons in virtue of the fact that they are persons. The ideal

that inspires the revolutionary movement is therefore moral and personal through and through, though this is not always clearly realised. But, since justice and liberty are moral and personal ideals, they must be secured by means which harmonise with the end in view, namely the full development of personality. This is not a class interest, but a universal human interest. All personalities as such, or even as such potentially, have a right to share in the universal values of the moral order. If the present order is wrong because a large class of human beings is treated as so many pawns, and therefore as less than persons, and if the exploited class has a right to demand that the social order be changed in order that exploitation may cease and human dignity be recognised, it is obvious that they for their part must not resort to methods that inflict a similar injury on others, even if those others are the present wrong-doers. Violence offends against the personality of those toward whom it is directed, for they too are treated contemptuously, being regarded as efficient instruments of the capitalistic régime and as nothing beyond that. But without entering into the controversy between Capitalistic and Socialistic theories, we can see that in the last resort the social problem sets us the task of establishing harmonious and mutually helpful relations between persons. Certainly the Socialist ideal of a co-operative commonwealth presupposes that all men are ideally destined to work together for common ends. But the method of violence and class warfare is tantamount to a denial of this ; it is an expression of the present unjust order, and it is hard to see how we are to

escape from the vicious circle which perpetuates that order unless we begin at once to use every opportunity of behaving towards *all* men on the lines demanded by the ideal that inspires the Social Revolution. Violence is avowedly divisive and disruptive; for creative and constructive purposes something else seems to be required. Is not the way of reconciliation (which is quite other than a blend of "blarney" and subterfuge that is sometimes mistaken for it) the method that expresses mutual respect for personality, however futile it may seem to be in some of its operations? May it not be that its apparent futility is due to our clumsiness or half-heartedness rather than to an inherent weakness in itself? It looks as if our means ought to match our ends. Do men gather figs of thistles? Are we any more likely to gather the fruit of harmony from the thorn of violence?

In conclusion let it be said that our three revolutionaries have in common a desire to see a fundamental change in our social and economic life. By revolution they hope to effect a complete transformation of the spirit and purpose of human society. The enlightened Christian is also a revolutionary in this constructive sense, and, in spite of misgiving as to these revolutionary theories and methods, he will have more in common with men like these, who look for a new world in which man shall achieve his rightful sovereignty over things and institutions, than with the complacent and lethargic Christian who in practice, if not in theory, identifies the present order with the Kingdom of God. We make common cause with the Social Revolutionary in urging humanity to

live by its hopes rather than by its traditions, and to take the way of courage and enthusiasm rather than that of expediency and opportunism, but we cannot counsel our fellow-men to look for deliverance to a gospel which preaches materialism, determinism and implacable antagonism.

> Non tali auxilio, non defensoribus istis
> Tempus eget.*

Materialism, as we have seen, robs life of all its higher values and makes meaningless that justice to which appeal is made ; economic determinism cuts the nerve of action and quenches man's higher hopes, and antagonism is a principle of division ; it is love, and love only, that can permanently unite. While sharing largely the revolutionary ideals, we have yet to seek a better, more effective way.

* Not for such help and not for such defenders
The times cry out.

CHAPTER III

THE WAY OF THE ECCLESIASTICS

It is not the social revolutionaries alone who look for a new earth ; for such an expectation is also part of the Christian hope. To the problems then that have been raised up to this point, what answer is returned by Christianity as it appears to those whose social conscience is awake ?

To meet this question we take the Bishop of Manchester as the typical and widely accepted exponent of modern awakened Christianity. No one can doubt the genuine religious feeling which marks what he writes and says, nor his passion for " social reform." Dr. Temple is one of the best accredited leaders of the younger Christianity and his influence extends far beyond the boundaries of his own denomination.

There is additional reason for singling out Dr. Temple as a representative, for his " Bishop Paddock Lectures," delivered in America during the war and later published in this country,* raise most of our problems in a highly controversial form, and an examination of his views will lead naturally to what we have to offer in the way of constructive statement.

* Under the title *Church and Nation.* (Macmillan.)

I

Dr. Temple, we think, would not be at pains to disclaim the charge that he also is a revolutionary. It is true his speech is not quite that of Karl Marx or Joseph Dietzgen, but, as we shall see, it is but a variant sub-form of Hegelianism. As Marx and Dietzgen give us the aspirations and determinations of the proletariat in the light (or in the mist) of the Hegelian dialectic, so Dr. Temple attempts to give us the Gospel through the same medium. Dr. Temple does not speak of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," but of the "kingdom of God;" but not less than the revolutionary he has in mind the new social order. Christ came, he tells us, to inaugurate upon earth the kingdom of God, and "that is the task to which we, as His followers, are pledged."* It is therefore, necessary to enquire "what are the fundamental principles of the Kingdom which Christ founded, what the method by which He founded it, and what are the principles and methods which He rejected?"†

As Georges Sorel writes to advocate the class war, so Dr. Temple writes to justify Christian participation in the recent war and to consecrate, with reservations, the way of violence.

"To advocate war, in the name of Christ," says Dr. Temple (p. xiii.), "is to adopt a position which looks self-contradictory and which certainly involves immense responsibility, and yet if our people can maintain the attitude of mind in which they entered on the war and can secure at the

* *Op. cit.*, p. 1. † *Ib.*, p. 2.

end a settlement harmonious with that frame of mind, I believe they will have served the Kingdom of God through fighting, better than it was possible to do at this moment in human history by any other means." So spoke not Dr. Temple alone, but in the main the chivalry of England in the early days of the war.

Praetulit arma togae, sed pacem armatus amavit.

Dr. Temple therefore set himself the task of thinking out afresh "the underlying problems which for a Christian are fundamental in regard not only to this war, but to war in general—the place of Nationality in the scheme of Divine Providence and the duty of the Church in regard to the growth of nations" (p. viii.).

The argument opens with a brief account of the life and purpose of Christ. He came to inaugurate His Kingdom, and the story of the Temptation at the beginning shows that for the attainment of this He rejected all "worldly methods to convert the world to God" (p. 7). He set aside "precisely every method of controlling men's action without winning their hearts and wills. He has rejected coercion; He has decided to appeal to Freedom" (p. 8). As the "deadness, the indifference and the hostility of the people gradually shows itself to be invincible," He gathers a small company of those who are drawn to Him; them He teaches that He must suffer, for "that is the way in which the Kingdom of God shall be founded" (p. 11). "Here then is the mode of God's power, and we know that it can be no other; for if God is truly King, He must be King of our hearts and wills, and not only of our conduct. There is only one way to win men's hearts and wills,

that is by showing love; and there is only one way to show love, and that is by sacrifice, by doing or suffering what, apart from our love, we should not choose to do or suffer. Sacrifice is the Divine activity; Calvary is the mode of the Divine omnipotence" (p. 14).

Here is a statement clear and unequivocal, and, as it seems to us, essentially true to the facts of the case; with Dr. Temple we take our stand upon this fundamental proposition that the Kingdom which Christ came to inaugurate lay in a new attitude to God and man which could only come through the awakening of insight and conviction. Christ saw that when the new outlook, which He called the Kingdom, was come, the institutions of the world would be inevitably altered, for institutions are but fixations, as it were, of ideas and of the relationships of men to one another. Therefore he paid little attention to the organisation of society and spent all his strength in the attempt to awaken insight and change of heart. It is self-evident that for the awakening of insight and of love "worldly methods," coercion, war, prestige, mass suggestion are futile.* "I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers," says Jack Cade. But the bonds of brotherhood are not so easily forged as this!

Christ came, then, to inaugurate a new order by means which the nature of that order necessitated, and, as Dr. Temple has said, it is to the

* See further *The Christ of Revolution*, by John Coates (The Swarthmore Press), especially chapters iv. and v. Also *The Galilean: the Permanent Element in Religion*, by N. Micklem (Jas. Clarke), especially chapters iv. and v.

same task that Christians are committed. "Calvary," which stands here for the uttermost appeal of love that will take no refusal from those who neither understand it nor respond to it and for a victory over men not by killing them but by dying to awaken their insight, is the way of "Omnipotence"; it is (from the very nature of the case) the "only way," but Dr. Temple hastens to tell us, it is not for us. "It is the actual Divine method and [the ideal human method" (p. 14). It remains impracticable for us, because "until we reach that perfection we cannot imitate His action" (p. 15). To apply this divine method is for us "sheer impossibility," because we have not in ourselves the "necessary love" (p. 14). "The Sermon on the Mount is not a code of rules to be mechanically followed"; it is "the description of the life which any man will spontaneously lead when once the Spirit of Christ has taken complete possession of his heart" (p. 16).

It should not be necessary to point out that the argument is already involved in some difficulty: the Christian is pledged to a task which can only be carried out in a certain way and by certain means, and at the same time the task is from the nature of the case impracticable for him. Dr. Temple reminds us of the Bellman in the tale:

> He was thoughtful and grave—but the orders he gave
> Were enough to bewilder a crew.
> When he cried "Steer to starboard, but keep her head
> larboard!"
> What on earth was the helmsman to do?

Dr. Temple himself seems to be aware of this difficulty, for although he has assured us that

"Calvary," or, in other words, the life depicted in the Sermon on the Mount and lived in fact by Jesus, is the mode of God's power, "and we know that it can be no other" (p. 14), he now goes on to explain that Jesus did use force, which force is therefore under certain circumstances legitimate for His followers; and later, when Dr. Temple deals with the problem of God in History (Appendix V.), he explains that the death of Alexander was "providential," and that Napoleon "appears at a critical moment, is active precisely as long as he can serve . . . the cause of progress, and is then removed." This "removal" of a "sinner" as soon as he has ceased to serve his turn does not seem a conspicuous example of the love that "suffers long and is kind," nor of the conduct adumbrated in the Sermon on the Mount, but it serves to show that the way of love to individuals is after all only one of the modes of omnipotence. But, apart from this arresting doctrine of Providence, we now learn that there is a "negative and preparatory" (p. 18) use of force to be exercised upon "immature characters" and those who are "so case-hardened that the appeal of love can never reach them until their present state of mind is broken up" (p. 17). Christ's use of force is illustrated by His treatment of the Pharisees (p. 18). Thus "we may use force in various circumstances in spite of the fact that for the positive work of the building of His Kingdom the Lord rejected it" (p. 16). "For all moral purposes there is no difference whatever between physical and non-physical force" (p. 18).

It is necessary to pause here to point out the logical fallacy underlying this argument. It

lurks in a double sense of the term force. The tacit implication of the argument is that Christ's use of force in the case of the Pharisees was a repudiation of the Sermon on the Mount; for if it be in line with the Sermon, Dr. Temple sees that he cannot get from Christ's treatment of the Pharisees to the justification of war, or alternatively, if he could, the Sermon would not be an impracticable ideal. For our part we should maintain that Christ's "denunciation" of the Pharisees was in the very spirit of the Sermon, for when men are "hypocrites," that is, living in a false world of their own imagining and refusing to face the facts of life, it is the way of love to bring home reality to them in any way that is consistent with its own nature. This was the motive and purpose of His words; the "force" He employed was the force of truth and such moral compulsion as issued from the letting in of light and truth upon their make-believe and mummery.* There is a force of this kind which is constructive in its effect upon character, where it is successful, and which is redemptive in motive; force which is purely destructive is better called violence; it was the way which the Zealots accepted and Christ rejected. Dr. Temple is wrong in supposing that in Christ's treatment of the Pharisees we have a new mode of omnipotence; force and love are not contradictories, but love and violence are.

That Dr. Temple himself thinks that Christ's

* For a fuller discussion of Christ's treatment of the Pharisees see *The Galilean*, N. Micklem, pp. 109f; but it should be added to what is there said that the nuance given to Christ's words by "Matthew" is different. The justification of our interpretation lies in this that it alone seems to make a moral unity of the character of Christ.

use of force will cover both political and military force becomes plain from the sequel. Once we have denied that there was that moral dualism in Christ, which in fact Dr. Temple postulates, and have regarded all Christ's use of force as employed for the purposes of moral construction and of redemption, it becomes impossible for us, so far as this argument is concerned, to plead that the Christian ethic will cover action which in motive is at best but very partially redemptive, and which in effect is likely to be destructive rather than constructive.

The first chapter has left us in some confusion : the line of thought appears to be, first, that the Sermon on the Mount, as the literary expression of " Calvary," is the only and necessary mode of the inauguration of the kingdom ; second, that for us it is an impracticable ideal ; third, that it is not the only mode of the divine omnipotence, for it was not the only means Christ used, and therefore, *â fortiori*, it is not the only ideal for us. This confusion has partly arisen through a double use of the term force ; there is no moral inconsistency in Christ's life and teaching if we assume that redemptive love should be the one motive of conduct; but in this case it is not easy to see why it is impracticable in the sense that, while it remains an ideal for us, we have to rule our lives in actual practice upon quite other principles.

II

In the brave days when high-placed ecclesiastics expressed their war-like ardour not in martial sermons alone but with force of arms upon the

battle-field, a certain bishop, it is said, was reproved upon the field for swearing. "Sir," he replied, "I swore in my capacity as officer, not as bishop." "My lord," came the answer, "when the devil has the officer, what becomes of the bishop?"

This pleasant anecdote raises an ethical problem which, in more complicated form but otherwise unchanged, exercises the minds of thoughtful men to-day, and to the further elucidation of which many of our subsequent pages will be addressed.

Can a man always do what he knows to be right; must he not sometimes act as a magistrate or as a politician or as a representative of his firm or his Trade Union in a way in which he would not act as an individual? Yet can a man live a double life acting sometimes in his private capacity and sometimes in his public; and if he may, what becomes of the Sermon on the Mount and the demands of Christ for uncompromising and unconditional loyalty? The same set of problems may be set somewhat more theologically in the form, what are we to make of the high doctrine of the New Testament as touching the Church; is the Church called the Vine, the Bride of Christ, His Body in respect of what it ought to be now or of what it shall be one day or again in respect of a mystical life independent of human affairs and human conduct? This inevitably leads us to ask, what is the relation between the Church as described in the New Testament and the various religious denominations we know in our own day? And, further, what is the relation between the Church or the

denominations and the nation or the State? Are not nation and State also divine institutions or ordinances, and does not therefore the secular ruler exercise authority by divine right, and by divine right claim complete allegiance? On the other hand is it not possible that there may arise a clash between the demands of Church and State, and if so, what is the Christian man to do?

Obviously it is most necessary for us to have a clear notion of the Church, its nature and function, so that we may see its place in the history of the world and in or over civilisation and the nations. Now the Church may be regarded as the *communio sanctorum*, the company of the faithful, or as the totality of the baptised, or as the clergy with their organisation and their rites, or again as some transcendental entity realistically conceived, or finally as an abstract, unrealised ideal.

Dr. Temple appears large-heartedly to embrace all these ideas, and it is not at first easy to see which is dominant in his mind. Starting from the aphorism that the Church is "a voluntary organisation for the maintenance of public worship in the interests of those who desire to join in it," he indignantly repudiates the view that the Church is a voluntary organisation at all. No, "the Church is the Body of Christ" (p. 26); it is not a voluntary organisation "any more than my body is a voluntary organisation, either of limbs or of cells" (p. 26). "We are Christians, if at all, not through any act initiated through our own will, but through our being received into the Christian fellowship and subjected to its influence. Just as we are born members of our family, so by our reception into the fellowship

of the disciples we are 'made members of Christ'" (p. 27), but "no man can be made a Christian against or without his will" (p. 27). The Church is "the creation of God in Christ" (p. 28). It consists "of men and women whom God of His sheer goodness has delivered from the power of darkness and translated into the kingdom of His dear Son" (p. 29). But in all this wealth of illustration Dr. Temple overlooks a confusion between two mutually incompatible ideas. The Church may be no voluntary institution for two reasons, either because it consists of those who have been baptised when they were infants and brought up through no choice of their own under the Christian influence, or, alternatively, because it consists of those who have become Christians much as a man falls in love, not through an original impulse of his will, and yet not against his will, but through an emotional response to something outside himself. Now these are entirely different conceptions, and their confusion brings only chaos, for they have quite different ethical implications. That Dr. Temple has confused the two is plain from an examination of his use of the term "body," a dangerous metaphor at all times, because it is a spatial metaphor applied to a spiritual entity. A human body has "members," and a corporation has "members." Is the Church called the Body of Christ by comparison with a human body or with a corporation? Both, answers Dr. Temple! The Church is no more a voluntary organisation than his body is a voluntary organisation, either of limbs or of cells (human body), (p. 26), and "just as we are born members of our family, so . . . we

are made 'members of Christ'" (corporation), (p. 27). The ethical difference between the two metaphors is very great; for without pressing a metaphor too far we can see that those who speak of Christians as being members of the Body of Christ in the sense of a human body mean that they are wholly at the disposal of the Head and subject to His control. Those who understand by the Body of Christ a corporation such as a family mean that all the members are bound together by an intimate tie and all share a common influence, but no one can cease to be a member of the corporation except by a public repudiation of his membership. Between these two positions so curiously confused by Dr. Temple lies the ethical difference between the two conceptions of the nature of the Church, Catholic and Protestant. In other words, Dr. Temple must make up his mind whether the Church is a sphere of influence (as he indicates on page 27), or the company of those who have actually been delivered from the power of darkness and translated into Christ's kingdom, those, that is, who have consciously and with their eyes open committed themselves to Christ and His way (as he indicates on page 29 and elsewhere). We shall see later that Dr. Temple attempts some sort of reconciliation by his mystico-metaphysical doctrine that, while the Church on earth is a "mixed" corporation, the real Church is an entity pure and spotless in the heavens. For the moment it is plain that, so far as the ethical side of religion is concerned, Dr. Temple regards the Church rather as a corporation than as a body in the sense defined above; it becomes increasingly clear, as

his theory develops, that the ordinary Christian cannot be required or expected to identify himself in practice and conduct with the ideals incarnated in the Head of the Church. But there are grave difficulties in the way of this view.

On any showing the Church on earth consists of the followers and disciples of Christ, and there is no doubt that in our fundamental historical documents it is laid down that discipleship is to be ethically interpreted, nor can we make sense of the New Testament except on the assumption that the Church, the company of believers, is to stand at all times and in the face of whatever consequences for the things for which Jesus stood in life. Nor does this escape Dr. Temple. He tells us that the Church is pledged to the task of Jesus, that "whatever obstacles there may be to overcome, whatever seductions to avoid, the Church is to remain absolutely devoted to the Divine Will" (p. 92). It is not supposed that Christians are perfect, but they are commanded to be perfect, and there is no hint in the New Testament that any Christian is not to live up to the highest standards and principles which he has seen, whatever be the consequences in an evil world. The disciples turned the world upside down not by compromising but by refusing to compromise. There are many metaphors for the Church in the New Testament which may be hard to be understood, but any sane interpretation of the documents must insist that discipleship was ethically conceived, and the disciple was called to an unqualified and unhesitating obedience to the will of God, as he had seen it revealed in Jesus of Nazareth. If in point of fact and history the

Church has become a *mere sphere of influence*, then it must be distinguished from the institution of that name in the New Testament, and useful as it may be for the gradual improvement of society, it cannot be that engine of revolution in the hands of Christ, which such a Church as the New Testament contemplates might be expected to be.

On the other hand that the Church is in some sense an instrument of Revolution is plainly part of Dr. Temple's idea ; it is there to " prepare the way of the Lord, so that His Kingdom may come on earth as it is in heaven " (p. 31). To this end those who are united in this sphere of influence must be united also in an organisation, a " quite definite society, with a coherent constitution and a known basis of membership " (p. 31) ; for " it is not enough that Christians should gradually leaven life " ; such a feeble, ineffective notion is " inadequate to the essential nature of religion " (p. 31). Why ? Because a spirit must take definite and concrete form if it is to become effective in the world ; this is the meaning of the Incarnation. Thus then the argument runs, " even as God Himself must become incarnate in order to establish His Kingdom on earth," so must the Church become " a quite definite society, with a coherent constitution and a known basis of membership " (pp. 31f). Taken seriously the argument from the Incarnation would be that if, in order to the establishing of His Kingdom, God must become incarnate, then to the carrying on of that work His Spirit must become incarnate in the members of the Church ; but Dr. Temple cannot hold that, because of his

ethical pre-supposition that the Christian cannot live by the Sermon on the Mount and the example of Jesus.

As will be made plain in a later chapter, we are not criticising Dr. Temple because he says that Christians should be organised, and that a Church is necessary, but for his stress upon the externals of the matter, the machinery, the rules, the conditions of membership. To some extent Dr. Temple seeks to meet this criticism. He realises that it is useless to have the organisation without the life or the faith ; but " half our troubles come from these absurd dilemmas. ' Do you believe in faith or in organisation ? ' Well ; do I believe in my eyes or my ears ? Why not in both ? " (p. 36). Dr. Temple misses the point. Order and faith are not parallel as sight and hearing are. Faith is prior to organisation ; the organisation of the Church must be adjusted, as Dr. Temple himself has said above, to the task of the Church ; the spirit seeks embodiment ; that is to say, the spirit, the life, the faith (whatever we call this element) is prior, and it is this which the organisation must subserve. We have to ask what is the life and task which the organisation must serve, and when we ask that, we suspect that the kind of quasi-political organisation which Dr. Temple favours and regards as necessary does not express but may absolutely deny the real function of the Church as committed to the task and method of Jesus.

But how comes it that Dr. Temple co-ordinates organisation and life (or faith) with sight and hearing, although he has above subjected life to organisation ? It is because he is now passing

over to an altogether new conception of the Church according to which the organisation of the Church is truly as essential as its faith. Let us note the change in idea by which he so skilfully makes this transit.

III

There are two principles at work in human history, he tells us: the principle of Immanence and the principle of Transcendence; corresponding to these there are two allied pairs of contrasts: Naturalism corresponding with Immanence, and religion corresponding with Transcendence, and secondly the nation corresponding with Immanence, and the Church with Transcendence (pp. 37ff). Dr. Temple frankly takes the terms Immanence and Transcendence in their literal and strict sense; for he speaks of religion "breaking in upon what is ordinarily called experience from outside" (p. 37); that is to say, he applies spatial terms to the Deity, and this spatial view is noteworthy because, as he shows, the Catholic idea is largely based upon it.*

Let us look at these attendant pairs. As great as the difference between inside and outside is the difference between naturalism and religion, by which latter, it becomes plain, Dr. Temple means in the main the traditional Catholic conception of religion. Naturalism starts from the history of man and of the Universe and tries to understand it. "The Will of God, on this view, is to be discovered from the empirical course and

* For the truth underlying these terms see W. Fearon Halliday, *Reconciliation and Reality.* (Swarthmore Press.) pp. 46-51.

tendency of history" (p. 37). Religion on the other hand, "begins with God; it breaks in upon what we ordinarily call 'experience' from outside" (p. 37); it is "a gift of God, and not a discovery of man" (pp. 39, 40). Now the two contrary principles of Immanence and Transcendence, naturalism and religion, are united and combined in the Incarnation; for "the life of Christ is at once the irruption of the Divine into the world, . . . and is also the manifestation of the indwelling power which had all along sustained the world" (p. 39).

Before turning to notice the next pair of opposites it is well to observe the extremely abstract and, in the worst sense, mystical nature of this argument. In the first place, as has been indicated above, it is not exactly true to speak of God as either Immanent or Transcendent as if he were in space; second, it is quite true that we can look at human history under either of two aspects, one that of man's search for and progressive discovery of God, the other that of God's progressive self-revelation to man; but the distinction of which so much is made between the "gift of God" and "man's discovery" is wholly false or rather wholly abstract; for on the one hand man discovers truth, and on the other truth is God's gift to man; and the same event or attainment is both God's gift to man and at the same time man's discovery; and this is true whether we think of the occurrence to Newton of that hypothesis whereby he was led to discover gravitation or of the "revelation" of the holiness of God to the Hebrew prophet. In other words, it is not in the Incarnation alone but in the whole

of life that these two principles are united and combined; all man's discoveries are made in virtue of what by no metaphor we call his "gifts," but they are not less his discoveries. That is to say, *life itself is the sacrament*,* the meeting-place of God and man, the Divine and the human. Dr. Temple's theory, which also is the Catholic theory, divides history into two parts the Incarnation and the Sacraments on the one side, as God's gifts, and the rest, "naturalism," on a lower plane altogether.

We are now in a position to look at the other but allied pair of opposites, the nation and the Church. The nation corresponds with secular history, the Church represents the Godward side of things and "is here to witness to the ideal and to guide the world towards it" (p. 44); as representing the gift of God in contrast with the discovery of man the Church must be constituted to keep alive this faith. "That is the meaning of hierarchies and sacraments" (p. 39). "The nation is a natural growth; the Church is a divine creation" (p. 40); but "if we believe in a Divine Providence, if we believe that the life of Christ is not only the irruption of the Divine into human history but is also and therein the manifestation of the governing principle of all history, we shall confess that the nation as well as the Church is a divine creation" (p. 44).

The nation, then, is divine, but this has not been sufficiently recognised, and this inadequate

* By this, of course, it is not meant that God is equally revealed in every event but that there is no occasion in which a man, if he meets his circumstances aright, may not find God's presence and help as truly as ever in the Church Sacrament. For a fuller exposition of this see *The Galilean*, pp. 19-29.

recognition of nationality by Catholicism has "avenged itself by almost ousting Catholicism, and with it Christianity itself, where national interests are concerned" (p. 37). Therefore Dr. Temple turns to an exposition on Biblical grounds of the sacredness of the nation and the State.

His Biblical exegesis is not altogether happy. He tells us that "the whole course of Biblical revelation" supports the view that "the world is by divine appointment a world of nations, and it is such a world that is to become the Kingdom of God" (pp. 44, 45), that is to say, nations are to be constituent members of the Kingdom of God. "Unless all history is a mere aberration, that Kingdom will have nations for its provinces, and nations like individuals will realise their destiny by becoming members of it" (p. 55). It is quite true that in the early part of Biblical History the absorbing interest is the forming of the Hebrews into nationhood, and that later there arises the higher conception that "all the nations, Israel and the rest, stand on an equal footing before the Judgment Seat of God." Nor need we dispute that in this doctrine the nations are treated "as real entities, and real moral agents" (p. 48).* But Dr Temple deals very casually with the New Testament, contenting himself for the most part with reminding us that Christ and Paul were both patriotic; but it is

* Dr. Temple does not refer to the very important doctrine of Daniel vii. 1ff.; e. ii. 34ff., that a human or humane empire shall supersede the old pagan empires; it shall start as a despised and persecuted remnant, and grow until it "cover the whole earth." This is in some ways much more akin to the New Testament idea. Dr. Temple has missed the point of the passage because he supposes that "one like unto a son of man" is "a Divine Redeemer."

in the New Testament that he would find it most difficult to substantiate his exegesis; for the very term "Church," or *ecclesia*, means the new nation, the Israel according to the Spirit. "Every assembly of Christians . . . was called *ecclesia*, an assembly of the New Testament Israel."* So far, therefore, were New Testament writers from being free to contemplate nations as constituent members of the Kingdom of God, that by their very notion of the Church they had in mind a nation that should attract men from every earthly nation and should ultimately triumph by gathering into it all the fulness of the Gentiles.† It is important also to remember that the early Church did not look forward to the gradual amelioration of society and the establishment by human agency of an ideal social order but to some catastrophic act of God. It will be seen later that we are not seriously at issue with Dr. Temple in his assertion that nations are to be the constituent elements of the ideal society which he calls the Kingdom of God; but the situation and outlook of the early Church was so utterly dissimilar to our own, that it is more than precarious to build upon this sort of exegesis.‡

But whether or no the Biblical foundation be good, let it be plain that Dr. Temple holds that "the nation is a natural growth with a spiritual significance" (p. 52), and that we are to look forward "not to the abolition of national distinctions, but to the inclusion of all nations in the family of nations" (p. 51); it is this family

* Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, I. 18., quoted Oman *The Church and the Divine Order*," p. 11.

† Cf. Acts x. 35. c. Daniel vii. ‡ See *infra*, pp. 200ff.n.

of *nations* which is to become the Kingdom of God: thus the constituent members of the Kingdom are primarily nations (p. 51). It is through nations therefore that God works in history.

Here, then, we are on the brink of a new ethical principle which may still further relegate the Sermon on the Mount to the limbo of the impracticable. Thus, the Church, "while upholding the ideal of brotherhood and the love which kills hate by suffering at its hands, and while calling both men and nations to penitence and renewed aspiration in so far as they fail to reach that ideal, will none the less recognise the divinity of the nation in spite of all its failures. It will not call upon men to come out from their nation or separate themselves from its action, unless it believes that then and there the nation itself is capable of something better, or unless the nation requires of them a repudiation of the very spirit of Christ, or an action intrinsically immoral" (p. 56). The Church, it will be noticed, upholds "the ideal of brotherhood and the love which kills hate by suffering at its hands" verbally, and, as we shall see later, through the example of its priests, not by calling upon its members to stand for these ideals, come what come may. What actions would Dr. Temple regard as "intrinsically immoral" and as "a repudiation of the very spirit of Christ"? Not the use of poison-gas, so his main argument requires us to suppose, not the economic weapon of the blockade, not bayonet-work. In this he seems to us "to set the murderous Machiavel to school"; we think that amongst those who have served in the armies there would be a

remarkable unanimity that, however necessary and unavoidable war may be, it has no recognisable connection with anything known of the spirit of Jesus Christ.

Thus we find that both Church and State are institutions existing side by side and complementary to one another with different functions and different ethical standards. "The State, being 'natural,' appeals to men on that side of their nature which is lower, but is not in itself bad. Justice is its highest aim and force its typical instrument, though force is progressively less employed as the moral sense of the community develops: mercy can find an entrance only on strict conditions. The Church, on the other hand, is primarily spiritual; holiness is its primary quality; mercy will be the chief characteristic of its judgments, but it may fall back on justice and even, in the last resort, on force. Both State and Church are instruments of God for establishing His Kingdom; both have the same goal; but they have different functions in relation to that goal" (pp. 52, 53).

This is far from clear and satisfactory when we realise that apart from their constituent members Church and State are pure abstractions with no existence in the world at all, and furthermore that every member of the Church without exception is also a member of a nation! This Dr. Temple himself naïvely observes in one place (p. 86), without observing that it makes havoc of the scheme. As citizens our highest aim is justice, as Churchmen, however, mercy will be one of the chief characteristics of our judgments. But are we to treat the criminal in our capacity as

citizens or as Churchmen ? To solve this patent absurdity, Dr. Temple, as we shall see, will maintain that the Church is represented by the clergy, and the rest of us must act as citizens. Good ; but why should not the State be represented by the magistrates, and the rest of us act as Christians ? For two reasons, one that the Sermon on the Mount is impracticable, and second that the primary constituents of the Kingdom of God, the primary entities, are not individuals but nations. It is interesting to note the ethical consequence of this personalising of the State and this ascription of "divinity" to the nation; and most instructive are the arguments to which Dr. Temple is driven to show that English Christians should go to war against German Christians, whose chief offence was represented as an exaggerated respect for these very doctrines !

For the moment, however, let it suffice that Dr. Temple once again hypostatises two abstractions. The end of his first argument was that the Church, or rather religion, becomes virtually the Incarnation and the Sacraments ; so here the Church becomes virtually the clergy.

IV

Before we pass to a more elaborate investigation of some of the underlying notions, it will be well to make quite clear from quotation what is the nature of the State according to the theory we have been examining. "It is only within a society which has developed some character for itself, which has indeed a personality of its own, that individual personality can reach very much

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development. You cannot have genius in a savage tribe. Genius is the focal expression of the personality of a whole people. . . . We find then, that individual personality, or spiritual life, is dependent upon the spiritual life of society ; and we need to notice that this society has every mark by which we distinguish personality in the individual. It has aspirations ; it has a predominant character ; it has claims, and it has duties. It has, in fact, in the literal sense of the word, a corporate personality" (pp. 146, 147). This confession has at least the merit of being clear and unconditional. But nations are not the only corporate personalities ; for within the nation are minor groups, " all of which have these same marks, and all of which are in the real genuine sense persons, spiritual individuals with a life of their own" (p. 147). Presumably we may add to these minor personalities also major personalities, such as Empires and Leagues of Nations, though these latter are, as we gather from Dr. Temple, at present adolescent personalities and not quite grown up (p. 155) ! Furthermore, we must suppose that the whole Church universal and the various provincial and national Churches and the various local Churches and congregations each have a corporate personality of their own, but what is the relation of these various persons to one another we are not told.

We seem on the threshold of a new Christian Gnosticism or mythology. At a later stage in this book we have sought to do justice to this notion of the personality of the nation* on its

* See *infra*, pp. 108ff. We may note here that there is a religious or poetical value in speaking of the nation or the Church

metaphysical side; at the moment we must be content to observe the ethical consequence of the doctrine as Dr. Temple states it. "We cannot surely assert that the corporate person is immortal, as the individual is; and therefore, to destroy the State is to inflict a more irreparable loss than to kill a man, which is one reason at least, perhaps the chief reason, why a man should die for the political freedom of his country, and even, if need be, kill for it" (p. 154). That man exists for the State, and not the State for man, is described by a well-known lawyer as an "old pagan idea."* Perhaps it is not quite fair to Dr. Temple to accuse him of this paganism without qualification, but he holds clearly enough that the State is more important than the individual—not, be it observed, that the safety or comfort of many is to be preferred to that of the few, but that the State is intrinsically of itself more important than the individual, and further that the preservation of the State is a justification for doing that which on other grounds would be condemned.

Let us, then, attempt to sum up the great sweep of Dr. Temple's book. It is thoroughly Hegelian in its method and outlook; history is subsumed under the interaction of thesis and antithesis, two rival principles called Transcendence and Immanence, and the Kingdom of God is the synthesis and completion of both. We may,

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as a person; we must distinguish, however, between a religious metaphor and a metaphysical reality. Cf. "Ealle we habbadh aenne heofonlicne faeder and âne gâstlîce môder, seô is ecclesia genamed, thaet is Godes cirice, and thy we sin gebrothra."

* A. Taylor Innes, Advocate. *Church and State.* (T. and T Clark.) p. 252.

therefore represent the argument in tabular form :



That there is something grand and impressive in this schematism we cannot deny, but that it is highly abstract and artificial and that it does not solve our real problems is seen when we bear in mind that the Church and the nation are composed in part at least of the same people, that in experience we cannot separate between man's discovery and God's gift, that priests are members of the State, and that science also is sacramental. On the ethical side we are still left with our problem, when the devil has the officer, what becomes of the bishop ?

PART II

Chapter IV

NATIONALITY AND HUMANITY

We turn now to the more constructive section of our task. There has been much talk and much loose thought, it is to be feared, of recent years about the granting of political self-determination to those communities which have shown that they possess a consciousness of nationality. On this view of things a nation, in whatever ways it may prove its right to be regarded as such, is a real entity and deserves recognition as a distinguishable unity among others of its kind with rights corresponding to theirs. One of these rights is the opportunity to express its collective life and to be treated as an end in itself in relation to other communities. It must, therefore, be granted autonomy as a necessary condition of self-realisation and self-expression, for if it be subject to the domination of another community, it feels that it is being treated as a means rather than as an end. It is this question as to the reality, the function and the permanence of the nation as a political entity and a factor in human history that is to concern us in this chapter. As to its reality or actuality history affords us abundant evidence; the failure to recognise the rights of national groups has led to much trouble in the realm of politics. Certain imperial States in

Europe have tried to suppress the national life of Poland by dividing its territory and breaking up its political unity; but though the separated parts of the nation were brought under the jurisdiction of various political powers, the vivid sense of national unity fostered by a common culture has refused to suffer extinction. Napoleon's attempt to establish a single Empire in Europe by the sword is said to have been frustrated by the same invincible sense of nationality that asserted itself in the several countries which he sought to bring under a common dominion; they resisted his ambitious efforts because they were resolved to maintain that measure of independence which seemed to them to be indispensable for the expression of national life. Modern Italy regained its liberty by shaking off the alien domination of Austria, not, however, before the smouldering national sentiment had been fanned to a blaze by the unremitting labours of Mazzini.

Aeneadæ in ferrum pro libertate ruebant.

The same sense of nationality is at the root of our present political difficulties in Ireland and India and Egypt.

The policy of empires is to impose for their own convenience a certain uniformity of organisation upon the peoples, which may be higher or lower than that which they previously enjoyed as independent communities; in any event it is a uniformity that involves suppression of a variety of customs and institutions that is dear to the several nations. The result is felt by them to be a loss. "If a man had opportunity to choose his city, no one would choose the more splendid in preference to his own; rather he would boast

that his fatherland was like heaven (ταῖς εὐδαίμοσι παραπλησίαν), no matter what sort of a place it might really be."* The wise empires, therefore, learn to allow a certain latitude of expression to national genius, and, in so far as this is done, the empire approximates to a commonwealth whose several constituents maintain political unity through diversity of speech and organisation, and thereby enrich the life of the whole. The tendency of smaller communities to unite and to organise themselves into nations and the tendency of the nation on the other hand to cling to its national being, when it has once been achieved, lends colour to the suggestion that in the nation we have a unit that is permanent, and that the imperial ordering of society is an offence against what is a more natural and therefore a more justifiable form of society.

Mazzini holds that the nation and the family are two ultimate and permanent forms of social organisation; the nation is therefore sanctioned by divine Providence, not merely as a transitory stage in social development like clan organisation, but as a constant and stable form for the fulfilment of a permanent function and destiny. It is no part of our purpose here to enter into the vexed question as to the part that language, race, geography and other factors play in the formation and maintenance of the national group. Questions of definition and analysis are notoriously difficult here, but it is neither impossible nor unimportant to clear up certain confusions that are apt to arise in such a discussion as that upon which we are now embarked.

* Lucian, *Patriæ Encomium*, 2.

It is well to remember that the nation may be both more and less than the State. A nation has a many-sided life which is only partially expressed in its organisation as a State. The State is the nation disposed for political purposes both internal and external; but there are many other interests that enrich the life of a nation, such as industry, art and religion; with these the State has some relations, but for the most part of a secondary and limited kind. On the other hand the State, if it be of the imperial type, may exercise political jurisdiction over several communities, each of them having a very definite national consciousness notwithstanding their common form of government, as is the case with Ireland, India and Egypt.

It is important that we remember that even where the geographical boundaries of the State and the nation coincide, the nation is a far richer and more significant unity than the State; for it contains more varied forms of life and activity. A nation's culture is more than its politics.

I

A very important and a desperately difficult problem arises in connection with this subject of national unity. There is a common, and, it may be added, a misleading tendency to speak of and to explain this unity as if it were due to a species of super-personality.* How comes it to pass that a nation is treated not merely as an entity but also as a personality? It would appear to be

* We may leave the State out of the reckoning at this point: the conclusions which we shall reach regarding the nation will apply equally to the State.

occasioned by certain analogous features in the behaviour of nations and of human individuals. Let us look at some of these.

Growth.—As a human being grows and develops through successive stages without losing his identity, so the nation appears to grow through successive generations and yet to remain the same nation. But personality is not necessarily implied in this, for the same is true of a tree or any other organic growth. Moreover, it may be urged, it is the human individuals in any generation who are aware of this growth on the part of the nation ; there is no national consciousness of growth and identity as distinguished from that of the individuals who compose the nation. If we point to literature as an expression of a nation's " soul " or " spirit," we discover on examination that the literature is the product of individual minds. Shakespeare's works may have been written by Bacon but certainly not by a committee ; it is a mere resort to metaphor to say that they are an expression of the " soul " of the Elizabethan age. The only personal focus that we can trace with certainty is to be found in the soul of the individual artist quickened, as we may readily allow, by all manner of influences from nature and society. Though Besant and Rice may write a book in which it is impossible to distinguish the work of the two authors by manifest differences of style, it is unnecessary to suppose that their two personalities were merged into a kind of composite soul or personality ; some sort of fusion there appears to be, but it is due to psychological sympathy rather than to metaphysical identity.

Unity.—Unity is undoubtedly one of the marks

of personality ; but, though the unity of a nation is a unity of persons, it is not necessary to suppose that such a unity is itself personal. In political philosophy, as in theology, we cannot too carefully guard ourselves from the error of regarding spiritual things as spatial and of applying the category of personality to an aggregated lump. Wills or desires cannot be aggregated ; even in agreement they always retain their individual identity, or else they cease to exist. The truth which gives great vitality to this error lies in the social nature of personality ; for two persons in fellowship reach a personal fulfilment which neither could attain in isolation nor by a process of mere mathematical addition ; for each may receive and add without losing, and each may inspire the other creatively in such wise that the results may be acquired by both. As iron sharpeneth iron, so a man the face of his friend.

Ethos.—It is commonly recognised that a group has what is described as an *ethos*. It may be found in a public school, in a Church, in a social class and in a nation, and it is the mark of a group as a group rather than of any of its individual members. It seems to correspond roughly to temperament or disposition in an individual. It cannot be denied that something real and unmistakable meets us here, though it is indefinable as Hamlet's cloud.* We speak of it as if it were

* *Hamlet :* " Do you see yonder cloud that's almost the shape of a camel ? "
Polonius : " By the mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed."
Hamlet : " Methinks it is like a weasel."
Polonius : " It is backed like a weasel."
Hamlet : " Or like a whale ? "
Polonius : " Very like a whale."

something pervasive like atmosphere; it is a sort of tradition, not confined to any individual or even to any generation; but it is difficult, not to say impossible, to see how it could have originated apart from individuals, or how it can survive apart from others in whom it finds support and expression. It is true that its supporters and exponents act together, but this does not necessitate the hypothesis of a super-personality which exists in the school or the nation apart from the several personalities of those who form the group. If we were driven to this resort, as some contend, it would not appear to be necessary that the group ethos should be reflected in the individual personalities or that they should even be aware of it. What we call ethos is again due to the social nature of personality, to the similarity of tasks and aims which members of a group share and to the fact that, until real freedom is attained, men tend to be the creatures of their environment and to have the same emotional biases and predilections as their neighbours. These emotional preferences become habitual and their source is not recognised. No doubt there is a very remarkable kind of unity here, and a composite personality is a very obvious hypothesis. It was natural to say of the primitive Church that "those who were together at the same place were of one heart and of one mind," but it becomes clear on reflection that in such a case we are merely borrowing the light of metaphor. What we are struggling to describe is a remarkable heightening of each individual consciousness through the generation of a profound sense of sympathy and affinity

rather than the collective experience of a single group-personality. For how do we conceive such a group personality to survive when the members of the group separate and cease to function as a group ?* Is it then dissolved to be recreated from time to time, when the group reassembles with possibly different constituents ? Let it be well observed that we are not in the least disposed to deny the facts ; we dispute only the interpretation put upon them. All heightening of personality, when its source is truth and love, produces unity of thought, feeling and purpose which is very like personality. It is not, however, a single self-consciousness but a common consciousness of a single thing.

General Will.—The conception of a general will belonging to the whole group as distinguished from the separate wills of the individual constituents has been current at least since Rousseau's day. That the members of a group may hold a purpose in common is an undoubted fact, but does this unity of purpose require for its explanation the notion of a single collective will other than the wills of the individuals ? The unity in question is the more remarkable because it appears to triumph over that peculiar individuality which is one of the more obvious characteristics of will ;

* Dr. Temple meets this difficulty by frankly avowing that while there is immortality for the individual there is none for the nation, and that therefore it is more criminal to destroy a nation than to kill an individual. His argument involves that the super-personality is of higher value than the personality of the individual ; but, if so, the Universe is charged with irrationality in that it ordains immortality for the lower value but not also for that which in his view is the higher. But living in a postkantian era we are unable to comprehend whence Dr. Temple derives his assurance upon this point. See Maciver, *Community*, pp. 200ff.

for "our wills are ours, we know not how." But we may observe that the disciplined will, as it becomes moralised and rationalised through growing insight, is progressively delivered from its capricious and individualistic features, and its universal character, which is its real glory, comes to light. If we will the good as opposed to the merely pleasant, our aim ceases to be a mere private advantage and becomes a contribution to social welfare. In this sense we may say, "our wills are ours to make them Thine." If this be true, why should it be difficult to conceive a common purpose embraced by a group; and is it necessary to call in this *deus ex machina* of a general will to explain the unity of collective desires and purposes? And if, further, one looks at the matter empirically, does it not appear that what passes for the general will of a nation is often nothing but the will of the majority? Are we then to say that the dissident groups within a nation also have a general will with opposing purposes? Has, for example, the group that desires nationalisation not only its common purpose but also its collective will, and have the champions of private enterprise another collective will? Once more, does the unity of international groups presuppose an international self? If these things are so, we are required to contemplate an indefinite multiplication of super-wills of greater or less authority. With this plethora of group-wills added to our individual wills is not the problem complicated rather than simplified? A spook-hunter like Dietzgen will find sport to his heart's content with all this big game about.

Sovereignty.—The national will is spoken of as

having sovereignty. It is regarded as having a peculiar authority that claims recognition both from the nations as nations and also from the individual members of the nation itself. If it has authority, it must be authority over persons ; and it would seem to follow that it cannot itself be impersonal. If personality be supreme, as we hold it to be, it can hardly recognise the superiority of what is lower in kind than itself, that is, the infra-personal or impersonal. But do we need to call in this mysterious, not to say mythological, super-personality in order to account for what is claimed to be the superiority of the common purpose ? Is it not sufficiently explained by saying that its superiority lies not merely in its being willed by a larger number of people, but in its being willed by them on the ground of its inherent universality ? The fact that a purpose is ratified by the will of the many is usually taken as a *prima facie* indication that it aims at the common good ; but there are cases where the individual was wiser than the group ; hence the need for caution in appealing to the verdict of majorities. It is often naïvely assumed that the superiority of the will of the majority rests upon its actual might over against a minority which, being a minority, is wrong. The will of the majority has naturally very great *power*, all the more because it has behind it the capricious taboo which appertains to convention. Yet national policy is not authoritative because it embodies the purpose of a collective will that is more competent than the will of any single individual, but only if and in so far as it truly aims at a common good and thereby commends itself to the will of the many.

Thus sovereignty lies in the nature of the thing that is willed rather than in some mysterious virtue that is conferred upon it by a super-will more powerful, but not therefore more just, than the several wills of the individual citizens. The tyrant may have more power to enforce his purposes than has plain John Smith, but that will not make them right. Only inherent rightness can give a purpose real authority.

The subject of *legal* sovereignty cannot be dealt with here at any great length. It is under this head however that most of our practical difficulties arise. The State in its executive capacity bases its authority upon the legal code. This can only be justified in the last resort if legal authority rests upon moral authority. Unless the State is to be regarded as a non-moral entity, its laws must express not only what is the will of its citizens, but also what is inherently right and just. It is not enough, therefore, to secure the will of the majority in legal enactments. The majority must be trained to recognise and to will what is just. When laws fall short in this regard they must be changed. The Medes and Persians were not wise in making their laws immutable. Stability is an advantage in the legal code of a nation ; but only that which rests on the firm foundation of justice can be stable. Rigidity is no virtue in a legal code, for laws are made for man, not man for the laws. Because an inflexible law may easily hinder the beneficent activities of moral personality, the old order must be ready to change and to yield its place to new when sufficient cause is shown ; otherwise that which was once a good custom may survive to corrupt the world. The

rebel is a benefactor in so far as he aims at bringing legal authority into agreement with moral authority, for in fact he is trying to substitute a real for a spurious authority and a higher fellowship for a lower.*

We need not therefore invoke this theory of a general will in order to establish authority and sovereignty. A purpose is sovereign if it is universal in the sense that it makes for a common good, and for practical purposes its universality is sufficiently, though not infallibly, attested if it be recognised by the common consent of those concerned. We conclude, therefore, that there is no moral, psychological or metaphysical necessity to postulate a general will in order to explain either the unity or the sovereignty of a national purpose.

Individuality.—Everything that really exists may be said to have individuality, without which it can neither be defined nor recognised. Personality has an individuality which is peculiar to persons, and national individuality tends to be represented as a national personality. This is sometimes spoken of as national genius. By that process of abstraction which is involved in all generalisation and by a somewhat exclusive contemplation of special periods in the history of nations, we may define the genius of Israel as expressed in its concern for religion, that of Hellas as expressed in its concern for truth and beauty, and that again of Rome as expressed in its concern for law. But on examination we find that there was always law in Israel, religion in

* Other aspects of this problem are dealt with elsewhere. See pp. 157ff., 215ff.

Hellas and beauty in Rome, for these are not peculiar national values but universal human values. The most we can say is that there was a higher conception of religion in Israel or a more intense devotion to truth in Hellas. What these nations discovered and valued for themselves, they handed on to others, not as national interests, but as universal human interests. *Graecia capta ferum captorem cepit.* And it may be well once again to insist that the higher religious conceptions of Israel were due not so much to the whole nation as to groups, generally in a minority, fired by the vision of the prophets, and the splendid art and philosophy of Hellas to groups inspired by individuals of the calibre of Pheidias and Socrates.*

We may amend the claim which we are now criticising by setting it forth in this form: though the love and cultivation of music is not limited to any one nation, still there is the sort of individuality that enables us to speak of Russian music and of the Russian soul or genius that finds expression in it. And is there not an Irish mentality, and, if a collective mentality, then apparently a collective Irish personality as its source; for mentality is a personal phenomenon? At the head of this procession of personal metaphors must march our familiar friend the Zeitgeist and at its tail as a parvenu "the soul of the war." With regard to Russian music it may be said that whatever general

* We do not wish to deny that the creative thinkers and artists owed much on their side to their intellectual and social environment. Shakespeare may be the child of the Elizabethan age, but it is possible to imagine an Elizabethan age without Shakespeare.

characteristics it may have, and however much these may be traced to a mysterious race influence, the actual body of Russian music is due to the genius and labour of individual Russian musicians. There is no traceable single soul of the Russian people that composes a collective product called Russian music, which is sufficiently explained by the action of individual musicians inspiring each other through association to a singular level of excellence and a remarkable unity of character. Irish mentality and the like are to be similarly explained.*

In effect what is known as animism among primitive people, the tendency, that is, to think of spirits as inhabiting trees and rocks, survives among more civilised peoples as a tendency to hypostatise and personalise mental generalisations like racial or class characteristics.† The temptation is specially strong in respect of unities composed of personal factors ; for it is natural that such unities should reflect some at least of the personal characteristics of the individuals who

* It may here be briefly remarked, however, that under stress of war-passion certain unpleasant characteristics in enemy nations are abstracted, generalised and personalised, and to them are added by implication and by what the psychologists call "projection" all qualities which appear hateful and devilish. Therefore "Germany" during the war stood not for what the Germans are as a matter of fact, but for every quality that the Englishman detests. (The newspapers further this process by taking care to suppress any generous traits that are shown by the enemy.) This is an instance, on the national plane, of the process that in ordinary life works on the one hand towards infatuation and on the other toward unreasonable dislike. The whole case of war is one of abnormal psychology. For "projection" of this kind, cf. Jung *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 427-433. (Baillière, Tindall and Cox.)

† Animism is the mental forerunner of mediæval Realism which still dominates much popular thought. See *infra* pp. 183ff.

compose them. These group-unities thus derive or appear to derive personal characteristics which give them a quasi-personal aspect. It cannot be shown, however, that these characteristics are other than derivative and secondary ; they do not inhere in and originate from a collective soul of the personality of the group, and it is fallacious to pass *per saltum* from quasi-personal features to the notion of a corporate personality as their source. In this matter the mediæval jurists showed the caution which befits exact thinking, for they described corporate unities as *personæ fictæ*, which is what they prove to be in practice. We may treat a corporate body, such as a Trade Union, as a quasi-personal entity, and we may ascribe some degree of responsibility to it ; but we cannot bring the soul of the Trade Union into the dock nor even, with any convenience, its body. We must sue a corporation through its Secretary or other individual officers, and it is with individuals in the last resort that we must deal ; for at best these corporate unities of persons are never more than quasi-personal.

It is interesting and important to observe that mediæval political theorists regarded the State as a firm or partnership and not as a fictitious, still less a real, person. "How came it about that political theory, which went to the lawyers for most of its ideas, borrowed the contract of partnership rather than the apparently far more appropriate act of incorporation ? In brief the answer is that the current doctrine of corporations, the classical and Innocentian doctrine, stood beneath the level of philosophic thought. A merely fictitious personality, created by the State and

shut up within the limits of Private Law, was not what the philosopher wanted when he went about to construct the State itself."*

It is not infrequently urged that there pertains to the nation, not personality indeed, but "super-personality." What, however, is meant by "super" in this connection? If the nation is other than a person, a self-determining spirit, it must be infra-personal or material; for we have no truly affirmative categories except personal and impersonal. Super-personal is a name for the unknown and the (literally) unthinkable.† In fine, the ego is always an individual self-consciousness, the will of an individual self-determining person. Self-conscious reason and love are alike impossible apart from the activity of the self. Where is the ego of a nation? Is it the minister who makes active the nation's will? But he is not a moral agent unless that action is also his own action, and he does not represent the nation unless he represents the majority of individuals in their separate free assents. If he is the ego of the nation, is the nation dead when he is destroyed? This is the futility of thought underlying many assassinations. It involves the confusion between personality itself and a personal consciousness on the part of persons of what they have in common. The technical error is one, common in primitive and mediæval thinking, of treating an abstract general as a concrete reality and, as we saw above, of applying the category of personality to the aggregated lump.

* Maitland, *Introduction to Gierke's Political Theory of the Middle Age*, p. xxiii. On this section pp. 108-125 see Maciver, *op. cit.*, bk. ii.

† See further *The Open Light, An Enquiry into Faith and Reality*, N. Micklem. pp. 50f. (The Swarthmore Press.)

II

Never does a nation seem to act as if it were a corporate personality in quite the same degree as when it comes into violent conflict with a similar group. An abnormally keen sense of solidarity is aroused, when the call comes to defend those interests which are cherished by the whole group. This provides a basis for the concentration of purpose and the unanimity of action upon which military success largely depends. From this striking manifestation of unity arises the common tendency to speak of "England" fighting "Germany," as if these were collective personalities. It is true that on closer scrutiny it may perhaps appear that, even if the threatened interests are felt by all to be worth the defending and to be really endangered, there may be dissident groups who are in opposition, being convinced that war is morally objectionable or practically ineffective or both. But let us suppose that there is no open dissent; is there in that case a collective personality which renders it strictly accurate to say that "England" is fighting "Germany"? If so, how does this personality express itself? A policy, if we would be exact, originates not with a personal entity called the nation but with certain politicians. It is possible that disagreeing at first among themselves they may have decided to act upon the policy preferred by the majority. Having thus as individuals settled their own differences they proceed as a Cabinet or Council of State to present a case to their fellow-countrymen in such a way

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as to command general assent. But it is the common assent of individuals once again that is gained, and the unity of action that results is secured in no other way than this. It is not grounded in any mysterious entity such as a national soul or personality, which, as we have seen, is as difficult to run to earth as the snark, and, we may add, is as much a character of fiction.

Punch may present us with the portraiture of a collective Englishman playfully called John Bull, a bland, elderly gentleman in knee-breeches and an antiquated coat; slow to anger he seems to be, but it is dangerous to presume too far on his good nature. He appears to be an amiable and not very intellectual representative of the English squirearchy, but it cannot be said that he is anybody in particular. Is he then everybody in general?

> A figure—but no shape;
> A vizor—but no knight;
> The real abstract hero of the age;
> The staple Stranger of the stage;
> A Some One made in every man's presumption,
> Frankenstein's monster—but instinct with gumption.

The simple truth is that he exists nowhere except on paper. It is as if, having nothing better to do, we were to put together a photograph of Mr. Asquith's brow, Lord Grey's nose and mouth, Mr. Burns' beard and Mr. Lloyd George's hair to form what is called a "composite" photograph. If we have a vivid imagination and a careless mind, we may transfer the photographic reality of these parts to the whole concoction and regard it as a real photograph. A real photograph it is

not, much less is it the photograph of a real person. This cartoon-and-catchword-thinking is primitive thinking, and the result is modern mythology. During a war there is always a lapse into primitive thinking and barbaric passion. Credulous theologians will perhaps continue to hope and prove that we shall avoid these things in the next holy war; the psychologists are wiser. Let us hear a neutral: "Is the present war supposed to be a war of economics? That is a neutral American 'business-like' standpoint, that does not take the blood, tears, unprecedented deeds of infamy and great distress into account, and which completely ignores the fact that this war is really an *epidemic of madness*. The several parties project their unconscious upon each other, hence the mad confusion of ideas in every head."*

Our abstraction fails us when we bring it to the test of history and experience. When Dr. Temple exemplifies the divine action in history, he cannot show us this personalised nation as the instrument of its purpose; it is to Alexander and Napoleon that he directs our attention.† Are we to help out our theory of national personality by saying that the soul of Hellas found embodiment in Alexander? Had he then two souls, his own and the nation's which he embodied, or did the national soul replace his own? The truth is, of course, that in the last resort we come back to the personal individual who is the fundamental

* Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, second edition, 1917, p. 416. Similarly Baudouin, "*Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*," E.T. p. 176. (Geo. Allen & Unwin).

† *Op. cit.*, Appendix V.

reality. It is not to be denied that the group has reality and worth, but it is not the reality and worth of a collective personality.* We have dealt with this matter at some length because of the theoretical obscurity that surrounds it, but still more because of the practical mischief that arises from what seems to us to be a wrong view. To mention one practical consequence of this fallacy, there is the demand for the undiscriminating punishment of innocent individuals for what is regarded as a collective crime. This is an injustice which offends the moral sense as soon as it is realised concretely and with any vividness. It is one of the ways in which the notion of a collective personality disregards and depresses the individual personality. It is a reversion to the old tribal habit of thought before the individual has attained to clear recognition, and when by the vendetta a crime committed against any

* Dr. Figgis appeared to hold this doctrine of collective personality, but not with complete consistency. In one place he speaks of "the fact that corporate personality, this unity of life and action, is a thing which grows up naturally and inevitably in bodies of men united for a permanent end, and that it cannot in the long run be denied merely by the process of saying that it is not there. In other words, this personality is inherent in the nature of the society as such, and is not a mere name to be granted or denied at the pleasure of the sovereign authority." (*Churches and the Modern State*, Longman, p. 64.) This seems unequivocal enough; but he says later: "All these groups (or many of them) live with a real life; they act towards one another with a unity of will and mind *as though* they were single persons," *ib.*, pp. 87, 88 (italics are ours), and again: "Every State is *a synthesis of living wills*. Harmony must ever be a matter of balance and adjustment, and this at any moment might be upset, owing to the fact that man is a spiritual being and not a mere automaton. It would seem to be wiser to treat all these great and small corporate entities which make up our national life as real, as living beings, *i.e.*, *practically as persons*." *Ib.*, pp. 92, 93, (italics again our own). Surely Dr. Figgis was halting between two opinions?

member of a group might be revenged upon any other member of it. It is war-morality.

Throughout this book the supreme worth of personality is taken as a final criterion; whatever tends towards the cramping of individual personality is regarded as bad and anything that favours its expression and development as good. The position thus adopted obviously involves a whole philosophy which it would be clearly impossible to vindicate at anything like sufficient length in the present discussion. But some explicit statement regarding a presupposition so fundamental it may be well to make at this point. The following section in smaller type may be omitted by readers not especially conversant with metaphysics.

It cannot be well denied that that which gives meaning to the whole of life is the ultimate reality; for no one can say without self-contradiction that that which is meaningless is final. There are two elements in self-conscious experience, persons and things, spirits and the outer world. We need not labour a discussion already finished for thinkers, that we could know no such thing as matter (things) were self-consciousness not pre-supposed. More than that, all value is personal and all meaning is personal. If, for instance, we take mathematics, it is found that the necessity of mathematics is a rational necessity; but there is no reason nor rationality apart from personality and, let it be noted, apart from personal activity; for reason is a functioning of personality according to its true nature. Thus the *a priori* necessity which lies at the basis of mathematics is a necessary way in which personality functions in relation to space experience; further, the practical outcome of mathematics is relative to the empirical conditions which are the empirical conditions for personal life. It is the same in science; we say that Nature yields up her secrets, which is true, but every scientific discovery is a personal attainment involving personal self-realisation and resulting in better conditions for the manifestation of personality, that is, for society.

Similarly the real necessity that lies behind æsthetic is in the nature of the soul and in that which the empirical element of sense evokes; and this is relative to meaning, and, let us add, a meaning deeper than that which mathematics or physics unfolds, deeper because more personal. This will be seen when we notice that the sense of beauty is the awakening of the personality to a certain state of purity and disinterested judgment necessary for nobility of soul and for those personal relationships of life without which there is no true love nor fellowship. It is for this reason that art has an infinite meaning; it evokes that state in us which has an indefinite and eternal application; the necessity for art is ultimately this; that these states of soul which it evokes are among the necessary personal conditions for personal self-realisation, and without it we cannot imagine a complete life or a true fellowship. If we take the other branch of aesthetics, namely the sublime, the issue is still clear; for it is not only the beauty of Nature, its order or harmony, that evoke the sense of the sublime, but also the denial of these things. The storm manifests a formless might and a merciless destruction; but, as Kant has shown, this terrific material might, against which we, as material bodies, are utterly powerless, evokes the sense of sublimity by awaking us to the fact that our reality is not body but spirit, that we are self-conscious while nature is not, that though it can destroy the body, it can never touch the soul, and that when we understand our real self, we know that, having a destiny for the spiritual sphere, we are victors, for when it destroys the body it can do no more.

Again, when we come to moral and ethical categories, the same result is apparent: it is obvious that without morals personal life is meaningless; but Nature is not moral, if by Nature we mean the non-personal world. Ethical law is but the expression of rational personality in its fellowship with persons; it is Reason, that is, the consistent and harmonious, manifested both in intention, disposition and action in the sphere of personal fellowship: its meaning is therefore obviously personal, and it has in it that which proves that personality is the ultimate value; for its fundamental basis is that each person must be treated as an end in himself and not as a thing, a part of non-personal Nature: it is therefore implicitly posited in ethics that ultimate value is personal

and that the ultimate meaning of the world is ethical, and therefore personal. The very term value itself has no meaning except for personality. Gold and precious stones, the various elements in Nature which may be harnessed by reason, have no value at all except that which they acquire in relation to personal life, or which persons in their development put upon them.

Finally, religion involves that the meaning of the Universe is personal: we only have religion because this is implicit in the soul. Religion arises with the sense of the sacred, which comes to be that which has an absolute and not-to-be-questioned worth; even with the savages it is not the fetish as material that is worshipped, but the spirit of the fetish which is supposed to be in it or in relation to it. With the development of personality this vague conception of spirit acquires content: it comes to be moral, which we have seen to be a personal term; it is seen to have æsthetic quality, until at last God is recognised as the Supreme Person, as self-conscious Spirit, possessing reason, will and love. We ultimately realise that the end of the world is the kingdom of God, that is, the personal fellowship or family of which God is the Father and we are children and brethren. It is obvious that this is posited implicitly in all religion; for, as we have seen, there is but the personal and impersonal, and, were God impersonal, men would worship that which could not hear them or know them, that is to say, they would worship that which was lower than themselves.

[It is as well to notice that while we may loosely say truth, beauty and goodness are eternal, it is not technically correct to say so. There is no truth apart from a personality which is true: that is not to say that truth depends upon finite personalities, but rather that truth is the law of personal life, and has no meaning except for personal life, and no existence apart from personal life. Truth is an isolated abstraction apart from personality, and like all abstractions, it can never be really isolated in fact any more than the colour can be isolated from the flower. We often use the term true in connection with facts when we should use the term correct; for truth involves more than mere harmonious adjustment or actuality; it involves right intention and right disposition, and is relative to that attitude of personality without which

correct action is not complete. We have seen that beauty has no meaning apart from the sense of beauty, and therefore when we say that beauty is eternal, we do not mean that it is timeless in the sense that our judgment of the beauty of a flower does not depend upon the day on which we see it and is not affected by passing years if it be once correct; we mean rather that beauty is ultimate, and in this sense it can only exist for persons; for the grass withereth and the flower fadeth: it is only the soul that remains. And when we think of goodness, we may have that which is beneficial in the outward relation of circumstances, but these are passing, and even as passing they are but conditions; goodness, however, is an abstraction of personal quality, and, as Kant rightly says, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will."* The good will is the fundamental necessity without which nothing is really good, and will is not conceivable apart from personality. It is personality, as actively and affectionally rational, that gives meaning to the world.]

III

Let us now turn to some other aspects of the subjects before us. What significance has the nation for history and for the Divine purpose? Must Christ establish a *modus vivendi* with Cæsar by ruling over the Church Himself and leaving the nation to Cæsar's jurisdiction, or will the kingdoms and nations of this world become, as such, part of the Kingdom of God? Can the life of the nation be so moralised and unified that it may become an organ of the Kingdom of God, or are we to look for the disappearance of these national differentiations and the emergence of a new world-order in which the nation will have no useful function to fulfil? It is better to leave these remoter questions to the prophets, adding, however, that an undifferentiated

* *Theory of Ethics*, p. 9, Abbott's translation.

cosmopolitanism does not seem an alluring prospect, and that some form and degree of national diversity may well be a permanent enrichment of human life. What seems to be certain is that for a long time to come, if not for ever, the peoples will be organised for common purposes into nations and States. If we are not moral dualists, we shall therefore desire to see the national life so moralised that Cæsar may increasingly become the vicegerent of Christ. This method of permeation is despaired of from different standpoints by groups of revolutionary socialists and revolutionary Christians, and not without considerable show of reason.

History has brought bitter disillusionment to many idealists, and those who set out to effect a spiritual revolution in society have often, under pressure, submitted to compromises, learning to be content with results pitiful in comparison with their splendid hopes. Many a leader, too wise in his generation, has failed his "little flock."

> We that had loved him so, followed him, honoured him,
> Lived in his mild and magnificent eye,
> Learned his great language, caught his clear accents,
> Made him our pattern to live and to die!

The cynic may fortify his position with much argument drawn from history, and it is small wonder that the very elect have sometimes lapsed into pessimism and have used its language: "the whole world lieth in the Evil One." Let it lie there, some have said, and let us set ourselves by God's grace and for God's glory to build a new society from the very foundations. It is much the same that Lenin says in a different dialect.

This involves for Christians that the Church should become a nation and take over all a nation's varied functions. But how can it do this, unless it secure the consent of those who form the nation, the despair of which very thing is the motive of this policy? If they form within the nation a smaller community in which a direct effort shall be made to sanctify all the manifold functions and activities that are proper to human life in society, they will hope thereby to influence the larger society by the impressiveness of the witness borne in the very life of the new society. They will resolutely try to undermine the old society by drawing its members away as largely and as speedily as possible into the new society. But if the result falls short of this programme, they may feel that even so it is better to have a society smaller in numbers but higher in character and for that reason better fitted within its narrower limits to express the glory of the Divine purpose. Such men must test their faith by action based upon it. In any case they must not cut themselves off from all relationships with the surrounding society, for complete isolation would mean the loss of influence. Nor does it seem possible for them to show that their dispiriting judgment on present society and civilisation has any finality in it, and that it is consequently to be held by all Christians. The most that can be argued from history is that this view has a certain presumption in its favour, and this claim it will be hard for others to refute. But past failures and disappointments cannot yield the irresistible conclusion that the future can hold no hopes; consequently other Christians will be disposed, in spite of much that

must be accounted failure in the past, to try to reform society by remaining within it and seeking to influence it from within; they will remember that it was said of old time, "the field is the world," and they will not despair of present society, though there seem to be many tares and little wheat. Believing that on the whole the present society registers progress as compared with what went before, they will feel that in this sense society and the powers that be are ordained of God—not that this involves them in approving blindly of every form of society or of every policy, as some theologians have argued in the mental confusion occasioned by the war.* They will approve of social institutions and standards in so far as these represent an advance, seeking ever for further progress towards the ideal. They will not regard as irremediable the evil and defective features of society, though as a matter of fact they have not yet been remedied.

As to these rival policies which Christians may adopt, each section must act according to the light that it sees.† The important point for the moment is that in both cases it is a national life

* This confusion takes the form of arguing in the first instance about the State in the abstract, and then tacitly or openly identifying the State as it is with the State as it ought to be. (See further, *infra*, pp. 157ff.) The argument sometimes used, that military necessity overrides normal morality, is not due to mental confusion so much as to a misunderstanding as to the nature of morality. "The canonists, then, while maintaining the divine nature of secular authority, and while condemning revolt against this as a revolt against God, seem clearly to maintain the principles of the Fathers like St. Ambrose and St. Isidore, and of the ninth century writers, that the legitimacy of secular authority depends upon its being conformed to the law of justice." Carlyle *Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, II., p. 151.

† See *infra*, pp. 194ff.

that is aimed at, a national life ideally conceived as a function of the Kingdom of God. Humanity no doubt is our final unity, but "since our hearts are small," as Kipling says, it seems to be too large to be dealt with in the mass; inevitably, therefore, we must deal with it not only through action upon individuals but also through the groups into which it seems to be organised by a natural ordinance which, so far as we can see, is of God. "In labouring for our own country on the right principle, we labour for Humanity. Our country is the fulcrum of the lever we have to wield for the common good. In abandoning that fulcrum, we run the risk of rendering ourselves useless not only to humanity but to our country itself."*

* Mazzini, *Duties of Man*, chapter v., cf. also Burke:—"Society is indeed a contract; subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure—but the State ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper or coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. . . The municipal corporations of that universal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on their speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles."

IV

The proposal to set up a League of Nations with its attendant international institutions presupposes that the ultimate unity will be a unity of national groups, a *communitas communitatum*. This ideal is in no wise inconsistent with the Christian ideal of the Kingdom of God. The nations, it is true, must of necessity be greatly changed, but they need not be other than nations. Why should the development towards nations and the subsequent development within nations be supposed to have reached its term or, if we will, to have run into a *cul de sac?* The nation may readily be conceived as an organ of the Kingdom of God, but for this end it must become far more homogeneous than it is at present. Israel was certainly regarded by the prophets as the instrument of the divine purpose, and, though actually it failed to realise its destiny because it was divided within itself through homage to divergent and inconsistent ideals, it was the function of the faithful remnant to bring the others to a better mind, in order that they might be fitted for their divine mission. The vineyard might be taken from the recreant nation, but it would have to be given to another; for these cultural values are social values; they cannot be created by any individual in isolation. The real unity of a nation is a teleological one arising out of its function or mission. It can only be completely achieved when the ideal is generally recognised and the mission to which it summons is accepted.

Mazzini insists that the nation, if it is to fulfil its mission in the world, must have a common ideal and a faith that can be expressed and taught.* To communicate this faith to the new generation and thereby to integrate it into the nation is the real function of education as he conceived it. A nation without a common faith can never be other than heterogeneous and at cross purposes with itself. "That which is most important for you is that your children be taught what are the Ruling Principles and Beliefs directing the life of their fellow-men, during the span of existence allotted to them on earth—what the moral, social, and political programme of their nation—what the spirit of the legislation by which their actions will be judged—what the degree of progress already achieved by humanity—what the goal it is destined to attain. And it is important that they should be taught in their earliest years a spirit of equality and love which links them in a common aim with the millions, the brothers given them by God. The education that will afford your children such teaching as this, can only be given them by the nation."†

An important practical problem arises here: suppose the nation to be so divided within itself as to be incapable of expressing a common ideal in the larger life of the world, or alternatively to be united for the most part in holding a spurious ideal, how is a line of advance to be found? The groups that stand for the higher ideal in each nation must under these circumstances make

* Is such a comprehensive and authoritative ideal for any nation to be found except in Christ?

† *Duties of Man*, chapter ix.

common cause, and in the case of Christians this will mean the formation of what may be called a Christian International.*

These idealist groups will thus unite not in order to cut themselves off from their fellow-countrymen but rather to strengthen one another's hands in action, each within his own country. At the same time they will witness in a limited and inadequate way to an international ideal which can only be fully expressed when it ceases to be sectional, either ecclesiastical or socialist, and the complete nations are won over to the larger ideal; for only *nations* can strictly express an International. The natural line of approach towards this goal is that the executive leaders in each nation should be persuaded to express the ideal in the nation's policy. The less enlightened members of the nation might then be expected to apprehend and appreciate such an ideal by observing it at work.

An exaggerated nationalism has tended from the first, as witness the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv. 5.10.), to obscure the universal faith and message of the Church. Consequent upon the rise of nationalism in Europe there appeared a tendency to identify the Church and the nation. This was expressed in the formula adopted by Lutherans: *cuius regio eius religio.*† This

* The Catholicity of such a group is grounded not in any concern for ecclesiastical order and hierarchical organisation but in a common loyalty to the supernational values of the kingdom of God. Such an International will, however, be a sentimental bond rather than an effective force unless in times of international conflict religious loyalty takes precedence over political. See next chapter.

† At Augsburg, 1555.

principle was adopted to secure the unity of the nation at a moment when political unity seemed to be contingent upon religious unity. But in the long run it has subjected religion to politics.* The "conversion" of England in and under Henry VIII was primarily a political move, so far as he was concerned. This mass conversion for political purposes cannot be a principle of true religion; but it is through tacit acceptance of it that Churches come to be so acquiescent in the national policy when war is declared. Christian principles have to be applied to the conditions of local and national problems, but they can never be limited to a merely national sphere. The League of Nations and a truly Catholic Church must both be grounded upon universals. So once again there is no real conflict between the genuine nationalism and the real internationalism. The nation exists to realise its own destiny, but this it can only fully do by furthering the spiritual destiny of the whole race. For as the individual realises himself through a unity such as the nation with which he is more intimately and therefore more effectively associated, so also these groups can only reach their destiny by ministering to the whole human family, which, on this view, may be regarded as a family of individuals and of nations, or, if we will, a family of individuals organised through groups. The individual can only enter effectively into relations with humanity as a whole through these smaller mediating groups.

* The political analogue of this principle is expressed by Ulpian *quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*; but this was only so, in Ulpian's view, because the Roman people had conferred their authority freely on the Emperor. See Carlyle, *Influence of Christianity upon Social and Political Ideas*, (Mowbray), p. 48.

We do well to realise that there are conceptions of nationality current in our time which are opposed to the view expressed above. Nationalism may be defined as a vivid sense of the importance of the nation as such, but in its extremer forms it leads to Jingoism and imperialism such as that of Scipio Sighele, who in his *Nationalismo ed i partiti politici* speaks of the nation as being inspired in its activities by a desire for power much after the manner of Nietzsche. The vigour of a nation, he says, is shown by its tendency to spread itself geographically (*estrinsecarsi*). This involves the acquisition of further territory and war as the means by which this will for power makes itself effective. Sighele is as indignant with pacific and humanitarian sentiment in the political realm as is Sorel or Lenin with any show of mildness in the industrial sphere. This is imperialism naked and shameless. It presupposes that the nation is a law unto itself.* This aggressive self-assertion has as its motive what is dignified by the title *il sacro egoismo*. *Egoismo* it certainly is, but *sacro* it undoubtedly is not. This is the temper that is calculated to frustrate all efforts to establish a League of Nations, which involves a limitation of national sovereignty. But that

* The kind of supremacy maintained under this view is obviously one that can only be established through military force. If men in many lands hold the view, that their State is to assert its supremacy, they are involved in endless conflict with one another, with morality and with logic, with one another because it is each man's duty to fight for his fatherland's glory, with morality because morality involves the notion of mutual rights and duties, with logic because in the same Universe there cannot be two (or more) supreme ends! This applies to all thoroughgoing imperialism.

absolute and unconditioned authority cannot belong to any State is a notion that goes back at least as far as the Stoics, who proclaimed a *jus gentium* or universal law. With this sort of nationalism the Christian can make no terms, but it may be doubted if the remedy for it is the abolition of the nation. Rather it seems that what is required is the sanctification of the nation by devotion to a nobler moral ideal, and the highest moral and social ideal is that of the Kingdom of God.

The International must be on a cultural basis. This involves that the nations must so come to appreciate one another that they unite. As Great Britain, comprising several nations, can be one, so on a far wider scale nationality may be transcended without being lost. Nationality is transcended, not when the nation is denied, but when it gives its real contribution to the whole. Thus is it twice blessed—by what it gives and by what in its turn it receives. The nation, like the home, must remain until it be fulfilled and so transcended.

Such is the true internationalism, as we conceive it. But it differs considerably from the proletarian internationalism of Lenin and Marx, which fails to recognise the importance of the nation as an entity. Their International is a larger group geographically and numerically regarded, but its unity is grounded in a narrower set of interests, that is, economic interests, whereas the nation is culturally greater, though numerically smaller,* because its unity is grounded in a larger

* Marx might reply to this that the whole of a nation's life is determined by its economic organisation. But the reply will convince no one but an economic determinist, see *supra*, pp. 27ff.

community of interests. This, however, is only to represent things as they are at the present moment. There is no reason why the "International" sentiment should not be purified and enlarged by a recognition of the fact that the higher cultural and spiritual values are universal in character; there may be distinctively national expressions of them, as in the case of music, or there may be an especially intense pursuit of any of them in one nation rather than in another, as of theology in Germany; but in this there is no conflict between the particular and the universal.

In fine, a nation seems to be an organ of culture and civilisation, and its main mission is to cherish and promote these values and to bring its own peculiar and differentiated contribution to enrich the common welfare. Just social reconstruction at home will make also for a juster and more harmonious relationship between nations, for the same principles which would lead to justice between classes at home would also lead to right international relationships. All our great human values are universal and international; commerce too is a form of mutual service between nations, if only men would recognise it as such, and although commercial rivalry is a potent cause of international jealousy and strife at present, mutual service for the common good must become in the future the motive in the industrial, social and political order. Then all the nations will bring their glory and honour into the City of God with its ever open gates and its never failing light.

Chapter V

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

I

The *Areopagitica* by one who knew politics from the inside is a protest against the censorship of the Press and enshrines one of the noblest pleas for liberty of thought and expression. Milton has the vision of an England free: "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant Nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazl'd eyes at the full mid-day beam, purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heav'nly radiance, while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amaz'd at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms." Not so brilliant in form nor so forthright in principle, but yet not dissimilar in standpoint, is Locke's *Essay on Toleration*, while Mill's discussion on "*Liberty*" expresses the nobler mind of the nineteenth century on the matter. It is true that another Englishman wrote the book called *Leviathan*, in which a very different doctrine is presented with

no mean skill,* but it is probable that the majority of enlightened Englishmen a generation ago would have sworn fealty to Milton rather than to Hobbes :

> We must be free or die, who speak this tongue
> That Shakespeare spoke, the faith and morals hold
> Which Milton held.

It has for long been the Englishman's boast that his country sided with the champions of liberty in all lands and afforded them asylum when they were exiled by their illiberal and intolerant compatriots. It was in England that Mazzini penned his glowing prophecies. In England and in the British Museum Karl Marx laboured upon his work *Das Kapital* ; in English soil at Highgate he lies buried. It has been in England that most of his life Kropotkin lived and taught till the overthrow of Tsardom enabled him, an old man, " to greet his own land with his wishful sight."

Things have happened, however, in our day which make it abundantly clear that the case for liberty and toleration has to be re-examined and re-stated. The passing of Compulsory Military Service Acts in defiance of our long-standing tradition and the perfunctory administration

* To a similar effect a famous essay by Bishop Berkeley begins in this lamentable way ; " That an absolute passive obedience ought not to be paid any civil power, but that submission to Government should be measured and limited by the public good of the society ; and that, therefore, subjects may lawfully resist the supreme authority, in those cases where the public good shall plainly seem to require it ; nay, that it is their duty to do so, inasmuch as they are all under an indispensable obligation to promote the common interest ;—these and the like notions, which I cannot help thinking pernicious to mankind, and repugnant to right reason. . ." *Passive Obedience init.*

of the sections in the Acts which provided that exemption should be granted to those who had conscientious objections to engaging in warfare, taken together with recent legislation to hinder, if not wholly to prevent, the entry of alien immigrants to these shores may be taken as proof that our traditional attitude towards liberty of conscience is no longer founded on the solid rock of principle and clear conviction. When the tempestuous passions of war came and blew upon the tradition, it was badly shaken if not completely shattered. Once again the issue presented by a conflict between the personal authority of conscience and the collective or political authority of the State confronts us.

It is urgently necessary to clarify the issues involved, for the minds of many men are in great confusion. This confusion is largely the result of a very equivocal apologetic for the recent war, to which resort was frequently made. It took the form of appealing alternately to rival and opposed views of the State. On the one hand we were told that one of the most important issues involved in the war was the attempt on the part of Germany to make dominant and operative a view of the State's all-embracing sovereignty that found exponents in Hobbes and Hegel. Against this view we were invited to make war at all costs in the name of human liberty. On the other hand, when men were pressed into the service by argument and legislation, it was this very view of the State—the absolutely sovereign State which has a right to make an unlimited demand upon a man and to exact unquestioning obedience from him—that came to the front. In the one

case it was an appeal against Hobbes and Hegel and in the other an appeal to them !

> Then the bowsprit got mixed with the rudder sometimes ;
> A thing, as the Bellman remarked,
> That frequently happens in tropical climes,
> When a vessel is, so to speak, " snarked."

The problem before us is one that arises most acutely and most frequently in highly developed communities, but it is in such communities on the other hand that it ought to be most easily solved. It might seem at first sight to be somewhat paradoxical to say that the problem relating to personal autonomy tends to be most acute in those social organisations which on the whole are most favourable to the development of liberty, or, to put it a little differently, that the problem arises at that stage in the growth of a community when it is moving more consciously towards the recognition of liberty as a social ideal ; but the reason why this should be the case is not far to seek.

In the earlier stages a community seems to be impelled as it were from behind by primitive and instinctive needs of which it is not clearly conscious. Hunger and love have been said to be the most powerful and persistent of social influences. The need to satisfy hunger and to propagate and protect physical life is one that is common to man and to other animals ; it accounts for the swarm in the case of bees, for the herd in the case of animals, and for the clan or tribe in the case of man. It is not so that human life begins with an isolated individual who associates himself with his fellows by a conscious social contract, as was maintained by social theorists like Rousseau ;

so too Hobbes gives a mournful picture of the state of primitive man upon the globe: "No account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."*

On the contrary, from the very first there was society; for from the nature of things mammalian organisms appear in communities whose type may broadly be said to be the family; in the case of slowly maturing creatures such as man with a comparatively long period of dependence the primitive group has an extended function which gives it the greater permanence. It is with a social unit, therefore, that we begin; man is by his very nature a social being.

This rudimentary group proves to be inadequate to ensure a sufficiency of food and protection against the attacks of similar groups, and so by a sort of brutal compulsion the clan is formed in order to be rid of the competition of the smaller groups. It is the same process which leads to the formation of the tribe. At this stage of organisation, though the welfare of the individual is necessarily involved, it hardly receives any definite recognition. An end or purpose is being served, but it is rather Nature's end than man's; for man serves it unconsciously, and its driving force is inherited instinct and impulse. The unit is the group; its solidarity is rooted in community of blood and of economic need; the individual has perforce to conform to the customs of the group, and at this point it scarcely occurs to him to try any other course.

* *Leviathan*, Part I., ch. 13.

Jonathan raises no protest against his father's fateful oath.* It is when the higher moral and spiritual needs of the community begin to claim conscious attention that the group comes to be moved not by a blind impulse but by a deliberate purpose. The ideal comes to count for more and more, and the mere impulse for less and less. The transition may be difficult to detect in detail, but that it necessarily occurs may well be understood. The contrast has been expressed in the familiar saying of Aristotle, that the State originates in the bare needs of life and continues in existence for the sake of the good life.†

In fine, looking to the past and to the lower side of our nature we see that social solidarity is grounded in physical need and necessity; looking to the future and the higher side of our nature we see that it is grounded in the effort to realise a common spiritual destiny. Marx is right retrospectively when he stresses the importance of the economic factor.

When this latter stage is reached, we come to the effective beginnings of real morality and progress, and it is at this point that the individual begins to count for his full worth as a moral agent. Progress inevitably depends upon the individual as the organ of spiritual vision ; ideals increasingly take the place of conventions, and aspirations as well as impulses direct the process ; not indeed that the instincts and impulses disappear by elimination, for they will still operate powerfully, and not less so in that they operate automatically and to a large extent unconsciously, but they

* I. Sam. XIV. † *Pol.* 1, 2, 8.

cease to be, if indeed they ever were in the strictest sense, the only factors in human activity. The values subserved by the pressure of instinct and impulse will be seen at this stage to be lesser though not unimportant values. The higher values on the other hand will be expressed in an ideal, which is only to be achieved by conscious and deliberate pursuit. The worth of a society will depend on the degree in which it stresses higher or lower human values, that is, on the degree in which it is predominantly moved by impulses or by ideals.*

But when we have reached this position, we see that the problem takes on another form: realised ideals embodied in traditions and social codes taken up into the warp and woof of the minds of the community come to be taken for granted and to be acted upon more or less automatically. Much of the legal code of a civilised society aims at the preservation of these moral and social achievements, and the penalties imposed upon offenders against a common social tradition are a device to prevent the individual from degrading the collective life of the community by acting on standards lower than those commonly recognised. Our liberties, as Burke says, should be regarded in the light of an inheritance. "Always acting as if in the presence of canonised forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity. . . . By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom.

* The contention of Freud and other psycho-analysts that our unconscious impulses work with unsuspected power and range may be perfectly accurate in point of fact; but it cannot affect the truth of what is here stated as an ethical judgment concerning what is desirable.

It carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrating ancestors. It has its bearings and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery of portraits ; its monumental inscriptions ; its records, evidences and titles."

But what if an individual wants to act on a standard which he feels to be *higher* than that which is commonly recognised ? Anything which prevents such action is an injury to the real welfare of the community. For the prophet represents " the spirit of the years to come, yearning to mix itself with life." It is for this reason most of all that personal liberty is of vital moment ; for the individual is not in this case being moved by caprice nor seeking that which in any small sense is pleasant or advantageous to himself ; rather he is honouring a standard of action which, if universally followed, would be for the general good and trying to secure its universal recognition by his own example of loyalty and obedience. This was the main contention of Socrates when he appeared before his Athenian judges : he was a heaven-sent gadfly urging his fellow-citizens to higher and nobler courses ; instead of punishing him they ought, said he, to show gratitude by maintaining him at the public expense. Athens judged herself in judging Socrates.

Two tendencies seem to be at work in more or less developing communities, the one aiming at conserving the achieved results of the past and therefore magnifying tradition, the other aiming at still greater achievement and so magnifying progress and that liberty which is the condition of its realisation. Now these two tendencies,

the conservative and the creative, are not necessarily opposed; for it is well to conserve the achievements of the past by every means which is truly favourable to this end, but only in order that from the tradition of the past we may more easily advance towards further progress. For progress is the march of the individual and of society towards an ideal destiny—

> On to the bound of the waste,
> On to the City of God.

But an undue stress laid upon past achievement and the social tradition in which it is registered leads to self-complacency and inertia and is the bar to progress both in the individual and in society. For whenever a community as a whole or any large section of it becomes disposed to rest content with a social achievement, a static conception of society results; the impulse towards change that is manifested by an individual or by a minority group is resented and is regarded as a disorderly element making for instability in a community which has reached a state of final equilibrium; a prophet is "a troubler of Israel," and "these that turn the world upside down" are not to be endured. Governments in particular are notoriously inclined to seek the easy way for themselves; this they do by favouring those parties and policies which least affect the *status quo* and by discountenancing the advocates of larger measures of change. In this way they expect to secure the greatest measure of agreement and consequently of unity; their concern is for what they regard as social order. This is quite intelligible and justifiable, but if they seek to throw discredit on social pioneers by calling them

agitators and by suggesting that they are mere gratuitous makers of mischief, they go beyond what is becoming. For in the course of history it has often happened that policies that appeared to the majorities to be undesirable have commended themselves later to the common judgment as a result of that very advocacy which was deprecated. "Your fathers stoned the prophets, and ye build their tombs." No one has the right to make the difficult task of Government unnecessarily difficult; conversely, those in authority have no right to ask that their task should be made easy for them at the cost of silencing the prophets.

Insight into historic process shows us that we should not condemn without qualification the *society* which stones the prophet, for ideals if adopted without being understood might be really destructive of society. For instance, to give unlimited freedom to children is not to produce liberty, but licence; similarly, selfishness under the shadow of a great ideal may actually destroy the attainments of society. Thus the abolition of army and police would destroy a society which had not come to see a better and more effective way of protecting good and overcoming evil than the army and the police can subserve. It therefore may be a not untrue sense of self-preservation which leads to the stoning of the prophet. On the other hand, society can never progress without the prophet, and the prophet, if a higher fellowship is to be created, must stand firm for the thing he sees. But such is the imperfection of human nature that the prophet with soul aflame has often preached his ideal in such a way that the ideal without the disposition corresponding to it and without which it

could not be safely operated has been all that the community saw, and in self-defence the community stoned him.* The true prophet, however, is one who not only preaches an ideal but incarnates it in a more loving and constructive personality. He may be stoned either because the message apart from the man is not understood, or because what he stands for both in ideal and in actuality opposes the selfishness of leaders, which then becomes militant ; but when he is a true prophet the stoning serves effectively to manifest his personal quality and that disposition which lies behind his ideal and which alone can make it operative. By this means then the community is raised to some real comprehension of the ideal it rejected.† Nothing, however, can justify the leaders of *religion* in stoning the prophets. They are not religious leaders if they merely voice the opinions of the community as it is at any given time, but only if they realise that the will of God as it is revealed requires quite apart from consequences not only their intellectual assent but their personal activity, and that with an absolute imperative. It is not open to religious leaders to say that the ideal is better, but that under the present conditions it is neither expedient nor possible ; for true religion cannot compromise with the ideal, but must stand

* For the prophet can only be personally known to a few ; his purposes and intentions are therefore liable to be misunderstood.

† Besides this, the ideal is illuminated by the necessary failure of the incomplete ideals which it transcends, a failure which is inevitable through the destruction and misery which the inadequate always ultimately involves, unless it be superseded in due season through the awakening consciousness which demands progress.

for it. We can therefore see why, for the sake of an ideal which was not only an intellectual persuasion but was so incarnated in Him that without it He could not be Himself, Christ should go to the Cross as to a doom that was inevitable, and should pronounce woe on the religious leaders of His time because their inability to see was due to religious insincerity. They took the position of expedient legislation and not that of childlike obedience to the divine will which always transcends actual conditions in its demands and its vision.

It can never be pardonable in a religious community to stone the prophets, because a Church should rest on the power of its ideal and its disposition, and unless it seek to transform society both in personality and law and methods with the leaven of the Spirit, it simply becomes part of the natural order which is ever a brake upon the ideal.

In most democratic communities a certain latitude in the advocacy of unpopular opinions and policies is usually allowed, but the difficult problem arises as to whether there should be any limit set to such advocacy, and, if so, how that limit is to be determined. If a minority wishes to proclaim and practise a policy which, if generally accepted, would appear to lead to the subversion of that order of life desired by the rest of the community, is it to be tolerated? If rumour speak truly, Lenin and the late Tsar would return the same negative answer, a case of strange bed-fellows. In their defence it might be urged that the judgment of the majority is likely to be right: *securus iudicat orbis terrarum.*

This is a good working rule but not an infallible criterion. It was a wise man who said long ago, "and now I say unto you, refrain from these men and let them alone; for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God."

Nothing short of the acceptance of this rule will really meet the case. It does not help to say that sincere advocacy of opinion and policy is to be allowed, for there is no way by which sincerity can be tested with certainty. It must be presumed that those who go to the trouble of engaging in unpopular propaganda are sincere, and that they are persuaded that what they champion truly matters. In such a case they will advocate their policy not merely on the ground that it is good for themselves, but also that it will be of universal advantage if universally accepted.*

II

In all this it has been presupposed that the individual and society must be interpreted in the light of their ideal destiny, that we cannot interpret either aright so long as we merely try to find its meaning in what it is at any particular moment, for we run the risk of being deluded into thinking of it as static. Both have undeveloped potentialities, and progress is therefore of the very essence of their life. Progress, then, is necessarily to be conceived of as movement towards an

* Of course, this does not mean that individuals and minorities may molest their fellows, for they obviously cannot claim liberty of action in a way which involves the denial of it to their neighbours.

unrealised but authoritative ideal. We must therefore say both of a man and of a society of men that it really, though not actually, is what it is capable of becoming.* The idealist is therefore a truer interpreter than the so-called realist, who takes things at their immediate and present value.

From this we deduce the necessity of liberty, for the ideal must be freely embraced and in no other way than by freedom can a moral ideal be realised. The slavish and unquestioning obedience to traditional standards, no matter how convenient it may seem to be for political purposes, is of little moral worth. " My country," or my party, " right or wrong," may have the sound of a very thoroughgoing loyalty, but, in that it asserts a non-moral solidarity, it is destitute of moral worth. The real reason for being loyal to the community is that it is the organ of a moral purpose. Authority, then, is not in the community as such but in the moral ideal, and for an enlightened conscience loyalty to the community must be based on the fact that the community itself is expressing loyalty to the ideal ; in other words, our highest or real loyalty is due to that ideal community in which the moral ideal will find complete and actual embodiment, and only in a secondary sense to the actual community which but imperfectly embodies the ideal.

> For Zion's sake I will not hold my peace,
> And for Jerusalem's sake I will not rest,
> Until her righteousness go forth as brightness,
> And her salvation as a lamp that burneth.

It is right, then, for the individual in given circumstances to appeal from the requirements

* Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1, 2, 8.

of the actual community to that court of higher instance which is the ideal. This appeal is not due to caprice nor personal predilection on the part of the individual, but to a concern for the real good of the actual community. "If thou in this thy day hadst known the things that belong to thy peace. . . . . ." Our Lord because of and not in spite of His patriotism would stand for the things of His nation's peace, whether His people would or no. The highest ideal is one that includes the highest good both of the individual and of the community to which he belongs. It follows therefore that the individual is furthering the good of the whole by expressing loyalty to the ideal and by urging the community to do so. Interests may be limited to person or party; ultimate ideals are not partial and separatist but universal; an ideal may have partial and particular embodiments as in the family and in the nation, but no real embodiment of a true ideal can be in conflict with the universal good. A family or a nation may embark on a policy which merely expresses a separatist interest, and this may conflict with other rival interests in so far as it is a mere interest; that is why social and national policy should be directed by principles which are universal rather than by interests which are particular and divisive. Justice can only be achieved by fidelity to principle.* It is right, therefore, for an individual or a group to refuse to share in a policy which offends against the ideal, and even to oppose it. To acquiesce in

* It would have been well if these things could have been borne in mind by statesmen at Versailles.

a common policy when it is felt to be wrong is to maintain solidarity at the cost of the ideal, to substitute a lower loyalty for a higher.* For this reason the individual must maintain his right to moral autonomy. He does this not that he may enjoy a personal luxury, but because it is a fundamental necessity of real moral action Athanasius may only stand, as it appears, *contra mundum*, when he is really standing *pro mundo*.†

The question of liberty and autonomy takes us to the very heart of morality. Kant insists that morality is not mere expediency: the latter is relative, whereas the former is absolute; the moral ideal comes to us as a categorical imperative with its own inherent and sufficient authority and its demand for an absolute though not unthinking obedience: the obedience must be real and therefore inward. The moral law is authoritative because it commends itself to our conscience and awakens a response in us not as something alien compelling us from without but as an expression of our inmost and most real nature. Because it is our inmost nature, it therefore has a universal quality. In truly moral conduct we consciously will the law of our own ideal nature; therefore it is our own law, and in obeying it we are realising our own freedom. We exercise autonomy even in obeying the will of God, for "in His will is our peace."

* This has a very close bearing on the morality of national alliances where the temptation is to aim at agreement at the expense of principle.

† As in the State so in the Church there is no ultimate authority except in the right. The appeal to canon law or to Church Councils cannot as such be binding upon Christians; only that is binding which is seen or believed to be right; nothing is binding upon the individual which he sees to be wrong.

This is a somewhat abstract account of freedom as an ideal; in actual practice we are not wholly free from constraint, for we are influenced by the pressure of public opinion and by social conventions which we have not examined and justified to ourselves. In principle, however, it is clear that we must demand that larger measure of liberty which is necessary for completely moral action. In human experience we may at first be incapable of exercising any but that limited freedom which consists in the absence of interference from without; but we must ever press on to that positive freedom which is of the nature of an achievement through moral obedience to the ideal. "Wir Deutschen fürchten Gott," said Luther, "und niemand sonst"; that, if it be true, is the real freedom.

A certain degree of freedom is the necessary condition of our making our earliest moral choices, and the reward of making right choices is an evergrowing freedom. From this point of view freedom appears both a means and an end, a starting-point and a goal. A man may be morally enslaved though politically free; conversely he may be morally free though politically enslaved. Political slavery is no small matter, but, taken alone, political freedom is not an ultimate or absolute value. "We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man. . . . . Verily I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant (slave) of sin." We need freedom in all its forms.

From what has been said it follows that no outside authority can step in at any stage of the process and say, Thus far shalt thou go and no

further ; no term can be set by such an authority to the soul's moral career. This claim to unlimited liberty is not arbitrary, though to many it may seem excessive. The larger liberty of society is due in the last resort to the exercise of freedom by individuals who have played the part of moral pioneers. If we are born free, it is because others have purchased freedom at a great price. The moral pioneer who appears to break the ranks and to deny his solidarity with his fellows is really blazing a trail for the whole community. Average morality is not creative morality. While the moral pioneer must brave all penalties in his loyalty to the higher ideal, it is a short-sighted and misguided community which inflicts such penalties. That new Jerusalem which is from above, because it is at present the city of our hopes and dreams, is free, and its citizens are all free men ; that city is the mother of us all. Existing communities tend to treat their morally more precocious children rather after the manner of the traditional step-mother ; the children on their side are apt to feel that they are but pilgrims and strangers who have no abiding city but seek one which is still to come.

III

The view of the sovereign State which is presented to us by Hobbes and Hegel is one which makes no clear recognition of this inward, personal and autonomous nature of morality. The State or nation is regarded as having necessarily a greater authority than the individual in virtue of its own intrinsic nature. In the last

resort, however, even this would only be true, as we have seen elsewhere, because of the positive goodwill exercised by all the individuals ; there is no communal Oversoul that can be seen to function as such independently of the several members of the social group.

But in what has come to be the current Hegelianism of recent political thought in England society is conceived in biological terms, and that unfortunately on the analogy of lower organic types. On this view the individual is thought of as a mere cell or at best a limb. The analogy is helpful in some ways, but it becomes misleading and mischievous when pressed too rigorously ; for though it would seem to have been truer of earlier forms of society, such as the tribe, where the individual received no clear recognition and where his dependence was more thorough-going, we have seen that in more developed, that is to say, more moralised communities, the social solidarity increasingly depends upon personal consent and upon recognised community of purpose. This higher type of community has been organised through the pursuit of common ideals, but it cannot be developed by the sacrifice of personal liberty and moral initiative in the individual. Hegel contends that the liberty which the individual realises through the concrete institutions of the community is more real than the abstract and theoretical liberty upon which Kant laid so much stress, and that such concrete conditions are necessary for the realisation of moral purposes and the development of moral personality. In this form the contention may be true, but it affords no excuse for the confusion

of ideal with existing institutions, the Prussian constitution or any other. When Hegel treats the community as having unchallengeable authority, he practically, though not intentionally, strikes at the root of morality by depressing the worth and importance of the individual person. " The State which is the realised substantive will, having its reality in the particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal, is absolutely rational. This substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In this freedom attains its highest right. This end has the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the State."* He adds as a note : " Were the State to be considered as exchangeable as the civic society, and were its decisive features to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would then be at one's option to be a member of the State. But the State has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only as being a member of it. Union, as such, is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result." Hegel rightly contends that society is the sphere in which the individual expresses his liberty ; but this means that society is, in part at any rate, a means for the development of the individual and is not an absolute end in

* *Philosophie des Rechts*, Section 258, Dyde's translation.

itself against which the individual has no personal rights. Society organised as a State is only completely sovereign if and in so far as it exercises the function of a real State, in so far as it contributes to the real development of the individuals comprised in it. Apart from society the individual cannot develop personality, for personality is a social concept ; but it does not follow that any or every particular organisation of society furthers this moral end. It must be allowed therefore, if we are really concerned with individual personality as an end of supreme worth, that there are circumstances in which the individual both in his own interest and in that of society may appeal against an enactment of the society acting as State to the ideal purpose for which society exists.

A particular social enactment may be resented either on the ground that it is lower than a previously recognised ideal or lower than a new ideal which has been perceived. When Antigone defied the king's command which forbade the burial of her brother, she appealed to the unwritten laws of traditional family piety which she felt to be higher and therefore more authoritative than this new edict.

Antigone :

I'll bury him ; doing this, so let me die.
So with my loved one loved shall I abide,
My crime a deed most holy ; for the dead
Longer have I to please than these on earth.
There I shall dwell for ever : be it thine
To have scorned what gods have hallowed, if thou wilt.

Ismene :

Nay, nothing do I scorn ; but, how to break
My country's law—I am witless of the way.

Antigone :

For thee such plea may serve ; I go to heap
The earth upon my brother, whom I love.*

The mere fact that the edict was issued by the king did not invest it with authority in Antigone's eyes : the appeal of morality must be inward, and it was to that more authoritative appeal that she responded though it involved her in an act of defiance towards the king.

Similarly Socrates would not escape the penalties of the Athenian State by promising to refrain from his prophetic mission, being persuaded that this mission was given him by a higher authority than the State, namely by God, and that his work was in the higher interests of the Athenian community, notwithstanding the fact that it was regarded with disfavour. But the appeal here is to an unrecognised ideal, and in this it differs formally, though not essentially, from the case of Antigone. The moral innovator breaks solidarity with the community on the lower level in the hope of resuming it later on a higher moral plane. When Crito proposed to Socrates that he should avoid the death penalty by withdrawing from the Athenian community, Socrates showed how greatly he valued his citizenship by refusing to go. He was not primarily concerned about himself but about the common good ; his supreme loyalty was due and was given to an ideal Athens ; but he did not confuse the moral issue by idealising the Athens of his day into an infallible super-state to which, as possessing an absolute and arbitrary authority, unquestioning obedience was to be given. To such an external authority only outer

*Whitelaw's translation.

and formal compliance need be given, and only such perfunctory homage can be exacted by it. That, however, is an illusory type of loyalty which, though much belauded in certain quarters, lacks inner moral reality.

IV

At this point it may be well to raise the question as to the form in which the appeal from Cæsar to Christ is to be made, when the need for it arises. Are we to accept a certain body of doctrines relating to the end and the method to be pursued in conduct merely on the ground that it comes to us from Christ, the Divine law-giver? This attitude of simple unquestioning obedience seems to many religious minds to have a special virtue and impressiveness; it is commonly regarded as a sublime form of faith or trust; but it is trust in an *external* authority, which we have already censured in discussing political loyalty on the ground that it robs the will of real autonomy and morality of that enlightened and willing consent which is of its very essence. One of the glories of Christianity is that it suffers no ultimate divorce between religion and morality. To do a thing merely because Christ requires it, and not because we see that what He requires is right, would indeed be to make the Christian ethic a slave-morality, as Nietzsche says it is. But Christ does not come to us as a tyrant requiring blind and unquestioning conformity with his demands, for such conformity would not be real obedience.

> Theirs not to reason why
> Theirs but to do or die

may be a convenient attitude for war purposes ; it is not Christian morality or indeed any sort of real morality. We may begin, indeed, with such unenlightened conformity to the demands of the Sermon on the Mount, but we do not render such moral obedience as is contemplated and required by Christ, until we exercise real inward freedom in our obedience. This truly moral consent can only be given when we ourselves by personal insight realise that the demand that comes to us from Christ's lips has inherent rightness in that it conforms to the deepest intuitions of our own nature and to the ultimate reality of the Universe.

This is the fundamental objection to certain positions in Calvinism which appear to maintain that God has the right to decree by sovereign fiat that certain of His creatures are to be eternally happy and certain others eternally miserable apart altogether from moral considerations as to the goodness or badness of their personal conduct during their life on earth. It may be possible by a certain unreality of thought to imagine God doing this in virtue of His superior power, but it is not possible for Him to make it just or right ; for justice is a relation between persons, and not even God can make a course to be just by ignoring the other persons involved in the relation. The fact that it is He who has created personal existence cannot deliver him from the necessity of treating persons, once He has created them, as such. Not so does the Father as revealed to us by Christ act towards his children, nor is the Son's authority of this arbitrary kind : " Henceforth I call you not servants (δουλοί), for

the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends." The Christian disciple is not kept in a position of utter tutelage ; he is admitted to the level of a friendship, in which his spiritual dignity is respected : " If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed, and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. . . . If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." Knowledge of moral truth does not consist in an external and superficial apprehension of moral propositions, but in an insight into their deeper meaning. Anything less than this is merely preparatory and provisional at best ; Christ is concerned with our spiritual maturity, and therefore makes appeal to our spiritual capacity for autonomy.*

But if this be the essential truth regarding the Christian life, clearly we may not ask an enlightened Christian to accept any other presupposition than that of spiritual autonomy in the political sphere. There too, unless he be a moral dualist ready to divide life up into separate compartments and so in the last resort to destroy the unity of his own personality, he is bound to say to those who require of him that he should act in ways which

* A theologian who holds that religious truth or revelation is a supernatural truth in the sense that it is non-natural implicitly denies that the world can ever become religious : for if the two forms of truth are capable of being related to one another, they cannot imply two standards of morality ; in this case the supernatural is not supernatural because it is correlative to natural insight or capacity ; or else (which comes to the same thing) the one can be subsumed under the other ; alternatively, if the two forms of truth are mutually contradictory, it follows that when a man acts as a citizen, he denies his God, and that God has denied Himself in creating a natural order which cannot be related to His will and a reason which cannot understand His (therefore irrational) ways.

are inconsistent with what he has come to recognise as the real meaning of life, " whether it be right to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye ; for we cannot but speak the things which we saw and heard," " for we can do nothing against the truth but for the truth." It is for this reason that Independency has been the parent of democracy ; men who had been accustomed in Church meeting as God's freemen to deliberate and to decide without reference to ancient formulæ or priestly direction were not likely to tolerate tyranny or autocracy in the State. " It was only in virtue of being thus put on a religious basis that these demands [for the rights of the individual] became absolute, and consequently admitted of and required a theoretic legal exposition. It was thus that they first passed into Constitutional Law as a fundamental doctrine, finding their way from the North American State-constitutions into the French, and thence into almost all modern constitutions."*

This does not imply that a nonconformist necessarily sees the truth in its fulness from the first or that he realises all the implications of the moral ideal ; but he must go on to do this out of sheer loyalty. Obedience to whatever measure of truth we already perceive is a condition of such growing insight ; fidelity is therefore of supreme importance and disobedience a dangerous disloyalty. The individual who resists the claim of the moral ideal is not only injuring his own moral integrity but also depriving society of the benefit which accrues to it from his obedience to an ideal which is never merely individual.

* Troeltsch *Protestantism and Progress* pp. 119-120.

V

In the light of this rather lengthy and theoretical discussion of general principles, let us take the concrete and crucial case of a breach of social solidarity during war owing to the conscientious objection on the part of some to engage in it. This case is likely to be a very difficult one in the conditions which surround modern warfare. Hobbes, who was himself no "breathing valiant man," may plead that a subject may sometimes not unjustly refuse to fight, "as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place; for in this case he deserteth not the commonwealth. And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness; not only to women, but also to men of feminine courage. . . . To avoid battle, is not injustice, but cowardice." But "when the defence of the commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged, because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain."* In the modern world this last condition is likely to be fulfilled; for the groups involved are large and powerful, and their power to inflict mutual injury has been enormously enhanced by the growth of technical skill. Moreover, the principle on which they grouped themselves up to the date of the recent war was that of trying to equalise military power so as to make victory for either side less likely and in any case extremely difficult to achieve, as indeed has proved to be the case. These conditions would appear to be such

* *Leviathan* II-21

as to make war so formidable that nations would not resort to it before trying all possible methods of conciliation. This seems to be a *prima facie* reason for supposing that a war entered into under such circumstances should be regarded as a moral necessity and therefore as inevitable. But the fact that it is so regarded by the combatant parties on both sides begins to lessen the value of this initial presumption ; to it may be added the fact that in calmer moments many men are doubtful whether war can ever be regarded as a moral arbitrament. Thus men find themselves with a vague and baffling sense that war is some strange and evil political necessity arising out of the very hardness of men's hearts and the consequent defeat of reason. Many spoke of the situation at the outbreak of the recent war as if, owing to the tangled state of the world, we were called upon to be loyal to an honour rooted in dishonour ; we must needs be faithful to our engagements whether actual or implied, for honour demands it ; but that it should lead us into war was due to a somewhat dishonourable arrangement of the worldly politicians. Or the confusion might present itself in some such form as this; on the one hand the interests to be championed were such as men could not afford to surrender, for they were not the interests of any one nation but of civilisation and mankind; on the other hand war is certainly an undesirable and un-Christian method of handling our fellow-men, and in an ideal community it would be impossible to resort to it ; but what if we abstain from war, and the great interests at stake are left in jeopardy ? That appears to be the worse

of two evil alternatives, and it must be right to choose the lesser of two evils in a situation where only a choice between evils is open to us. On the face of it it seems paradoxical to speak of a moral duty to choose an evil alternative, for it is the good that we are to choose as moral agents; and those whose apologetic merely took the form of defending one course of action as less bad than another need not have been so impatient as many of them were with others who espoused that which seemed to them to be a better course.

It must be granted that to break solidarity with the nation in so critical a situation is to adopt a course that is bound to appear ungracious at the very least, and it is liable to have all sorts of evil constructions put upon it. It is not a thing to do lightheartedly nor wantonly. But it may be doubted whether a Christian man need ever find himself in a situation where his only choice is between various forms of evil. Can a man who is in touch with God ever be supposed to be in such a desperate situation? From the point of view of morality that form of defence is about as ruinous as any that can well be imagined. Is it any other than a modified form of the saying, evil be thou my good? Is not that to "teach sin the carriage of a holy saint"?

There seem to be two cases to be considered, the first is that of the man who has made it part of his life-work to resist the courses that lead to war and to build up an order both at home and abroad that shall express brotherhood and human solidarity. He has protested against political commitments and entanglements that seemed to him likely to lead to the embroiling of

human relationships. The outbreak of a war which he has tried to prevent does not therefore put him in the position of having to choose between two evils or of following a principle of mere neutrality. Why should he not under new conditions continue in his task? It is not really at this point that he breaks solidarity with the nation, though this is the point at which it becomes obvious to others. All along he has pursued a different line, and he is not therefore committed to the logical consequence of other people's policy. When the new situation has arisen he has to consider whether a higher good is being presented to him than that which he previously pursued. He may well decide that there is no sufficient reason for departing from the course of action which he previously followed in opposition to the policy of his fellow countrymen; but this is not a choice of evils, though either choice may have undesirable consequences. The fact that politicians have decided on a policy cannot change the moral outlook of an individual and the course of action which that outlook inevitably involves. No man may surrender his moral autonomy because of a crisis precipitated by others. Such an attitude may appear to others to savour of aloofness like that of the Epicurean god in his remote and untroubled heaven. But that is not really the temper in which such a man approaches the situation; he may as much as others speak of "this blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England," but his love for England must not set him in opposition to the world which God loves. How can he change his way of thought and life "at one blast of Queen Elizabeth's (or King

George's) trumpet" without wrecking his moral universe, without treason to humanity ?

The second is a much more difficult case. What of the man who in the past has failed to resist the beginnings of evil, either because he did not see them or because he did not care sufficiently ? When war comes he sees the real implications of the national policy in which he has hitherto acquiesced.* The argument with which he is confronted runs as follows : This war is the logical outcome of previous policy ; having failed to protest against it at an earlier stage, he must for consistency's sake now bear the full brunt of the unhappy consequences. Therefore, it is argued, if he is to repent, it must be after the war is over. If this position be granted, the nice point arises as to whether his repentance is to date from the Armistice or from the signature of the Peace Treaty or from the end of the final consequences of that treaty ? It is perfectly open to argument that the position of Europe as a result of the Treaty of Versailles is more perilous than it was at the outbreak of the war or during its progress.

Is this man's problem truly to be described as a choice between evils ? If he feel called upon to break with his past in the interests of a higher policy, is his choice not one between evil and good ? Is he to wait until the whole nation engages in a simultaneous act of repentance before responding to what has come to him as a call of duty ? No doubt the consequences will be painful enough both to him and to all concerned, but we have to distinguish between

* As things are done to-day in political circles he has probably never been told what commitments have been made on his behalf.

painful consequences and moral evil: to choose a course which he feels to be wrong through a desire to avoid painful consequences to himself or others and to avoid failing those who have with good reason relied upon his help is undoubtedly to choose moral evil. The moral problem remains, can repentance be postponed ?*

The objection to taking part in war may be based on either or both of two grounds. First, a conviction that a *casus belli* is not well established; second a conviction that, however right and good the cause to be defended may be, war is not a way of defending it, being morally objectionable as a form of violence that on no consideration whatsoever is to be used towards a human personality. A moral end can only be served by means which are moral, and therefore in keeping with the end in view. Let us do evil that good may come has not been a common plea until recently in Protestant circles. War is the supreme form of coercion, and therefore is of itself impotent to produce moral ends.† This kind of moral "stop in the mind" is not to be overcome by external pressure. It is a case where a man does wrong if he defy his moral scruple. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." But in the case of the more enlightened protester there is the further feeling that he can subserve none but universal purposes and that to hurt one section of humanity in the effort to help another is an impossible course for him;

* "Give me chastity—but not yet," prayed Augustine, but it has never been regarded as a particularly Christian prayer.

† This is not to deny that some moral good may be the indirect outcome of a war. Disillusionment, for instance, may lead to truer insight, suffering to sympathy.

the obligation to love his fellow-men and therefore never to do them hurt is one that is universally binding upon him. We are never exempted from loyalty to the ideal; no moratorium can be placed on the Sermon on the Mount; we cannot serve particularist and divisive interests such as those of one nation or alliance of nations. Something of this was recognised in the plea that was offered in justification of the war, that it was a war in defence of civilisation, in defence, that is to say, of a universal good, a good not limited to race or nation or any other mere section of humanity. But if it seem to a man that spiritual values cannot by any possibility be defended or furthered by war, then he cannot as a moral agent be compelled to engage in it, still less if it seem to him that war is a positive injury to civilisation.* Morality is not a playing off of

* In war the individual is habitually treated as a non-moral agent. "Among legitimate ruses may be counted . . . . transmitting bogus signal and telegraph messages, and sending bogus despatches and newspapers with a view to their being intercepted by the enemy. . . It is not illegitimate to employ spies, or even to corrupt enemy civilians or soldiers by bribes in order to induce them to give information, to desert, to surrender, to rebel, or to mutiny, or to give false information to the enemy." (*Manual of Military Law*, War Office, 1914). "Neither sex nor age afford any immunity from the operation of the laws with regard to espionage and treason." (*Ib.*, p. 260.) "Many other acts, however, which may be attempted or accomplished. . . . . by private individuals or by soldiers in disguise, are also classed as war treason, although perfectly legitimate if done by members of the armed forces. For instance . . . . . fouling water supply." (*Ib.* p. 303.) "Reprisals are an extreme measure because in most cases they inflict suffering upon innocent individuals. In this, however, their coercive force exists, and they are indispensable as a last resource." (*Ib*, p. 304.) In war it it is the duty of the soldier to lie, to corrupt others, to foul water-supplies, to inflict suffering on the innocent at the command of his superior officers without regard to any moral scruples which he may have. Men who have undergone military training have

evil and good results in a profit and loss account ; there is something fundamentally wrong from a strictly moral point of view in such a contention, unless one thinks of good as pleasant and of evil as unpleasant in which case we are not thinking in terms of real morality.

Sidera terra
Ut distant, ut flamma mari, sic utile recto.*

VI

Having laid great stress so far upon the moral autonomy of the individual conscience, it is only fair to look at matters from the standpoint of the State as the guardian of the general welfare. War involves a situation where the utmost uniformity of action will be desired. Confronted by the argument as it has been presented above some may be tempted to ask what would happen if everybody or very many people took the line of the Conscientious Objector. The only answer is that if the argument has cogency in terms of moral principle the appeal to inconvenient consequences can only raise what is at best a secondary issue. What is probably required is a change of diplomatic method to conform with the situation contemplated. Issues between ourselves and

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felt that its result was to dull their finer susceptibilities and so to degrade their manhood. Can we serve civilisation by corrupting character ? We may point out that the real hero of war is the spy. He runs all risks and there is no glory attaching to his work. When he is caught, he dies an ignominious death ; by his enemies he is detested and dishonoured ; his fellow-countrymen by a singular revulsion of moral feeling are half ashamed of his task and put up no tablet in his honour.

* As the stars are distant from the earth, as fire from water, so is the useful from the right.

other nations should not be raised in such a way as to pledge the nation to the arbitrament of war for their solution. This is the case against secret diplomacy and bellicose diplomacy. It is not the nation's honour that is involved in such a procedure, but the practical wisdom of statesmen. It is high time that diplomatists should be made to realise with some sternness that the common people cannot justly be made to answer with their lives for their *amour propre* and their miscalculation in negotiations.

But what would happen if everybody took the pacificist position ? Obviously the best thing that could happen would be for everybody to take this line, for it can only be right for one if it is also ideally right for others. But the supposition that all the people in England might suddenly become pacificist leaving all the others in another country solidly bent on war is an unreal contingency that is sometimes presented as a dilemma. Not much time need be spent on such a hypothesis, as it shows little understanding of the way in which ideals work in the modern world. Nations are influenced by groups within them in the direction of higher ideals ; they are not converted in the mass. But even if the supposition were a more real one than it is, and if it were possible to conceive a nation as a whole refusing to fight, it would remain true that it is not for us to judge of the rightness of a course of action by its calculable or predictable results. We must act in faith and think in terms of humanity. That was the way of Christ. " If a grain of wheat fall into the ground and die, it bringeth forth much fruit."

But let us suppose that there were a nation

ready to be a martyr, what in fact could happen ? A military nation would overrun it ; but, we may note, it is exceedingly unlikely that those atrocities would be perpetrated which usually occur when a nation that resists is over-run, for the passions inflamed by opposition and fighting are quick to find justification for outrage. Further, it is almost humanly certain that the conscience of the invading nation would be touched and in its consequences Calvary would be repeated, which *ex hypothesi* is that which the non-resisting nation would achieve at any cost. If a foreign government were imposed, it would surely be transmuted from within, not attacked by violence, and the captured nation once again would conquer the oppressor. But speculative history is no very profitable study. Let us therefore consider the more practical case where a war finds support from the majority of the nation while the recalcitrants are in a small minority.

We must suppose that both parties are sincere in the pursuit of their respective policies, for the argument is often obscured by representing one party as a shirker and the other as a swashbuckler. Here the answer may be given in the words of Prof. L. T. Hobhouse : " There is indeed a court of appeal. There is an objective moral order underlying all disputes, an order which if once apprehended would settle all controversies But, unless, and until this objective order is apprehended and agreed upon by men, moral conflicts will not cease. Appeal indeed is always open until agreement is reached. New facts and new arguments are never barred, and no opinion is to be silenced. But if no clear verdict is collected

and both parties remain firm in their conviction, there is nothing for it but that the case should go to the ordeal, the barbaric ordeal of endurance. That this is a satisfactory solution no one would contend, but it is better to recognise frankly that in the region of ultimate moral conflict each party is bound by its own conviction than to obscure the issue by such subterfuges as the contention that true freedom would consist in subordination. . . . It is right that he [the non-conformist] should do what he thinks right, although, as it happens, he thinks wrong; the ultimate reason of this is that, though by so acting he is wrong on occasion, if he acted otherwise as a matter of principle, he would never do right at all, and if everyone so acted, right and wrong as moral terms would disappear."*

The crisis assumes an aggravated form in the case where a pacificist feels called upon not merely to abstain from participation in warfare but to carry on a positive propaganda for the conversion of others. In the degree in which his own action is based upon conviction rather than scruple, and in proportion as he feels that he is acting upon a universal principle rather than upon a personal preference, to that extent he may feel urged to press for the adoption of his line of policy by others. The fact that a war is in progress may seem to him to be no sufficient reason for the postponement of the advocacy of a moral principle. This will obviously cause the State great practical embarrassment in the conduct of the policy upon

* *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, L. T. Hobhouse. (Allen and Unwin), pp. 90 and 91, and page 93. The whole passage, pp. 88 to 95, is well worth careful consideration.

which it has embarked.* The main principle involved in this case is not essentially different. Here, too, the issue must go forward, as Professor Hobhouse puts it. The thing that matters supremely is that there should be the utmost integrity and fidelity in the action that is taken. However little these motives may lead to the furtherance of military policy at the moment, they are fundamental to the stability and progress of the moral order, and that is what ultimately matters. Ultimate moral issues are apt to be disregarded when the public mind is obsessed by the enormous exigencies of military policy, and those who care for these weightier matters must be prepared to receive short shrift. They must win their souls and the world's soul by their patience. The Christian will be supported by the

* But in the actual circumstances of war the non-resister should notice that public action on his part is almost bound to be misinterpreted by fellow-citizen and foe alike; by the former it will be mistaken for disloyalty, by the latter for fear. It behoves him, therefore, to walk wisely, making clear the real meaning of his attitude to individuals as he may have opportunity. It must be borne in mind that when we speak truth to another in circumstances where misunderstanding is inevitable, we are not able really to reveal the truth for which we conceive ourselves to stand. This principle, therefore, would lead us to differ both from the man who engages in public propaganda against war in the midst of war, and from the man who, refusing to do anything even of a constructive nature at the bidding of the community, is left in prison to eat that bread which would not be his apart from the struggles and sacrifices of those who are fighting to secure it. We submit however, that the problem of what is right and what is wrong for the non-resister in war-time is exceedingly complicated, and in any case we are bound to defend the right of the absolutist to be an absolutist, if such a course seem the only one open to his conscience: for although he may be objectively wrong, he is bound to stand for the right as he sees it. The strength of his case lies in the fact that he is resisting dictation in the form of military conscription, and that it is well-nigh impossible for him to escape from complicity in war-like activity, inasmuch as all so-called constructive activity is largely diverted to serve military ends.

thought that it is enough for the disciple to be even as his Master. This is the way the Master went, when He refused to inaugurate the Kingdom by the sword. The conflict between Christ as the champion of the Kingdom on the one hand and Caiaphas and Pilate as the defenders of the existing order on the other seemed to be most unequal and hazardous. They had the weapons of selfishness and hate, whereas He was armed only with love and unflinching fidelity to His heavenly purpose. When His tiny band of followers saw Him moving forward to the conflict that was to carry Him to the shame and apparent defeat of the Cross, they cried out in terror and dismay, "This be far from Thee." Would it not be far better to prolong His invaluable life and postpone the conflict? Here if anywhere was a case when compromise, if only for the purposes of a truce, seemed most expedient. His purpose, so little understood even by His followers, appeared to depend so utterly upon Himself and upon His presence on earth to prosecute it. The fortunes of the Kingdom were balanced on a razor's edge. Surely the hazard was too great! But then as always it was faith that gave the victory over the world: "Not my will but Thine be done," "and I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me." His empire is the empire of love, and He would accept no other. In the guise of a rebel the greatest lover of His nation and of our race strove for the highest of all ends, choosing rather to lose His life than to relinquish His mission. None so truly loyal as the rebel for love's sake.

Love has its victories far more complete than war. That is why the pure in heart must seek the nobler triumph. *Ave crux spes unica.*

Chapter VI

THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM

I

The nation is one of the most important of human groups, not because it is one of the largest and most universal, but because membership in a nation affects the life of the individual on nearly every side and because the nation has been of the greatest significance in history and seems destined to be not less important as far ahead as man can well think. But in Dr. Temple's theory of progress and of the coming of the new order the Church also takes an important place, and there is no doubt that in the past the so-called Christian Churches have played a very important though sometimes, it is to be admitted, a sinister part in the moulding of history.* A long discussion of the Churches would here be both wearisome and out of place as would be a protracted account of the machinery and tactics of a socialist society. But in the idea of a Church, that is, of a group of men welded into a society by a great moral purpose and enthusiasm, all must be interested, and indeed in this wide sense it would nearly be accurate to describe some of the revolutionary societies as Churches; for did not Joseph Dietzgen preach from a pulpit? Is not the motive behind much revolutionary propaganda not class

* See Professor Bury's *History of the Freedom of T hought* Williams and Norgate.

selfishness (though this is not absent) but the high moral passion for justice and service and brotherhood? And do not many in our own country claim to find in the Independent Labour Party or some kindred organisation exactly that which others claim to find in organised Christianity?

How, then, shall we attempt to answer the question, what is the idea of a Church? We cannot limit the Labour Movement to the various Labour organisations, still less to their manifestoes and their public meetings; the world-wide Women's Movement of our day, too, is something far more penetrating and pervasive than the various women's societies, organisations and activities; it is a spirit, a point of view, a stirring in the heart that was prior to any organisation and would be in our midst, less effectively but not less surely, were the women's societies dissolved. The Church, then, is something wider than "the Churches." It is not primarily a matter of organisation but of outlook, of spirit, of insight.

Let us enquire then how far the Church is a group of the same kind as the nation. For this purpose it is of the first importance that Christ was concerned with the Kingdom, not with the Church. The Kingdom of God is the reign of God in the soul; the Church is the company of people in whom the Kingdom is operative, in so far as it is operative. The Church then is like the nation in that it is, or is capable of being, a group which is organised and operative as a fictitious person. In other words, the same kind of quasi-personality might be predicated of the

Church as of the nation. But there is this great difference: whereas the nation consists of a certain definite number of persons such that a man either is or is not an Englishman, we cannot define membership of the Church in the same way.* In the wide sense one can be of the Labour Movement or the Women's Movement without membership in any society. So Church membership properly understood is neither a question of legal status, as is naturalisation, nor of local status, so as to enable us to say that so-and-so is inside or outside the Church, as we can say that he is inside or outside a certain building. If we would understand what the Church is, we must think in terms of life, not of legal status or of space.

We may say for purposes of convenience that a boy becomes a man on his twenty-first birthday, but this date is merely conventional; it does not correspond with facts. For there is no one moment when a boy becomes a man, even though there may come a certain moment when he awakes to know that he is a man. Again, a man must learn to be an artist, but there is no one moment before which he is not an artist and at which he becomes such. Life is not partitioned in that sort of way. Similarly one cannot say that at the moment of exactly that amount of intellectual conviction and that amount of moral assimilation a man becomes a Christian, who before was a pagan or unbeliever. Even a "sudden conversion" is the result in most cases of a long series of impressions, and, further, to be a Christian

* It will be observed that we are here speaking of the Church, "the communion of saints," the company of all Christian people, not of the Churches or sects which in most cases have defined bases of membership if not credal statements.

is but to be a follower of Christ and to be in the way of being saved, and men vary as widely in their understanding of Christ as in their loyalty. A man then is a Christian in the same sort of way that he is an artist : it is a matter of vision and of response.* As art is that world in which men move in so far as they are artists, and philosophy is that world in which people live in so far as they are philosophers,† so the Kingdom as described in the New Testament is the world in which believers move in so far as God really rules in their hearts ; the Kingdom then is Christ in the hearts of men who, in so far as they have Christ in their hearts, thereby constitute the Catholic and Apostolic Church.‡

* We may observe that this interpretation alone makes sense of the New Testament language about the Church. Paul bids the Corinthian Christians put their house in order because they are and know that they are "the Temple of God," (1 Cor. vi. 19.). That is to say the Church is not called "the Temple of God," "the Body of Christ," "the Bride of Christ," because it is such only in *ideal* (so Rashdall, *Doctrine and Development*, Methuen, p. 251), but because it is regarded as such in fact. But how could it be so called when there could be such a Christian community as that depicted in the Corinthian epistles ? Only if the Church be the fellowship of the kingdom, which kingdom was that new world into which the Christians were beginning to enter and to which they really belonged. Quite strictly, the Church is the society of spirits in so far as they have entered into the mind of Christ or in so far as God reigns in their hearts. These two expressions mean the same thing.

† That which is ugly in a work of art is to that extent not art ; that which is false in philosophy is not philosophy.

‡ Is then the Church visible or invisible ? The members of the Herkomer school are not Herkomer, but they are visible in their persons and in their works. That is the kind of visibility which the Church has. Jesus is really in the hearts of men, but of none completely ; the Church is both an ideal and a fact. The "Churches" or denominations must be distinguished from "the Church." The Churches with their terms of membership, their public meetings and their machinery are visible in the same sense as the State is or the Town Council.

That which we now term the Labour Movement first dawned in the hearts of a few men ; as the new ideas spread it was inevitable that groups of men should form to work out the implications of the new vision, to spread the new hope and faith and to accomplish the work which it involved. Similarly, when men have begun to realise, however dimly, that in the Sermon on the Mount is the key to the meaning of life, when they have begun to see the world with Christ's eyes and to hear the trumpet-call of the great task to which he summons them, it is inevitable that they draw together in groups for fellowship in the purposes of their great task. It is beyond question that if the so-called Churches were groups and societies of men and women standing loyally for the things for which they believe Christ to have stood and seeking together to serve mankind without stint and without any reward but the reward of the work itself, as Christ did, all men of goodwill everywhere would speak with reverence and gratitude of the Churches.

> Ahi, Constantin, di quanto mal fu matre,
> Non la tua conversion, ma quella dôte
> Che da te prese il primo ricco patre.*

II

One of the great controversies of the Middle Ages was that between the two doctrines known as Realism and Nominalism. The problem may be represented by an illustration : a man goes out into the street and there he sees a number of

* Ah, Constantine ! mother of how much evil, was not thy conversion but that endowment which the first rich pope received from thee. Dante, Inf. xix. 115 ff.

animals, to each of which he gives the name horse. In virtue of what does he give them the same name? Is it merely for convenience, or is there such a thing as horse-in-general or equinity which all horses possess or in which they all share? The Nominalists answered that the world consists of individuals, that classification and common names are thus a mere convenience, and that there is no such thing as horse-in-general or equinity apart from the existing horses.

The Realist contrariwise said that there is a common nature in all horses in virtue of which they are constituted horses, and this common nature, horse-in-general or equinity, is a *real* thing; thus each horse is the common nature horse plus its own particular and idiosyncratic qualities such as bad temper, black legs or other peculiarity which is not shared by every horse.

We need not go into this almost interminable controversy; it will suffice to say that the progress of philosophic thought partially justified and partly discomfited each party. The Nominalists were right in maintaining that the universe consists of individuals; they were right in saying that the horse-in-general of the Realists is a mere abstraction; but they were wrong in denying that there is something which essentially connects all horses and constitutes them horses; for the kinship of horses is essential, not accidental. The Realists were right in asserting that all horses share a common nature and that there is therefore a notion "horse" which is exemplified in every horse. But this notion which all horses exemplify is a *notion*, an idea, not a *thing;* the Realists were guilty of the common and persistent error of

confusing a logical entity with a real entity. Their horse-in-general is a pure abstraction; there is no such thing as horse-in-general apart from horses.

The fundamental error of mediaeval Realism lies behind Dr. Temple's notion of the Church and behind Catholicism generally.* As the Realist argued that there is such a thing as horse-in-general apart from horses, so Catholicism regards the Church as something distinct from its members. A broken-kneed, broken-winded, sunken-eyed horse is still a horse; it is a manifestation and embodiment of horse-in-general; in the same way the Church may be divided into parties, narrow in doctrine, corrupt in morals, but it is still the Church, the earthly embodiment of the real Church. The local congregation where the Mass is offered is an imperfect embodiment of the whole Church. The Pope may be a monster, the clergy may be the scandal of Christendom, but the Church remains one, holy and catholic. Thus Dr. Temple would probably agree with most of our criticisms of his own and other Churches, but he would say that the external "Apostolical Succession" and the duly administered sacraments are the reminders and pledges of the true nature, the unity, the Catholicity and the holiness of the Church.†

* It will be observed that the personifying of the nation discussed in chapter iv. belongs to the same circle of ideas. Animism, Realism and Hegelianism (in the sense criticised above) are three modes of the same type of thinking which underlies Catholicism on the one side and on the other what the British call "Prussianism" and the Germans, we believe, "Hurrah-patriotismus," see pp. 118. 157 ff.

† *op. cit.* pp. 111 ff.

But the Church's officers were regarded in the earliest time as representing the *diversity* rather than the unity and uniformity of the Church: "and He gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers." Unity was found elsewhere: "one Spirit. . . . one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Thus the diversity of officers did not *constitute* the unity of the Church but *ministered* "*to* it, till we all attain unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God."* The unity of the Church then was not symbolised by, much less constituted by, the uniformity of its official organisation. The diversity of function was itself supported by the one body which derived its unity from the one Spirit, an ultimate and underivable unity. The holiness and catholicity of the Church must be traced back to the same constitutive influences. The only thing that can make a Christian Church is the common relation of the members to Christ the Head—not the bishop nor even an apostle. On this view no officer can possibly be of the *esse* of the Church.† The question of *bene esse* is a judgment of value to be established empirically from history.

The claim that the so-called "Catholic Church" to the exclusion of all other Churches is the representative upon earth of Christ's Church, or that the three orders of bishops, priests and

* Eph. iv. 4-16.

† This position, it should in fairness be stated, is not explicitly maintained by Dr. Temple (*op. cit.* p. 111), but it is the common claim of "Catholics."

deacons are of the *esse* of the Church, is based upon and logically involves a different notion of Christianity from that which underlies this book. The Church is regarded as a hospital dispensing medicine of life and immortality to the sick. It is "a remedial institution (Heilsanstalt) founded by God and endowed with a personality of its own,"* In such an institution, as Gierke points out,† there must be one authority, and that too an external one. Thus the Church is in Kantian phrase "a juridical community,"‡ that is to say, it is a political rather than a religious and ethical institution.

The Catholic system involves that the Church and the Kingdom are identical: herein the conception of the Church differs from that given in the New Testament. But this view is unsatisfactory, as is shown by the increasing tendency of sacramentalists to acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is operative *extra ecclesiam;* but this

* Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, III. 547, c.f. also Oman, *The Church and the Divine Order*, pp. 297 ff., where this metaphor is more fully considered.

† *Ib.*, III. p. 548.

‡ "It is true that a people of God subject to statute-laws could be conceived, subject, that is to say, to laws of such a character that in their fulfilment regard is had not to the morality but merely to the legality of the actions. This would be a juridical community: God indeed would be its law-giver (hence its constitution would be a theocracy), but men, in the character of priests receiving commands direct from him, would carry on an aristocratic government. But such a constitution, the existence and form of which rests entirely on historical foundations (Gründen) is not that which constitutes the task of pure reason which legislates in the interests of morality. . . . In the historical section it will be considered as an institution with political and civil laws, whose law-giver is external to it, God though he be." Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.* III., 3.

logically involves a denial of the conception of the Church from which they start out; for the means used by God to mediate His Spirit and to reconcile men to Himself through Christ, because it is used by God, must therefore be divinely sanctioned being sufficient to the end which is His purpose. Nothing can sanction a condition but that it is adequate to its end.

It is worth while to dwell upon this here because it is sometimes urged by sacramentalists, who as a matter of fact hold much that view of religion which underlies this book, that the necessity of the episcopate is their contribution *par excellence* to the united Church of the future. They do not realise that their doctrine is not an addition to Protestantism but the denial of it; nor is it logically open to those who hold it. It is a commonplace of philosophy that history cannot prove necessity. In this case, we may add, history cannot even be said to prove the fact, much less the necessity for it. Therefore the necessity for the episcopate must be proved *à priori*, if it is to be proved at all. Now the terms "Christian" and "Church" have a significance apart from their collocation in the phrase "Christian Church," and no necessity can be proved of a composite notion or of a *synthetic proposition à priori*, unless the necessity inhere in one or both of the component terms. In this case such a claim could only be made by resort to the device known to logicians as *petitio principii*.

III

If the Kingdom be Christ in the hearts of men, we can see how the language of the New Testament about the Church though metaphorical, is true. It is that fellowship into which men enter when they begin to look upon life through Jesus' eyes ; it is for ever one, holy and universal, for there can be nothing divisive nor impure nor idiosyncratic about it.

According to Dr. Temple's realistic notion of the Church there is something essentially sacred attaching to the earthly institution which represents it. But it is one of the first principles which shine forth in the teaching and thought of Christ, a principle which, as we have seen,* alone gives meaning to the world, that nothing is sacred but personality ; there is nothing sacred in religious denominations and corporations except the persons who compose them. If we approach the matter without *à priori* theory, it is plain that all the Churches are very human institutions and very fallible ; for no one could dispute that the world and the spirit of the world have invaded and moulded all the Churches.† Catholicism and Anglicanism have taken their monarchical and oligarchical forms of Church organisation from the notions of the world at a particular date. As in organisation so in doctrine : the world believed in demons or law or substance or Realism or sentimentality—in those terms do we find Church doctrine. Thus in doctrine and system the Churches always tend to reflect the notions

* See *supra*, pp. 125ff.

† cf. H. Morgan, *The Social Task in Wales.* (S.C.M.), pp. 82-87.

of their own age, if not of an age long since gone by. But if there is nothing of ultimate value nor sacredness except personality, there can be no sanctity in forms, institutions or ceremonies except in their meaning and value for personality. Similarly, inasmuch as the Church is nothing apart from its members, the terms one, holy and catholic or universal must be personal qualities. Thus the unity of the Church is not a matter of external organisation or assent to a common formula ; the Church is one because those who compose it are one in spirit.*

Catholicity also in its religious sense is a term relative to persons : the Church was originally called " Catholic " because it was the Church for everybody,† but unless the Church be regarded

* This principle is very relevant to the burning problem of " Christian Reunion." The Church is not composed of denominations but of individual members. It is the clear teaching of the New Testament that a man is a member of the Church solely in virtue of his personal relation to Christ, the Head of the Church. The proposed alterations in Church machinery to further " Unity " are not unimportant, but it would be possible to unite all Christians in one great corporation without furthering in any way the unity of Christendom in the religious sense. Real Christian union can only be accomplished as individual Christians become truly one in spirit by their progressive growth into the likeness of Christ. There is at the moment a real danger lest Christian Unity be treated as a political rather than a personal and religious matter. Cf. the notion that the real unity of the Church can be effected by re-ordination or any particular form of ordination. See above, pp. 186f.

† The first use of the term " Catholic Church " signifies " the Church in its wholeness." (Ign. " *Smyrn.*" VIII., 2). In Polycarp the term means " the Church designed for all " ; but, as we have indicated above, as soon as religion is interpreted in personal, as opposed to magical, terms and the Church is not regarded as a mere dispensary of supernatural medicine (Heilsanstalt), we see that a Church designed for all must be one whose members are of a certain personal quality. On the original sense of " Catholicity," see Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 122f.

in Dr. Dale's phrase as a hotel rather than as a home, the Church can only be the home for everybody in so far as its members exhibit a common type of life. Therefore as little can there be a dark-haired nation whose members are all blond as a Catholic Church whose members are not Catholic; Catholicity is a matter of outlook and temper; it is the opposite of sectarianism and party spirit. But it is more than mere charity and inclusiveness. In religion as in art and philosophy the true is the Universal; in proportion as Christians are attaining the mind of Christ they are becoming catholic. This is the only religious meaning of catholicity. In the writings of ecclesiastics the term is used in reference to the historic symbols and the historic order;* but the substance-philosophy of the creeds has become not only incredible but unthinkable; and catholicity can only be essentially connected with bishops and the episcopal system as the notion is deprived of its strictly religious significance.

Holiness again is a personal term. We can say that such a place is holy, but that is only because of its association with persons; that *things* are holy is the primitive notion from which the history of religious development is that of man's gradual emancipation. Nothing in the Universe is sacred except personality. Bread and wine, buildings, rites, clothes, offices are only sacred derivatively, and holy is more than sacred, for it has a moral connotation;

* As Dr. Oman points out, *ib.*, p. 123, this is the idea not of *ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία* but of *ἡ οἰκουμενικὴ ἐκκλησία*, *i.e.*, the Church is universal in the empirical, not in the religious sense.

nothing can be holy that is not morally pure. Nothing shows more clearly the immense gulf between Catholicism and Evangelicalism than this distinction. Holiness and purity are interchangeable terms. There is no Holy Communion unless there be a personal communion that is in a spirit of holiness.

Now this personal holiness because it is a personal quality is something that obviously cannot be delegated. It inheres in the Church simply because it inheres in the members of the Church. But to Dr. Temple it appears that the Church is holy though its holiness is represented only by the abstention of the clergy from certain human activities. But this holiness which the priest represents is at its best but the false holiness of the Pharisees who would not be defiled with the world, not the holiness of Christ, which was that of a life in the world which the world could not stain because it was an inward thing of spirit, not a matter of outward contagion. Dr. Temple defines holiness as " absolute conformity to the will of God " (p. 92). He continues, " Whatever obstacles there may be to overcome, whatever seductions to avoid, the Church is to remain absolutely devoted to the Divine Will." Well and good, but it becomes plain in the sequel that this does not mean that the members of the Church are therefore to be absolutely committed to the way of Jesus and to stand in the world for the things for which He stood and to take the consequences. No, there is " no means by which this separateness of the Church can be achieved unless there are certain persons set apart to be representatives of the Church, and of the Church

only" (p. 95). Why can this separateness of the Church be achieved in no other way? We see from an illustration: "If the Church called on all its members to refuse to serve" (that is, in war, which certainly is not the way of Jesus), "the result would be to interfere with the freedom of the State to act in its own sphere; if it allows everyone to serve, it is deprived of its Catholic witness just when that is most vitally needed. The only way of doing justice to the legitimate claims of both nationalism and Catholicity, is to differentiate between persons; and there is no practicable or even sensible way of doing this except to make the Church's officers responsible for the Catholic witness and its lay, or unofficial, members for the national" (p. 97). Thus the reason why holiness is not practicable by the commonalty of Christians is that it would interfere with the freedom of the State "in its own sphere." Are we then to assume that if Christ had been conscribed to fight against the Zealots or the Parthians, He would have left holiness to be represented by the priests, while He as an unofficial person would have temporarily abandoned its practice? Or, if this be unfair, are we to assume that He would have called upon any of His followers to do what He would not do? Did He not call them *all* to be holy and to be perfect, even as their heavenly Father?

Dr. Temple has virtually asserted that the highest value is a political, not a religious value. In this he does not appear seriously to misrepresent the vast majority of his fellow-Christians; for during the recent war the old adage *salus populi suprema lex* seems to have been accepted alike

by the Established and the "Free" Churches.* But logically this involves that the only absolute value is not personality but something in the world of politics and political status. Self-preservation is undoubtedly a very powerful instinct; since when has it become a Christian principle—and on what authority?

The Church is only holy in so far as, through its membership, it stands for the things for which Christ stands. The only holy and sacred thing is personality, but the absolute worth and sacredness of personality is a notion which it is one of the chief objects of military training to undermine.

In fine, the new world into which the Christian soul is being born is one in which there is unity because all, in so far as they are there, are of one spirit, the spirit and likeness of Christ. Similarly, there is catholicity because all are in the truth, which is not particular and idiosyncratic but the same for all. There is holiness because the life lived there is one of moral purity and unselfish love.

IV

A great idea involves a school; a common interest or great common experience involves groups who meet for fellowship upon the basis of this interest or experience; that there should be Christian groups is as inevitable and quite as desirable as that there should be Labour groups. What, then, is the place and function of these groups within the State? At once a difficulty

* But with increasing hesitation: a defensive war was so justified, reprisals with less assurance and the post-war blockade with even less.

arises, for the Church or Christian interest by its very nature must be supernational; a man is a Christian not in virtue of his relation to a local group, but by his relation to Christ and to the whole human family and to a world-wide task; thus in idea the Church and even the group is a wider unity than the nation. Furthermore, the bond which unites Christians with one another is a new view of the whole of life. The Church, therefore, touches life in one sense on every side, while the State touches it on some sides only, leaving much to private choice. Is the Church therefore to deny the State altogether? This has been one of the absorbing problems in practice and theory since the first days of Christianity, and we can as little give a history of the thought on the matter throughout the ages in our short space here as we can hope to solve in a paragraph the riddle of two thousand years. Let us seek, however, to put the problem in its setting.

In the teaching of Jesus there is little that directly concerns the State.* Jesus did not set Himself primarily to inaugurate a social movement.† His appeal was to individuals.‡ Only implicitly was there in it a social or political philosophy. But underlying His teaching is

* We refrain here from any detailed examination of the relevant sayings of Jesus because these matters have been treated at some length elsewhere, see *The Early Christian Attitude to War*, Cadoux, pp. 19 to 46; *The Christ of Revolution*, Coates, *passim*; also, *The Galilean*, N. Micklem, pp. 73 to 116. It will be understood that these references lie behind the short discussion here.

† His preaching is "in no wise the creation of a social movement." Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. (Mohr, Tübingen), p. 15.

‡ "Christianity is from its very nature no mass ideal." *Ib.* p. 40.

both an extreme individualism and a complete universalism. Only as individuals can men enter the Kingdom, and therefore all the appeal of the Gospel is to men as individuals ; but entry into the Kingdom carries with it a new and universal outlook. " As God is active, creative Love, and causes His light to shine upon the good and the evil, so must they who have been made holy by God make known their love to friend and foe, to good and evil, and must overcome enmity as stubbornness by an overplus of love,* which shames the other and awakens in him an understanding for love."† That is of the essence of the Gospel. The New Testament contemplates a ceaseless warfare against evil and unbelief, but only by love and an overplus of good is this warfare to be waged. The problem of nationalism was acute in the time of Christ ; it was largely by His refusal to lead the people against the Roman oppressor and to take the side of the Zealots that He lost the enthusiasm of the people and was finally rejected by them.

In the main the attitude of the New Testament to the Empire is friendly ; not only is the Roman a brother and to be loved and treated as such, but " the powers that be are ordained of God."‡ It is true that the " Revelation of John," written in time of persecution, breathes another spirit, but it is not typical either of the New Testament or the early Church. " The Christian," said Tertullian, " is the enemy of none, certainly not of the emperor, for since he knows that the emperor is ordained (constitui) by God, he

* Cf. *The Christian Ideal*, Wilson. pp. 55ff.

† Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 38. ‡ Rom. xiii. 1.

necessarily wishes his prosperity (salvum velit) with that of the whole Roman empire, the which shall endure so long as the world shall stand." But in the essential universalism of the Christian faith there always lies the possibility of conflict. The Christian must treat every man as a brother. What then if the State bid him treat one man as a slave, another as an enemy ?* Many and various have been the answers given by Christians to the problems of political philosophy involved here ; they may be very briefly summarised as follows :

(*a*) The ascetics and monastics with whom must be grouped such Quietists as " the Friends of God " and such modern sects as " the Plymouth Brethren " have taught that the world must be altogether denied and the Christian must live the life of absolute separation from the world. The objection to this theory is that it is impossible to have bread and butter and to eat it in peace and security apart from the labours and protection of those who are too easily described as " the world," for *inter se mortales mutua vivunt.* Furthermore the " separateness " or holiness contemplated here is like that of the Pharisees but not like that of Christ, who came " eating and drinking " and was in the world yet unspotted by it.

* " As absolute individualism proceeds from the religious idea of a pure-hearted self-dedication (herzens-reinen Selbsthingabe) to the Father's will, the will that seeks for souls and summons them to sonship, so also, from the self-same fundamental idea, absolute individualism passes over into an equally absolute fellowship of love between those who are linked together in God and into a practice of the divine love towards all strangers and enemies ; for only through the manifestation in them of absolute love can the true understanding of God be awakened and the way to God be opened." Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 4of.

(*b*) The Church as an institution has been regarded as the ark of salvation in the midst of the floods ; it was not claimed that all must be monastics and live the life of " perfection," but the world outside the Church was the kingdom and rule of Satan and was thus regarded as hopelessly corrupt. But this again is not according to the thought of Christ. " For Jesus, common life in spite of all sins was yet full of traces of Divine goodness : in children, in sinners and Samaritans He could recognise the naïf note of piety, and for Him the line of division was not between the world and the Church, but between the present and the future. So in Paul's thought we already find the full opposition between the Kingdom of Christ on the one hand and the kingdom of the first Adam, the flesh, sin, the Law and the evil spirit on the other. With the thought of the clerical-sacramental Church as the *civitas Dei* round which the angels play, and in which the Christ-God sits enthroned, comes the strengthening also of the opposition of the world as the kingdom of Satan in which only perdition and moral weakness is to be found. It is first in the notion of these opposites that the narrowing of Christian sociological thought is completed, and this notion becomes ever more significant for Christian social theory."*

(*c*) In the main we may say of the first millenium of our era that it was generally held that Church and State had different spheres and that each was supreme in its own. " We think that the safest judgment which we can form on the whole character of the ninth century is this, that men

* Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 94f.

were convinced that each power had its own appropriate sphere, but that they were also keenly alive to the fact that in practical life the two spheres intersected, and that no general principle could enable them to determine, with regard to many questions, what exactly was the sphere of the State and what the sphere of the Church."* That is to say, there was no satisfactorily worked-out theory but a practical compromise between the claims of Christ and Cæsar where they appeared to come into conflict. Doctrine was in the making :

> So, as I grew, I rudely shaped my life
> To my immediate wants.

(*d*) On the basis of the Stoic doctrine of a *lex naturae* and of the patristic identification of this law with the decalogue, it has been also held that religion is a great human or lay interest ; not only was the king often regarded as God's vicar, but it was his constant claim to have a voice in the selection of Church officers and in the summoning of Councils and Synods ; and we even find that Charlemagne considered the character of the Pope as a matter for his concern.† But as in the course of time the papacy grew stronger, especially under Gregory the Great, the opposite influence became stronger, till Innocent III. claimed to be to kings and potentates that which the parish priest was to his flock. *Salva debita ecclesiæ magisterio ac legibus obœdientia.*

(*e*) Thus the developed theory of Catholicism was rather that the Church is a State above all

* Carlyle *Mediæval Political Theory in the West.* (Blackwood.) Vol. I., pp. 257, 258.

† *cf.* Carlyle, *op. cit.*, I., 263.

States with its own princes, laws, courts and treasury, that the States of the earth with their sovereigns owed absolute obedience to the Church; thus the sphere of the secular power apart from its duty of supporting the Church and carrying out its wishes became ever more restricted. Although the Reformation meant a revolt against the foreign domination of the Pope, it by no means meant a new idea, and nowhere was there more complete domination of the State by the Church than in the famous Geneva model. In Lutheranism and Anglicanism we find the Church subjected to the State (the State Church), in Calvinism the State subjected to the Church (the Church State).

(*f*) But from the early days parallel with these notions had run a very different. Over against the Church type there had constantly been the "sect type," as Troeltsch calls it. This notion comes from the Old Testament. Against the doctrine of the Church State in ancient Israel prophets had set "the Remnant," the elect minority whose power was spiritual and who were in opposition to the Church State of their day.* There can be no doubt that this Remnant doctrine is more akin to the mind of Christ.† According

* For a very interesting exposition of the "Remnant doctrine" in the history of the Church, see *The Remnant*, Rufus M. Jones. (Vol. VIII., in this series).

† Christ set Himself to call into being "the Israel according to the Spirit" as distinct from the "Israel after the flesh"; we do not wish to assert that He regarded this new Israel as necessarily "a remnant"; but the Remnant doctrine we have called "more akin to his mind," because it is a spiritual and not a legal and external notion. We may point out that it is in the highest degree precarious to build hasty generalisations upon words of Christ that bear upon politics and political philosophy:

to this notion the Church is not conceived as a great hierarchical institution seeking to impose a civilisation upon the world, but as the company of true believers who being in the world are yet not of it, and who seek by permeation and peaceful penetration to change the hearts of men and through this change of heart to affect the institutions and

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for due account must be taken of his eschatological expectations, and it must be remembered that for Christ "Cæsar" (in the sense in which we are using the name in this book) was represented in part by the Roman Empire and in part by the Jewish theocracy. The following quotation is illuminating: "Jesus . . . never thought of leaving the Jewish community. The Church is not His work, but an inheritance from Judaism to Christianity. Under the Persian domination the Jews built up an unpolitical community on the basis of religion. The Christians found themselves in a position with regard to the Roman Empire precisely similar to that which the Jews had occupied with regard to the Persian; and so they also founded, after the Jewish pattern, in the midst of the State which was foreign and hostile to them, and in which they could not feel themselves at home, a religious community as their true fatherland. The State is always the pre-supposition of the Church; but it was at first, in the case both of the Jewish and of the Christian Church, a foreign State. The original meaning of the Church thus disappeared when it no longer stood over against the heathen world power, it having become possible for the Christians also to possess a natural fatherland in the nation. In this way it became much more difficult to define accurately the spheres of the state and the Church respectively, regarding the Church as an organisation, not as an invisible community of the faithful. The distinction of religious and secular is a variable one; every formation of a religious community is a step towards the secularisation of religion; the religion of the heart alone remains an inward thing. The tasks of the two competing organisations are not radically different in their nature; on the one side it may be said that had not the Christian religion found civil order already in existence, had it come, like Islam, in contact with the anarchy of Arabia, instead of the Empire of Rome, it must have founded not the Church, but the State; on the other side it is well-known that the State has everywhere entered into possession of fields first reclaimed to cultivation by the Church. Now we must acknowledge that the nation is more certainly created by God than the Church, and that God works more powerfully in the

civilisation.† There is little doubt that these "sects" or faithful remnants, had the root of the matter in them; they went back to New Testament ideas and to Old Testament prophets and to spiritual as opposed to hierarchical notions of the Church; their theology tended to be expressed in terms of experience and personality rather than of magic and metaphysic. Their danger was quietism‡; their strength was their spiritual

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history of the nations than in Church history. The Church, at first a substitute for the nation which was wanting, is affected by the same evils incident to an artificial cultivation as meet us in Judaism. We cannot create for ourselves our sphere of life and action; better that it should be a natural one, given by God. And yet it would be unjust to deny the permanent advantages of the differentiation of the two. The Church will always be able to work in advance for the State of the future. The present State, unfortunately, is in many respects only nothing more than a barrier to chaos; if the Church has still a task, it is that of preparing an inner unity of practical conviction, and awakening a sentiment, first in small circles, that we belong to each other." (Wellhausen, *History of Irsael*, E.T., pp. 512f.)

† "The Church-type is an organisation that is predominantly conservative, relatively world-affirming (welt-bejahende), governing men in masses and therefore in principle universal, *i.e.*, an all-embracing organisation. The sects on the contrary are relatively small groups which aim at a personal and inward transformation (Durchbildung) and a personal and direct linking up of the members within its circle. For this reason they are driven to a policy of forming smaller groups and of renouncing any attempt to win over the world as a whole (Weltgewinnung). Towards the world, the State and Society, they are indifferent, tolerant or hostile, for they have no desire to conquer or incorporate these, but they rather desire to avoid them, and leave them standing side by side with themselves, or possibly to replace them with their own society." Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

‡ "Calvinist Christianity had conceived that it was to serve Christ by copying the Old Testament, by persecuting religious error, and by harrying vice as a crime. When such a policy became impossible, Protestantism gave up—only for a time, please God—the effort to reconstruct the world according to the will of Christ." Dr. Robert Mackintosh, *Christian Ethics*, p. 82.

notion of religion. It certainly cannot be said of them that they any more than those of other schools worked out satisfactorily the philosophy that underlay their attitude to the State and the world.*

These may be regarded as the main strands of thought; but this outline is most misleading unless it be understood that most of these schools of thought had their disciples in every age, that there were many modifications of every view, and that probably no one teacher held any one of these views so as completely to deny any truth in all the others. In other words, we find that throughout the ages this problem of the relation of the Church and the State has puzzled the minds of men, and up to the present no completely satisfactory solution has been worked out. Indeed all these views have as a matter of fact involved some illogical compromise, and the ground is still clear for a compelling doctrine. We are not able to do more at this stage than indicate the lines along which, as it seems to us, we may most profitably look for a solution.

The monastic and ascetic ideal, then, we have to set on one side as impossible of accomplishment (for we cannot but be dependent on society) and as being alien to that holiness in the world which was taught and exemplified by Christ: the notion that the Church is the ark of salvation and all without the Church the realm of Satan we likewise reject, for the virtues of the heathen are not splendid vices, and the Spirit of God is to be found outside the borders of the ecclesiastical

* See further *Spiritual Reformers in the 15th and 16th Centuries*, Rufus Jones. (Macmillan.)

machinery sometimes more easily than within it : the utter corruption of man is neither true nor in line with the thought of Christ. Not less certainly must we reject the theory of any control of the Church by the State in matters of religion. " The magistrate is not by virtue of his office to meddle with religion, or matters of conscience, to force or compel men to this or that form of religion or doctrine ; but to leave Christian religion free to every man's conscience, and to handle only civil transgressions . . . for Christ only is the King and Lawgiver of the Church and conscience."* In a famous passage Robert Browne, who did not himself object in any way to reformation by the power of the civil sword, declares : " In the meane time let them knowe that the Lord's people is of the willing sorte. They shall come vnto Zion and inquire the way to Jerusalem, not by force nor compulsion, but with their faces thitherward ; yea, as the hee goates shall they be before the flocke, for the haste they haue vnto Zion, and they themselues shall call for the couenant, saying, Come and let vs cleaue faste vnto the Lorde in a perpetuall couenant that shall neuer be forgotten."† This shows that these reformers had laid hold of a principle in virtue of which, though they themselves did not grasp

* John Smyth, quoted by Dr. Powicke in his *Life of Henry Barrow*, (Jas. Clarke), p. 211. It should be realised that in this opinion John Smyth was far ahead of his contemporaries : the early English Separatists agreed that the Prince or the magistrate should reform abuses in the Church ; they differed from the Conformists in holding that the Church must be reformed " without tarying for anie." William of Occam, " the Invincible Doctor," is reported to have said to Louis, " Defend me with the sword, and I will defend you with the pen ! "

† " A Treatise of Reformation without Tarying for Anie."

its full significance, we must prefer the Remnant or sect type to the Church type, the principle that in religion authority is not external but inward. Catholicism and Calvinism and in a somewhat different form Lutheranism sought to impose upon the world from above a Church civilisation.* They all failed to realise that nothing of religious value can be imposed, and that Christianity can only advance by the awakening of insight in individuals: the Lord's people must always be "of the willing sorte." This is a lesson which as yet organised Christianity is far from comprehending, but it clearly follows from the nature of religion itself.† For men are never really united in religion till they "see eye to eye in truth and stand shoulder to shoulder in love."

In fine, the Church is to be committed to a love that knows no barriers and will brook no refusal, overcoming enmity and indifference by the active display of love; it is to be in the world and yet not seeking by any external and coercive means to impose its ideals upon the world. It is to be a faithful remnant. If we seek a clear example of it in actual practice, we should take the Church in the Mission field in some such country as China, where it is not connected with the ruling caste and seeks for itself no political power or privilege.‡

* See Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, p. 44. (Williams and Norgate.)

† See further *The Galilean*, N. Micklem, pp. 134 to 142. It may be noted in passing as not without significance that the sects that were most near to appreciating the inwardness of spiritual authority with its corollary of the absolute worth of personality have tended to be Quietist, non-resisting and anti-sacramental. See Rufus Jones, *opp. cit.*

‡ It may be objected that in China there is a pagan government, whereas in England there is one that may be described as

Such, we take it, is the place and function of the Church in the world, but we must leave till the next chapter a discussion of what this involves of "compromise" with the world, remarking here only that at present we have attained no clear principle as to these matters of compromise or accommodation. This much, however, should already be plain, that such a Church will not cut itself off from the nation of which its members are subjects. Naturally a situation may arise where obedience to "the Prince" would involve disloyalty to "the covenanted work of Reformation and Christ's kingly government of His house," but in general the attitude of the Church

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quasi-Christian. But our governments are not avowedly Christian: in democratic States they are representative of the people; they are not appointed to further the kingdom of God, nor because of any particular conception of religion, but rather to equate material interests and to execute legal justice. If at present we seek to unify the Church and the State, we are bound to adopt a heteronomy of principle which is not only confusing but logically destructive; it ends not in the denial of the State as existent but in the denial of those spiritual conceptions, the heritage of the Church, which are contrary to the merely natural order. The very conception of a quasi-Christian State as altering the problem as over against a pagan State leads the Church into a very subtle danger, namely that of seeking to manifest its own principle in its purity while compromising with ideas which are always destructive of its real meaning. The Church is in greater danger from a half light than from an opposition which is clearly understood; for the Church has no victory unless it be absolute and pure; in the measure in which it does not stand for its own principle, it ceases to be the Church of Christ and is subsumed under the natural order. It may be answered that the State is progressing to the full spiritual position. This we think is true, but the question is deeper; it is one thing to acknowledge and affirm and seek to utilise that in the State which enables us to call it quasi-Christian; it is another for religious men who see all things "according to the Gospel of the blessed God," to assent to any inadequate stage. That is to stop progress.

to the nation will not be negative. We may even say that the Church exists for the nation, inasmuch as it exists for those who compose the nation. If we were able to interrogate the great prophets of Israel as to where lay sovereignty in the State, and if we were able to make them grasp the meaning of our very modern question, it seems plain that their answer would be that sovereignty lies not in the legal code and not in the government of the hour but in the ideal destiny, mission and calling of Israel. When, as so often happened, they were in opposition to the government of their day and had to incur the charge of disloyalty or even treachery, they were in their own minds not disowning their people but standing for their people's true destiny and for those principles upon which alone their people could find true blessedness.

CHAPTER VII

COMPROMISE AND PROGRESS

I

In this chapter we are to consider the very difficult problem that confronts the religious man who, seeing a higher ideal than his contemporaries recognise and being unswervingly committed to it, has yet to live in a world organised upon different principles in its social, political and industrial life.

> And did those feet in ancient time
> Walk upon England's mountains green ?
> And was the holy Lamb of God
> On England's pleasant pastures seen ?

However we may answer this question, there is no doubt that it is the duty of the Christian to walk in the footsteps of Christ. We must first ask, then, in what sense, if any, did Christ compromise with the world. The answer is by no means simple.

On the one hand it is apparent that for the bringing in of His Kingdom not for one instant did Christ stoop to "worldly" means. He declined to use force or violence and to lead His people against the Roman garrison. He refused to grant a sign in the sky and thus by the prestige of a great name and miraculous powers to draw men to His allegiance. This was of necessity the case. As soon as it is realised that men enter

the kingdom of heaven when they see God to be all-loving and all-worthy of love and when with the eye of faith they judge their neighbour not by his accomplishment but by his possibilities and desire his fellowship with an infinite desire, because they would give and win a brother's love—then it is apparent that neither by force nor argument nor rhetoric nor prestige can men be won into such a kingdom, but only as their eyes are opened and their imagination is kindled to see things as they truly are. For Christ personality, that is each individual personality, is of infinite value. Personality, as we have more than once insisted, is never merely individual, but Christ loved men not in the mass but as individual persons. His refusal to use worldly methods for the establishing of His Kingdom alone explains His life and gives meaning to the Crucifixion. He could never compromise with the world in the fulfilment of His redemptive purpose, and He had no other interest but redemption. Thus all possibility of compromise appears to be ruled out.

On the other hand it was largely because He would not take up what was regarded as the absolutist and uncompromising attitude toward the world that the people deserted Him, and He was betrayed to His death. In the eyes of His contemporaries He compromised with the world when He refused to tell the Jews not to pay the Roman tax. The money raised by this tax went to the treasury which among other services provided for gladiatorial games and the erection of heathen temples ; yet His word was, Render unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's. So far

as we know, He never denounced evil systems as such, militarism, slavery, imperialism. The reason for this is two-fold : in the first place He would have His followers come after Him only as they themselves saw that what He stood for was right and true. It is easy to rouse men's indignation against a system ; it is hard to get them to cast out of their own hearts that which they hate in the system.

> Latius regnes avidum domando
> Spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis
> Gadibus iungas et uterque Poenus
> Serviat uni. *

Christ only called men out of the system under which they lived as they came to see that it was inconsistent with their call to stand absolutely and without compromise for the things for which He stood. Christ's authority was that of a certain spiritual position. We may say that He has personal authority only because His authority is not merely personal but based upon truth and insight into the ultimate meaning of life. Where this is forgotten the Christian idea is not emancipated from the ordinary idea of authority in the State. In the second place Christ saw that deeper than a need for a change of system lies the need for a change of heart, that no change of organisation or machinery will solve the world's problem, but that when men's hearts are changed the old systems which expressed their wrong personal

* He that can conquer his affects rebelling,
Hath larger monarchy than he that sways
The Libyans, Gades and both Africas,
—And more excelling.
Horace, Od. II. 2.—J. Healey's translation.

relationships with one another will be automatically destroyed.*

In what way, then, may the Christian, who *ex hypothesi* is committed to the way of Christ, compromise with the world, with "Capitalism," with imperialism, with war, with legal compulsion? How far may he use the machinery of the law courts? How far may he obey the behests of a sub-Christian State? What is his relation to the industrial order or disorder of to-day? None of these is a simple problem, and we are not seeking here to lay down a law for others nor to set forth the "nice sharp quillets" of a new Christian casuistry, but rather to see into general principles which every man must apply for himself according to his own insight and conviction.

II

Christ is reported to have said to Pilate that he would have had no power, had it not been given him from above.† While it is perfectly true that the methods of the State and of the world war, the tyranny of majorities, the appeal to self-interest, the authority of prestige, of power and of money are means that Christ definitely rejected, and that therefore the State might appear as anti-Christ, yet, as we have insisted above, it is idle to speak of the State as being intrinsically evil and irremediably bad. The development of society from a primitive tribe or clan with its elementary moral sense to the modern State with its judicial and administrative systems, even though these fall far short

* See further *The Galilean*. Ch. v. and vi.

† John xix. 2.

of the Christian ideal both in accomplishment and in intention, may be a story of progress and gradual attainment. By trial and experiment, success and failure, man should be working out and attaining in spite of many set-backs ever higher forms of social life. The development and progressive moralisation of society appertains assuredly to the will of God. It is better that men should live in societies, however imperfect, than that they should dwell in splendid isolation, if such a thing were possible. A rich social organisation is necessary for the fullest life and development of individuals. The present order of society is evil, but anarchy, so far from being an improvement on it, might be a step backwards into the mud ; order is intrinsically better than chaos.*

It is true that Christ would, for the purposes of His work, have no recourse to legal compulsion, but it would be absurd for the Christian to have any objection to law as such. At the present imperfect stage of society it is inevitable that many laws should have the negative purpose of preventing injustice and wrong, such as insanitary workshops, unfair remuneration of labour, the exploitation of the public and so forth ; but in proportion as society develops, the legal system becomes less and less the prevention of wrong

* It is sometimes said that Christianity is anarchical ; if by this is meant that the Christian ideal is a state of society where there is no outward law because every member of the community has the law written on his heart, where, that is, law has not been abolished but has become nature instead of law, there is truth in this plea ; yet, as a matter of fact, only in a very simple and small community could men live together and organise their lives ideally without a social *order*. Yet Christianity is anarchic because it would substitute love for coercion and moral authority for legal. See *Supra* pp. 162ff.

and more and more the self-organisation of men of good-will for the purposes of their common life. Laws may be and ought to be rational arrangements, for great communities cannot live without organisation of production, of distribution, of mutual self-help ; a system of laws which should regulate and provide channels for mutual service and fellowship would be the glory of the community that produced it. " Law itself," said Burke, " is only beneficence acting by a rule." Except in the Christian sense indicated above, anarchy is the denial of the will of God, because it is the denial of the meaning of personality and of human life, which is a social meaning. The way of the Army and of the Common law courts may be necessarily or occasionally the denial of the way of Christ,* yet as we look at history and view them as part of man's gradual attainment, they are not without qualification un-Christian and at least have a relative justification. Thus there is a real sacredness or divinity attaching to society and even to the State, imperfect though they be.

But our problem here is as to the attitude of the Christian man to the un-Christian, or rather sub-Christian, ways of the world and of society. What obedience does the Christian man owe to the law of the land ? It is plain that such laws as the rule of the road, which we may say regulate and express the brotherhood of man, deserve an implicit obedience ; but difficulties arise when we are asked to shoot Germans or blockade Russian ports or to exercise coercion upon Ireland or to prosecute a burglar. Would Christ have done any of these things ?

* Cf. *Infra* pp. 226ff.

The question what, under particular circumstances that did not and could not arise for Him, Christ would have done, raises a more complicated problem than has been always recognised. We shall do well to keep to first principles and revert to the question raised earlier,* where ultimately does sovereignty lie? The Christian will usually answer that conscience is the ultimate and sovereign authority; but this does not take us far, for while it must remain a first principle of morality that we should never do that which we see to be wrong, yet the problem still remains, what ought we to consider wrong? On the one hand we may put the pure individualist (whether or no such a person actually exists) who claims to do exactly what seems right in his own eyes and who will brook no control from the society about him. This man errs because he denies the meaning of human life, which is that we should realise ourselves in fellowship. On the other hand stands the man who deifies the State, says that it is impeccable and is quite prepared to hand over his conscience to the keeping of the State. He unconsciously bases his theory on the presupposition that the Christian ethic is identical with natural law and natural right. He is like the lazy man pilloried by Milton: "What does he therefore but resolvs to give over toyling, and to find himself out some factor, som Divine of note and estimation that must be. To him he adheres, resigns the whole ware-house of his religion with all the locks and keyes into his custody, and indeed makes the very person of that man his religion. . . . So that a

* See *Supra* pp. 113ff., 157ff.

man may say his religion is now no more within himself, but is becom a dividuall movable, and goes and comes neer him according as that good man frequents the house. He entertains him, gives him gifts, feasts him, lodges him; his religion comes home at night, praies, is liberally supt, and sumptuously laid to sleep, rises, is saluted, and after the malmesy, or some well spic't bruage, and better breakfasted than he whose morning appetite would have gladly fed on green figs between *Bethany* and *Ierusalem*, his Religion walks abroad at eight, and leavs his kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without his religion." This man errs because he denies morality altogether, for no action is ultimately moral which is not done because it is seen to be right by him who does it, and no progress is possible where none will stand out against the conventions of his day. The truth must lie somewhere between these two extremes. We believe our solution is to be found in the principle that Law is sovereign.*

By this we do not mean that

> The law's the true embodiment
> Of everything that's excellent;

for, while we hold Law to be sovereign, there is but a relative authority attaching to legal codes. The legal system of any country represents with more or less fidelity what we may style the average conscience of the community. For example, when the equality of the sexes has been recognised by the people as a whole, the legal

* Cf. The famous dialogue in the *Crito* between Socrates and the laws: see further E. Barker *Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors* pp. 38ff. (Methuen).

equality of men and women will soon be recognised by statute law. Such law could never have been enacted unless first a few and then a gradually increasing number of persons had seen this principle of equality and had gradually brought others to their view. But such law will be carried against the opinions of a minority and will not represent the conviction of the whole people. That is, the laws at any one time represent a kind of average of the conscience of the community; but at any stage of history the average conscience of the community is only partially enlightened. Thus Law has only partially found expression in the laws. Laws are sovereign only in so far as they truly represent Law. We may compare the old Greek distinction between *νόμος* and *οἱ νόμοι* or between *νόμος* and *τὸ δίκαιον* or between Recht and Sittlichkeit in modern German. Written and conventional law is an imperfect expression of Law; a law taken literally may be used to subvert Law.* It was Shylock who said, "I stand for law." "Justice also differs from *jus*, for the former is constant, unchanging, while the latter is variable. This is due to the varying nature of the circumstances to which it has to be adapted."† In other words, justice is absolute: *jus* is relative. "Justice is said here to have many qualities in common with *jus*, but also they differ, for God is the author of justice, while He has made man the author of *jus*. Justice has also a wider scope than *jus*, and the author refers to an imaginary case, whether the property of Lazarus, which had passed upon his death to his sisters, should have been restored to him. *Jus* could

* Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* III. 10. † Carlyle, *op. cit.*, II. 13.

say nothing on such a case, but justice would find the answer, and thus, he says, justice will always find the solution for new cases for which *jus* could not make provision."* The classical appeal from the lower to the higher law is to be found in Antigone's speech to Creon :

> Nowise from Zeus, methought, this edict came,
> Nor Justice, that abides among the gods
> In Hades, who ordained these laws for men.
> Nor did I deem *thine* edicts of such force
> That they, at mortal's bidding, should o'erride
> Unwritten laws, eternal in the heavens.
> Not of to-day or yesterday are these,
> But live from everlasting, and from whence
> They sprang, none knoweth.†

"True Law," says Cicero, "is right reason, congruent with nature, universally diffused, constant and eternal, which summons to duty by commanding and restrains from wrong by forbidding, which however neither commands nor forbids the righteous in vain, nor moves the unrighteous by commanding or forbidding. From this Law nothing may be taken away, nor indeed can senate or people free us from this Law. . . . But all peoples at every time, Law, one, eternal and immutable shall constrain, and One shall be as it were master and emperor of all, even God."

We may take as a further illustration of this our Lord's attitude to the Mosaic code. The law of Moses was the law of God, and not one jot or tittle of it should pass away ; but a literal subservience to the law of Moses might involve the

* *Ib.*, II., p. 21 ; cf. also Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, pp. 121f. See (forthcoming) *Christian Justice*, by N. Robinson, in this series.

† Whitelaw's translation.

denial of its real meaning and purpose. "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" stands in the Mosaic code for the limitation of vengeance; but it is an imperfect embodiment of the law of God that vengeance shall find no place whatever in the hearts of His children. If a man demand an eye for an eye, he is fulfilling the letter of the law of Moses but denying its meaning and spirit. Of course we do not mean that the original law-givers of Israel consciously realised that the total putting away of vengeance was the true meaning of their law, but that when we put away vengeance, we are fulfilling the principle implicit and latent in the ancient code. Man is only justified in disobeying a particular law, when he does so in obedience to Law, of which the existing code is in this particular a misrepresentation. The authority of law and convention then extends only to what is right and true. Thus political is a branch of moral obligation. In other words, Law in the sense intended here is the immanent meaning of our personality; it is therefore God's purpose for us. But it is also the immanent meaning of every human personality, because it is the meaning of personal life as such. It will thus be seen that Law which is sovereign is something very different from the wish or caprice of the individual, but that to obey a particular law when it conflicts with Law is to deny that which alone gives validity to any law, namely, that it is an expression of absolute right.*

* In claiming that Law is sovereign and that this Law, ἄγραφος νόμος, is higher than local codes, we are reverting to a principle which has had a dominating influence on the minds of men since the days of the great Stoics. Justin identifies this unwritten law with Christ, αἰώνιός τε ἡμῖν νόμος καὶ τελεύταιος Χριστὸς ἐδόθη.

III

But laws are concerned with the relations of a man to his neighbour; has a man any rights against the law? Is there any demand which society may not make upon us? The answer, as it appears to us, is with one single exception in the negative. The exception is that society may not demand of us that which we hold to be immoral; for so would morality be altogether undermined. In religious terms, the State may demand of a Christian man that he go anywhere and do anything provided it do not put him in a position where he is not able to take that attitude to God and man which Christ exemplified.

As a modern instance of this we may consider the problem of conscientious objection. We hold

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Dial. 11, so Orig. *contra Celsum* V37, Lactantius *Inst*, VI. 8, etc., see Troeltsch, *Soziallehre*, pp. 148, 149, 159, 160, 163, where he gives these and other instances and traces them back to Cicero and the Stoics. *Diese Tatsache hat ihren Grund in der Voraussetzung der Identität der Christlichen Ethik und des Naturgesetzes und Naturrechtes*, p. 150. On its theological side this doctrine was never fully worked out till the great schoolman, John Wiclif, devoted attention to it, see his de Civ: Dom: and de Div: Dom: Compare also the saying of de Victoria (quoted by Bacon, "Advertisement touching a holy war"), *Non fundatur dominium nisi in imagine Dei.* Bacon proceeds to quote Hosea, "They have reigned, but not by me; they have set a seigniory over themselves, but I know nothing of it": he concludes that "as there are kings *de facto*, and not *de jure*, in respect of the nullity of their title; so there are nations that are occupants *de facto*, and not *de jure*, of their territories, in respect of the nullity of their policy or government." cf. also Blackstone (*Commentaries*, Introd. § 2), "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."

that a man has no right to say, " the State orders me into the trenches, but I do not relish the trenches, and therefore I will not go." He is only justified in disobeying the State when in his own innermost conscience he is persuaded that in the trenches, or rather in the duties laid upon him there, he could not stand for the principles for which Jesus of Nazareth stood in human life. But here he is not disobeying the State through any merely individual caprice or idiosyncratic preference ; he conceives himself to be standing for the real destiny and vocation of the State as against its misreading of its destiny and duty. In his own idea therefore he is not asserting himself against the State, but is asserting, if not Philip sober against Philip drunk, yet society in its real meaning and purpose over against society partially moralised and partially enlightened as it dimly feels after its own true destiny. He stands for *νόμος* as against *οἱ νόμοι*. In doing this he does not in the least deny the relative justification of what society is doing, nor does he minimise or depreciate the moral enthusiasm and ideals which have called society to its tremendous sacrifice. Whether in this particular case he be right or wrong, his attitude to the majority of his nation is closely similar to that of Christ towards the Zealots and patriots of his day. We can see clearly that Christ sympathised with the patriotic aspirations of His people ; He took the language of their partly political, partly religious hopes as the best available expression of that which He sought Himself ; for them as for Him the kingdom of God was the goal. We may suppose that He sympathised much with their condemnation of

the paganism, the political oppression and the frightfulness of the Roman Empire. Yet He could not altogether side with them, for their ideals were imperfect, and their methods would stultify His nobler ends. We conclude then, that a man is only justified in standing out against the laws when the laws misrepresent Law, which is an ideal of human relationships.

It may be objected that legislation made for those who are imperfect by those who are imperfect must necessarily be imperfect too. Therefore it might appear that walking in the light of his ideal a Christian man is delivered from obedience to any law. It is true that at the present stage of society many laws necessarily ordain a *minimum* of right conduct, as that an employer shall not house more than a certain number in a factory of a certain size, or shall not pay his workmen less than a specified wage or shall not send the miners down the pits without certain safeguards and precautions and assurances. It is plain that the Christian whose ideal is service can never be satisfied with giving only a *minimum*, and that in this sense he is above the law. In many cases the law ordains political or social or industrial machinery which is far from ideal, but which is the best at the moment attainable, and in the working of which a Christian man, as it seems to us, is in no sense called upon to sacrifice his principles.

We may take as example the case of the anti-militarist who pays income tax which is partly spent upon the maintenance of armaments. His acquiescence may be due either to the practical difficulty of separating the portion that goes to

armaments from the part that goes to such services as education, or to doubt as to the most effective form of protest and a disinclination to break solidarity and to appear troublesome to the authorities.* In both cases it is probably regarded as a question of expediency rather than as a quite definite matter of conscience. This would appear to be the way in which Christ regarded the payment of tribute.† In only a very few cases does the modern State call upon a Christian man to do that which he is likely to regard as positively wrong. In these cases his obedience to "the Prince" must give way to "the crown rights of the Lord Jesus Christ."

The traditional problem of political philosophy has been to strike the balance between the good of the individual and the good of society as a whole. It has, therefore, been too often assumed that for the sake of society a man must be willing to forgo something that naturally belongs to his own good. If we interpret the notion of good in a material or hedonistic sense, this is no doubt true, for there is only a certain amount of sugar to go round, and it is certain that individual happiness must often be put second to the advantage of the community. The problem has therefore often been put in the form, how much may the State demand of the individual, and how

* The Passive Resistance Movement against the 1902 Education Act involved a similar problem.

† This at least is the point of view attributed to him in Matt. XVII. 27, "Notwithstanding, lest we offend . . ." The incident, it is true, is historically doubtful; it is instructive, however, as showing what the writer thought was the Master's attitude, though it should be added that the question raised by Christ is not the *use* to which the money is to be put, but their liability to taxation.

little need the individual surrender for the sake of the State. Various answers have been given. In war-time it has been assumed that the State may demand everything even to life itself; in peace-time the individual has usually been allowed considerable "rights" over against the State. The position maintained in this book will at first sight appear self-contradictory; for it has been urged on the one hand that personality is the one absolute value in the world, and on the other that the State may make any demand on the individual except only the demand that he shall disobey his own sense of right. How are we to resolve this apparent antinomy?

The answer is that ultimately in Christianity, and, we may add, in Christianity alone, there is no final heterogeneity between the good of the individual and the good of the whole. The good of the individual is essentially bound up with the good of the community, because, if in Christ we have the key to the meaning of life, the community never attains its real nature or meaning or φύσις or fulfilment, until it is a family. Conversely, the individual can never truly fulfil his destiny or nature, can never be truly himself, until he find himself one of a family the members of which have become conscious of their true relationship to one another. Thus ultimately the good of all is the good of each. But even before the final goal be attained, the same principle holds true; for our own individual good in any given circumstance is that we should vindicate the freedom and truth of our own soul relative to that situation and should so use the situation as thereby to awaken the insight of the community.

If, in the supposed interests of the community as a whole, a man find himself stripped by the State of his lands and possessions and suddenly thrown upon the labour market without knowledge of any skilled trade or the physical capacity for hard manual work, it might well appear to him that, at the present stage of society at any rate, his individual good was at variance with the common good. So indeed it is if the individual's good consist solely in outward possessions and comfortable surroundings; but if, remembering that the only absolute worth is personality, we seek to define our notion of the individual's good in personal terms, we see that there are in it two elements, first, a state of soul or character for himself:

> That away
> Men are but gilded loam or painted clay:

and, second, a community of like-minded spirits. Now that state of soul or character wherein lies man's highest private good need not be destroyed but may rather be elicited by such painful experiences, and he may be made "perfect through suffering." At the same time these experiences, borne in an uncomplaining spirit and overshadowed by a love that no personal suffering and no enmity of others can overwhelm, may be the most potent means available, in such a society the only means, of awakening the conscience of the community. This is what the Cross means. There appears to us to be a variance between the good of the community and the good of the individual only because of our fundamental disbelief that Christ's Cross was His choice. If the one thing He desired

for Himself was to win the love of His brethren for God and for one another, and if this was the only way whereby under the circumstances of the day this could be done, have we any occasion to say that his good was at variance with that of the rest? It will also be clearly seen that any disobedience to the inner voice of right is disastrous to the true welfare of the individual, for in a type of soul that is inflexible to evil lies his highest good; and to demand disloyalty to conscience is the greatest imaginable folly for a State, since in citizens who at all costs will stand loyal to conscience and to conviction a State's true wealth consists.

IV

The most difficult cases of compromise seem to us to lie in the use of force. That Christ rejected the way of violence and the attempt to dragoon men into His Kingdom, that the Lord's people must be of the willing sort, that no man could be coerced into that love of God and of his neighbour in which the Kingdom of God consists, has, we think, been sufficiently shown. But it would be the height of absurdity to suggest that all use of force is wrong. We can neither drive a dog-cart, nor lean on our neighbour's arm, nor wield a pen without the use of force; nor can it be anything but right forcibly to prevent a child from falling into the fire. Forcible restraint again must obviously be applied to certain forms of lunacy and delirium. These admissions may involve us in nice points of controversy. We might debate for hours after the manner of the Schoolmen at what point a man becomes insane enough to

require and justify forcible restraint, and whether a man is to be coerced who is " beside himself " with passion, and at what stage a toper crosses " the borderland dim " between sobriety and intoxication, and where the line is to be drawn between normality and abnormality. As we have already insisted, however, it is not the task of any man to draw up a new *theologia moralis* or Christian casuistry: indeed, there is no real problem here, for we have no doubt that under certain circumstances physical coercion is the way of love.

It is fundamental to our position that Christian love is not sentimentality. Christ did not incur the implacable hatred of the Pharisees and Zealots for sentimental reasons. His love was not a maudlin pity nor a pathological hysteria, as sentimentality is too often. It was a moral valuation of persons based not upon their attainment but upon their possibilities and a self-identification of himself with them in friendship such that men's need became His need, men's sorrows His sorrows, and the awakening of men to righteousness and fellowship and God was the one passion of His life. The purport of this chapter will be greatly misunderstood unless this definition of love be borne in mind.

It is generally supposed that society as it is would be disrupted and would sink back into barbarism, were it not for the police, the law-courts and the army. But we have seen that the Christian's one interest is redemption ; can the police and the law-courts and the army help him here ? Few things are more certain than that to appear in the criminal dock tends in the majority of cases to take away self-respect and

to degrade, and that of ordinary criminals practically all leave prison worse than when they went in. Moreover, the preacher who should proclaim temperance by extolling its excellence and threatening to shoot any man found with a beer-mug might by these measures keep men sober, but could by no means make them temperate, for temperance is a matter of character. It might appear to follow therefore, that while the Christian will see the relative justification of that which the State is doing, he himself as seeing a better way and as likely, if he deviates from it, to render his specifically Christian witness ineffective, must hold altogether aloof from those normal activities of the State, and serve the State best by following his own campaign against sin and iniquity according to his own principles. If the police-court tends to degrade and does not in the least represent Christ's way of dealing with a wrong-doer, how can the Christian be party to a criminal prosecution? And yet in the present state of society, when day by day and night by night grievous wrongs are being inflicted by the strong and the cruel on the weak and on the innocent, does a Christian man really serve best the kingdom of God by standing aloof from that real though imperfect vindication of the moral order which is represented by the police-court?

For instance, if there be a rich landlord owning a row of workmen's cottages, which are verminous, tumble-down, insanitary, unfit for human habitation, and this landlord will do nothing to put them in repair, is he not to be compelled to put them right as much "for the good of his own soul" as for the good of his tenants? Our instinctive answer is

in the affirmative, and yet we are somewhat baffled when we seek justification for this answer in the life of Christ, who refused to be a judge and divider amongst men, who would neither lead his people against the Romans, nor give Himself to agitation against profiteers and extortioners, nor would allow the execution of the law against the woman taken in adultery, and who set Himself always to appeal to individual hearts. We may take as further illustrations the man who has again and again been prosecuted for assault, the man who has been shown to get his living by the ruin of others, the man who will not isolate his family though they suffer from a dangerous and infectious complaint. Are these not to be forcibly restrained? These are hard cases, and any theory is doctrinaire and sentimental which does not face them. Before coming to our own tentative conclusions we shall discuss first, the justification offered by Christians for refusing to exercise force even under these circumstances and second, the justification for the use of force put forward by others. To some readers it may seem so intolerable that any decent person should hesitate to use force, if need be, in cases of this kind that they will be disposed to skip our exposition of the principles of those who hold this view. We would urge, however, that although this view is not in all points that which we ourselves adopt, it is *prima facie* much more easily reconciled with the teaching of Christ than its contrary, and that it seems never to have been seriously considered by the Christian Churches.

(1) This view we may describe as the absolutist or wholly non-compromising attitude Its

principle may be summed up in Dr. Temple's words: "Our Lord's method is the only one that aims straight at the evil will: it is the only method that has in it any real hope of converting the individual. It may fail time and again; but it is the only one that has a chance of real and absolute success. . . . There is no heart yet made that can resist the appeal of love which is constant in spite of every betrayal, the appeal of trust which is renewed in spite of endless disappointments" (pp. 68, 69). John Woolman may be cited as a noble exponent of this way. He felt moved to go round amongst those of his Society who kept slaves and quietly and under a heavy sense of duty to expostulate with them. The delivery of his message was, he tells us, "a trial both to me and them." To him it was truly a cross, but, he adds, "the fear of the Lord so covered me at times that my way was made easier than I expected; and few, if any, manifested any resentment." John Woolman was able in his lifetime to effect a great change; it may fairly be said that had there been more of his spirit to work with him, there need have been no civil war in America. That war was what Disraeli called "a just and unnecessary war," just, because Lincoln and those who stood with him sought no personal and private end but the deliverance of the oppressed, unnecessary, because there was a better way.* More than that, it was ineffective; it made the slave politically free, but it did little to solve the still perplexing question of the right relations between the white

* The fact that recent writers have treated slavery as a secondary issue in the American Civil War does not affect the point we are raising.

man and the black. Is there any doubt that Woolman's was the Christian way? Still, it will be argued, there are some problems where a slow policy such as this is no policy at all; if the landlord will not put the drains right at once, the children will die; while we consider and persuade, there are people starving and crimes being committed against humanity that will take generations to undo; we cannot possibly wait for this slow way of persuasion and consent; it may be admitted that, where we ourselves are concerned, we ought to turn the other cheek to the smiter and to win our enemy by love, but what right have we to do this at the expense of the lives of others?

The answer given by those whose view we are expounding will be, that Jesus Christ did not at all costs protect His friends from suffering; He went to the Cross Himself though it meant leaving His friends sorrowful and unprotected. In the second place we may be sure that in His eyes the problem is much more that of the conversion of the slum-landlord than the safety of the tenant, on the ground that it is better to suffer evil than to do it; and third, we have no right to assume that a slum-landlord or any other man is less than a man and is a devil incarnate. Let us then seek to apply what we are assuming to be the Christian way to these definite problems, and ask how exactly does it work?

There are three ways of dealing with the slum-landlord who wilfully neglects to put his property in habitable condition. There is the method of mob-violence; there is the method of coercion by the law through the sanitary inspector and the police court; and there is the way of "direct

action." What man, it is urged, could resist the pressure of the knowledge of what he was doing, if it were brought home to him by some one whom he knew to be disinterested and whom he knew to love him? Well, but he may resist even in that case, and then what is to be done? Suppose then that as a result of the insanitary condition of the row a pestilence breaks out and the people are swept away; will not that open the man's eyes, if indeed he is a man and not a character in fiction? And if, more than that, the people die without a curse on their lips or an ill-wish in their hearts against the man whose cruelty has brought this on them and their families, will not then his heart be turned? Even then, perhaps, it may not, but we can at least assert that love has made the last appeal, that those who have died in that spirit have truly shared in the Cross of Christ and have walked in His way. For that is the method of the Cross.

But it will be objected that this is well and good where there is a row of Christian slum-dwellers; but what if the poor folk are not ready to sacrifice themselves and their children as martyrs, are we not then on their behalf to set in motion the machinery of the law? No, it is argued, the task of the Christian is still to bring the maximum of moral pressure on the landlord to do his duty and the maximum of moral pressure on the oppressed to put away resentment, however just. It may seem that this is not likely to be very effective, but we are asked to consider what would be the result if the Christian Church as a whole took up this attitude; instead of passing "pious" resolutions about legislation and in support of

policies and Governments, the Church, that is Christian people everywhere, would be engaged in an active and ceaseless campaign against social evil; their motive would be seen and known to be not vindictive but purely loving and disinterested. They would go not with a threat upon their lips, "If you do not do this, we will set the police upon you," but really believing as Christ did in the essential goodness of human nature, appealing to what was good and thus evoking it. It is not suggested, it will be observed, that the police force should be forthwith disbanded, but only that Christian people should hold themselves free of the whole system because they have a better and more effective way of working.

But, it may be said, is it proposed to leave legislation and the work of the courts to those who are not Christians, and is it not far better that Christians should throw themselves into this work and try to make it more Christian? To this it is answered that Christians would have a far more effective influence on public affairs and would do far more to mould public opinion if they would keep loyal to their own principles. We may take as an illustration the moralising of war, and ask whether the very small body of Quakers has not done infinitely more to keep alive the soul and the ideals of the people on this question than the Churches that have been afraid to say anything lest they embarrass the Government. Indeed, it may be fairly urged that the participation of the Christians in war so far from moralising it has made it infinitely more atrocious, and that for two reasons: first that, when Christians compromise, the lower elements in society can

" let themselves go," because the religious folk are with them ; and second, because the refusal to be reconciled becomes a matter of *principle*: when moral principles are involved, it becomes immoral to compromise and to make peace before complete victory is gained. It is similarly urged that every attempt to further the Kingdom of God by having recourse to the political machine is likewise foredoomed to failure.

> Ed e giunta la spada
> Col pastorale ; e l'un col l'altro insième
> Per viva forza mal convièn che vada,
> Però che, giunti, l'un l'altro non teme *

Should the Christian Churches join with others who would impose Prohibition upon this country ? No, it is said, the country might " go dry " for merely economic reasons, whereas the Christian interest is in temperance, which involves a certain type of character. The triumph of the Prohibitionists, unless they could effect a change of character, might even prove their undoing, for the craving for drink might be replaced by some even more destructive and demoralising habit. The Churches, following the lines of their Master's offensive, would most effectually influence politics for the better by remaining unconnected altogether with political action.

In expounding this view it ought not to be necessary for us to point out that those who take this position have little in common with the Quietist contention that the Church should be

* The sword
Is grafted on the crook ; and so, conjoin'd,
Each must, perforce, decline to worse, unawed
By fear of other.—Dante, Purg. XVI., 97 sq.
Cary's translation.

hedged around and separate from the world, refusing to touch politics because it is an activity exercised within the devil's world and, therefore, no concern of the elect. The only problem is, how is evil to be most effectually overcome in the world? There is no doubt that in the past the Churches have seriously impaired the effectiveness of their witness in social matters by their not very holy nor disinterested connection with political parties, but ought we to agree that the Christian man should stand altogether outside the political "arena"? Is that involved in the discipleship of Christ? Furthermore, this doctrine affords us no guidance as to what our duty is in regard to membership of firms, committees, partnerships, companies and institutions in the work of which it appears to be our duty to participate, while we cannot share the ideals of all our fellow-members. Again, this view seems to us on the whole to involve a too negative attitude towards the political and legal institutions of our day which, as we have seen, are real, though imperfect, embodiments of the Christian spirit.

(2) We turn next to what we may call the Christian justification of coercion. We may start from an excellent chapter in Dr. Temple's book, entitled "Justice and Liberty." He there tells us that "legislation is really an instrument of self-discipline. . . . What a community does, especially a democratic community, when it passes a law, is to invoke, every member upon his own head, the penalties enacted by that law, if he should do the act which the law forbids. Let us consider, for example, an international

convention. Nations . . . strengthen their deliberate purpose to avoid such acts by entering into an agreement with one another always to avoid them. There would be no object in doing this unless they needed help, or thought that they might at some time need help, in living up to their own purposes. . . . Most of us, I suppose, are sufficiently honest to desire in general terms to pay for what we buy; and we should perhaps usually pay for our places in the train, even if there were no ticket inspectors. Still, the existence of the inspector just clinches the matter. The possibility of the penalty as a matter of fact helps to maintain our general, permanent, and deliberate purpose of honesty against a momentary temptation to be dishonest; and so far it is helping us to live up to our purpose, or, in other words, is increasing our real freedom" (pp. 73-75). Much the same is the contention of Burke: "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human *wants*. . . . Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. . . . This can only be done by *a power out of themselves*, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights."

Along similar lines it is argued that our political life is a system of consent.* We appear to coerce

* Hobbes puts this position in its extremist form when he argues that David did no injury to Uriah, "because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself!" Leviathan ii. 21.

one another, but as a matter of fact at a General Election the country agrees to be guided and ruled by the majority, subject to the Parliamentary system, and we do really agree to be coerced or punished if we disobey the laws. Politics, even the party system, is thus essentially in spite of all appearance to the contrary a system of consent. So far so good, but it may be urged on the other hand that there are many persons in the State who would certainly not obey the law but for the threat of the police and behind the police of the military. Nearly every reform therefore which is regarded as important is virtually passed by a threat of police or military force. Further, the time may come in a State when there is such bitterness between two classes or parties that this unexpressed agreement no longer has any reality ; that seems sometimes to be the condition towards which we are drifting, but it is a calamity from which we must keep ourselves by every effort ; for it is anarchy. That is to say that civilisation and settled Government involve essentially and increasingly an element of real consent.*

There is another theory which in the end comes to much the same thing. It starts from the premise, which will be undisputed, that the use of force is in itself a-moral and becomes moral or immoral according to the use to which it is put. In this connection we are asked to distinguish two uses of force, that in destruction and that in " redemptive restraint." According to this theory

* One of the reasons that puts war in another category from police-action is that between nations there is only in the slightest degree this consent and agreement.

to use force to keep the criminal from committing the crime is " redemptive restraint," and although it is a far less matter than converting him from the evil will, it is still an essentially Christian action. Indeed, only by forcibly preventing men from going along certain evil paths can the way be made possible for them to reach the higher freedom and culture and enjoyment of life.*

We fear that Dr. Temple's theory, that the members of the community have virtually agreed to be coerced or punished when they dislike or disobey a law, is open to nearly all the familiar objections to the social contract theory. There never was such a contract and, if there had been, we are no parties to it. The only social contract is that which is implicit in the ideal. On the other hand there is no doubt that most people do desire for their own sakes as well as for the sake of others that there should be a legal system, and that they should not be left to their own devices. They do not so much consent to be punished if they break the law as they consent to majority rule as preferable to chaos or anarchy. Thus there exists a real measure of consent to which we shall return. So far we agree with Dr. Temple.

There is also great value in the principle of " redemptive restraint." It indicates that love is not maudlin, and that the use of force which it will cover is employed with the right Christian motive. But if we " redemptively restrain " a tradesman from using false weights and measures by threat or fine, we may indeed cause him to do the

* War on the other hand or capital punishment is destructive ; it does nothing to redeem the criminal if indeed in the former case it touches him at all, and therefore it is on a different ethical plane from redemptive restraint.

thing that is right, but not from the right motive ; or we may persuade him that falsification does not pay, but we may be leaving him still wishing that it did pay. There is no potent magic in coercion of itself to awaken insight without which there is no redemption.* Restraint, therefore, though it may be employed by one whose interest is to redeem, is not of itself redemptive. Further, although the redemption or good of the child may be the father's motive for preventing his child from falling into the fire, yet the good of the criminal is at the present stage of civilisation only a very secondary interest of the legal system.

In the light of these criticisms, then, let us seek a somewhat more satisfactory formulation of the principle after which we are groping.

The State is necessary for the sake of the good life. By the State is meant society organised for the regulation of its common life. As civilisation advances, the State has within it the possibility of indefinite development towards the ideal or Christian order.† Meanwhile, chiefly owing to its ignorance of a better way of overcoming evil, the State has to use force and coercion. But

* It is quite true that the law or the fear of the law *may*, as we say, " bring a man to his senses " and so indirectly contribute towards his redemption, but equally it *may* awaken in him merely an impotent and quite impenitent anger against the powerful machinery of society ; it may make him a Nietzschean quite as easily as a Christian.

† The question is sometimes raised whether we have any ground for expecting that the ideal society or the kingdom of God in its fulness will ever be found upon this planet. We hold that the future is contingent and therefore unpredictable in detail ; all we can say is that we believe that *within its own limits* the earthly order is perfectible ; what these limits are we do not know ; we know only that indefinite progress is open to human society.

Christ taught a better way, namely, by rendering good for evil and love for hate, though it led Him to a Cross. To the imitation and discipleship of Christ the Christian is committed absolutely. Evil and wrong cannot be eliminated from the world by mass methods, but only by awakening in individuals insight into the true meaning of life and of the world. This involves a slow and personal ministry. It is based on the conviction that in every man, though often hidden and overlaid, there is something of the divine to which we can appeal, that "far and wide, though all unknowing, pants for Thee each human breast," and that where a man will deny or ignore the barriers of convention, of shyness, of assumed gaiety and carelessness whereby men seek to hide from their neighbours that which is really in their hearts, and will act on the assumption that every human heart craves for human fellowship, and will thus venture "over the top" to meet his neighbour, he will find in the end a great and wonderful response. It would almost seem that it is necessary to be a blind man or a cripple in order to know how good men are. Men fear one another's laughter or greed or contempt, or even righteousness, but Christ had no fear of any one and ran all the risks of going unarmed and defenceless amongst men, appealing to that which was good in them; so He won the love of a few before His principle led Him to His Cross, from which He shall rule over the hearts of men for ever. No one need fear Christ, and where there is no fear none can in the end, when it is seen, refuse a love like His that seeks the unlovely without reproach and without intermission "till he find." The real

way, therefore, to treat the criminal is to treat him as Christ would, and to take the consequences. We should not so labour this point, but for two things: first, that it is far more important than any political action we can take, and second, because as a matter of fact the Churches have been apt to be full of people doing very good works instead of exercising a redeeming personal ministry like that of their Master.

At the same time we are not of opinion that the Christian who has seen and tries to practise this better way should forswear all corporate action with his contemporaries, holding completely aloof from politics on the ground that our political life still largely reflects the ethics of the jungle, should sit on no executive committees except where all the members share the same ideals, should enter into no partnership with "unbelievers," and should have no truck with the penal system of the country, which is a real though partial expression of the divine righteousness.

It may fairly be said that the rightness or wrongness of our conduct will largely depend on the spirit in which we use the instruments or tools available to our hand. To some men political life is primarily a system of war with its own code of honour, its own rules and its own victories, be it class war or party war; for others, notwithstanding the fact that for the purposes of our political life men find themselves divided into opposing groups or parties, politics is primarily and essentially and ought increasingly to be in actual fact a system of government by consent in spite of differences. It seems to us quite consistent

that, in the present distress, Christians should work and vote, so long as they are able to do so,* some for the Conservative, some for the Liberal, some for the Labour Party, according to temperament and conviction, but each pursuing a two-fold end, first to make political life increasingly a system of real consent, second to make the laws increasingly to correspond with Law. Where men are known to be disinterested, and when their principles are known and held inviolable, it does not seem to us that participation in politics involves inconsistency and "compromise." It is for individuals in individual cases to decide what does and what does not involve a compromise of principle. We may suppose that had Christ foreseen all the intricate problems of conduct in modern life with which His disciples would hereafter be faced, He would still have laid down no exact directions for them to follow. He came to call men to the free exercise of their own insight, not to enslave them to the bondage of a law.

So too the motive behind our present penal system is but very partially redemptive, yet, when a man is dealing with a wrong-doer and more particularly when he is acting not on his own behalf but on behalf of the wronged and the oppressed, and when, as may well be the case, there is no opportunity of personal contact, he *may* come to the conclusion that the best and kindest thing, although from the ideal standpoint it be far from best, will be to prosecute and let the law take its course. He will be

* Fox is reported to have told Penn when asked by him what to do with his sword : "Wear it so long as thou canst."

like one that stands upon a promontory,
And spies a far-off shore where he would tread
Wishing his foot were equal with his eye.

But it appears to us that in so doing he cannot be said to be compromising his principles. But, if he is to retain his sincerity, he must not *finally* acquiesce in the limited opportunities now at his command ; he must press for the creation of a better redemptive instrument. On this understanding and in this spirit while desiring the better he may resort to the imperfect—the only available means to his hand. That which is positively evil he cannot do without violating conscience ; this is compromise in the bad sense. But there is one further consideration. We cannot but have condemnation for our present largely inhuman prison system ; but in the abstract it is quite conceivable that forcible restraint may be for a person's good. Still, at best it is but a negative condition for improvement. Far more serious than the mere fact of forcible restraint is the conventional judgment upon the man who has " served his time." In this case a man is always judged in the light of what he has done, not in the light of what he has it in him to become. The criminal stain upon a man's name is like the damned spot upon the palm of Lady Macbeth ; society will not believe that it can be washed out. It is this conventional attitude towards the criminal that is un-Christian, not the fact that he is put under restraint. Christians are to love others as God in Christ has loved them.

Ah, countrymen ! If when ye make your prayers,
God should be so obdurate as yourselves,
How would it fare with your departed souls ?

Constraint might well have a redemptive value if it were obvious to the wrong-doer that society has as its real object not the mere protection of its property or persons but the redemption of each of its members. Constraint being thus entirely altered in meaning might be expected to appeal to the criminal as a positive effort to save him. It is in this chiefly that the defect of our present system lies : it illustrates the truth that it is *meaning* that matters, and that the same method may be used with two wholly different intentions.*

It ought, however, to be recognised that war is on a different footing from the kind of corporate action discussed above. Law treats a man as a person because it discriminates : the law regards the offender as an individual and gives him a chance of establishing his personal innocence. It is imperfect because it does not discriminate sufficiently. By its very impartiality law does not and cannot sufficiently allow for personal considerations such as ignorance of a not very culpable kind, heredity, severe temptation or lack of moral stamina. War, however, lumps men together in an indiscriminate mass, punishing both guilty and innocent. From a moral point of view this is an important difference. It is no sufficient answer to those who really care about morality to assert that this is regrettable but inevitable. It is one of those " inevitables " that must be abolished as soon as the moral sense is quickened to realise how monstrously unjust it

* It is, we think, greatly to be desired that magistrates, while faithfully administering the law, should also seek personal relations outside the court with those who have come before them as offenders.

is. In taking part in politics or under certain circumstances in prosecuting a criminal, it seems to us, a man may feel that he is thus standing for the things for which Christ stood, and may know in his conscience that his one interest is the redemption of that particular criminal whom he is treating *as a person** But it seems to us impossible to reconcile with the spirit and methods of Christ the wholesale slaughter of men in battle or the starving of non-combatants at home, that is, the treating of human beings as less than persons. " And this, I say, is not to be measured so much by the principles of jurists, as by *lex charitatis; lex proximi*, which includes the Samaritan as well as the Levite; *lex filiorum Adæ de massa una:* upon which original laws this opinion is grounded; which to deny, if a man may speak freely, were almost to be a schismatic in nature." In answer to this Christian Englishmen have been disposed to argue that in the recent war it was necessary for Germany's good that she should be beaten. War, therefore, may have the redemptive motive. Without wishing to deny that defeat may work beneficial results through disillusionment to any imperialistic nation we may observe that in this argument " Germany " is treated as a person which, as we have seen, she is not. In the process of war many persons who are misinformed or innocent or coerced are killed. It will not do to answer that death is not a final evil; it is not with the killing of the body that we are concerned; the moral problem lies in this, that the process of war causes us so to act towards individuals that

* But consider E. V. Lucas, *One Day and Another*, pp. 1-9.

we are purely destructive and act in such a way that we cannot be redemptive to the individual who has an absolute value. "A bullet, whether fired by a patriot or a pirate, has no distinguishing message on it." Fundamentally, therefore, the problem is: can a mass-method be right which involves the denial of the absolute worth of moral subjects, without which, be it observed, there can be no morality?*

* See *supra* pp. 126f. It should be noted that (1) we agree with those who say that it is right to defend the weak from suffering and wrong but not *at any cost*. The redemption of the wrong-doer is a primary Christian motive, the prevention of pain is secondary to that. The claim that the weak must be defended *at any cost*, *e.g.*, by the killing of the aggressor, implies that the physical well-being of one is to be set before the (possibility of) the moral redemption of another; such a theory is part of the sentimentalism of war; it does not face all the moral facts. Had Christ accepted it, it would have prevented him from going to his Cross. We may not defend "the weak" by doing that which "the weak," in so far as they have moral insight, can neither desire nor condone. Incidentally if it was from *suffering* that we desired to defend "Belgium" it would have been better had we counselled neutrality. (2) We agree that "the moral order must be vindicated." But this can only be achieved when he who has violated it comes to see and accept it for himself. We do not labour this point here because it has been sufficiently shown by W. F. Halliday in *Reconciliation and Reality*, pp. 76-87 q.v., cf. also *supra* pp. 209, 223ff. (3) Under modern conditions there is no clear demarcation between wars of offence and of defence. When the Continent is divided into two hostile camps armed to the teeth, to strike the first blow is felt by many to be the wise *defensive*. Further, Clausewitz rightly describes war as an extension of policy. To find the real aggressor, if our concern is with morality rather than with evasive conventions and subterfuges, we must go behind the actual hostilities of war to the diplomacy that leads up to war. Here we are met by the difficulty that the public has no material for forming a judgment beyond the *ex parte* statements of contending diplomatists whose aim it is in each case to make it appear that they are the aggrieved and their opponents the aggressors—though both sides *may be* sincere in the presentation of their case. Hence for working purposes the distinction between aggressive and defensive war turns out to be illusory.

There is still one further difficulty with which we must grapple. How is it possible, it may be urged, in practice to discriminate between what may be called the " redemptive restraint " of the police and the violence of war ? Incidents like the late struggle in Sidney Street may at any time arise. It may seem the best thing that a group of lawless criminals should be arrested ; the police come to arrest them ; they resist, barricade themselves in a house and threaten all comers with fire-arms. What is there for it but that the house be stormed ? What is to be the attitude here of a man who says he can justify police action, but not war ?

This seems to us the hardest problem which we have to meet, and we are anxious not to shirk the difficulty even though our solution is not wholly satisfactory. We have argued that evil can only be overcome with good, hate with love, and that persons are to be treated not in the mass but as brothers and individuals ; we believe that under certain circumstances coercion may be used upon persons with a view to their redemption from the evil will. But how are these principles to be applied in these hard cases ? It might perhaps be said that these situations only arise because in the past the Christian way has not been taken, and therefore there comes a point when the Christian must leave to others the clearing up of a situation for which he is in no way responsible. This might be fair; and yet it would be tantamount to the admission that the way of Christ is not adequate for every human situation. It may be fairly urged that there is no need to storm the house in Sidney Street ; let the ruffians be isolated,

and let them be fed ; let the maximum of moral pressure be used upon them, and let there be left no possibility of doubt but that forgiveness and restoration await their willingness to take once more their proper and due place in society. This seems to us the Christian way.*

We have throughout this discussion disclaimed any desire to erect a new Christian casuistry ; we have no ready-made solution for every problem of compromise ; there are many things we do not see clearly, but it would be a pity if a frank recognition of perplexities should cause us to forget that much is clear enough.

Nothing is more distinctive in the teaching and example of Jesus Christ than the attitude which we are to learn to take up towards evil doers, and the principle which not incorrectly has been called the principle of the Cross, that the evil will can only be changed by a self-forgetful love that clings to the evil-doer as a person and potential brother through all his sin and all his waywardness, by which love alone can a like love and spirit be awakened in him. This is the Christian way : be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good. This, we take it, is not controversial, and indeed we would so far as possible avoid all controversy in these difficult matters. It is plain, we think, that he who walks by this

* But if those whom we are isolating refuse to be isolated and break bounds, are we to shoot ? Our most hesitating answer is, shoot, but to "wing" not to kill. Whatever way force is used, it must have the means of being a negative condition of good will. This rules out machine guns. At the same time we may insist again that the important question is not concerned with the use of force as such or the killing of a body, but whether any activity which is engaged in is *manifestly* part of a system of construction and not of destruction either vengeful or legal.

rule will be relatively unconcerned with political party and mass action and suggestion, as was Christ, and that he will seek to treat everyone with whom he comes in contact as a person of infinite worth whose friendship and fellowship are part of his own heaven. For those who set out from specifically Christian first principles or from moral principles substantially identical with our own, to consent to war seems to us to involve that their moral Universe goes to pieces.

In conclusion, we have sought in this book to grapple with a problem which, from the specifically Christian standpoint, has been unsolved and in our day little attempted. We have tried, however inadequately, to state a doctrine which shall give due weight both to the value of social life and to the worth of the individual, and which therefore will satisfy the moral consciousness. The *onus* is on those who differ from us to prove that humanity can ever be a free and firm fellowship if the principles which we have stated are denied.

INDEX

Alexander, 84, 123.
Ambrose, 131n.
Anarchy, 211ff, 236, 237.
Animism, 118n, 185n.
Antigone, 160f, 217.
Aristotle, 145, 153n, 216n.
Athanasius, 155.
Augustine, 31, 171.
Augustus, 14.
Austria, 106.
Authority, in Religion, 155n, 162-165, 205, 208f, 210, 212n.
Authority, in State, 157-162, 164f.

Bacon, 109, 219n.
Barker, E., 215n.
Baudouin, 123n.
Bergson, 60.
Berkeley, 141n.
Besant and Rice, 109.
Blackstone, 219n.
Brethren, Plymouth, 197.
Browne, Robert, 204.
Buckle, 22.
Bull, John, 122f.
Burke, 7, 132n, 146f, 213, 235.
Bury, 179n.

Cadoux, 195n.
Cæsar, 14f, 128ff, 162, 201, 209.
Caiaphas, 178.
Caird, 40n.
Calvin, 31.
Calvinism, 30f, 163, 200, 202n, 205.
Carlyle, A. J., 131n, 136n, 199, 216.
Carson, 16n.
Catholicism, 90, 94, 97, 136, 183-194, 198, 199f, 205.
Catholicity, 135n, 189-194.
Charlemagne, 199.
Christ, Cross of, 83f, 151, 175, 178, 209, 224f, 230f, 239.
Christ, Teaching of, 81ff, 195f, 198, 200n, 210, 222, 228, 247, see Sermon on Mount.
Church, function of, 88ff, 100f, 151, 194-207, 231ff.
Church, Nature of, 87ff, 98, 111, 179-207.
Church, Unity of, 189-194.
Church and State, 65, 100f, 128ff, 134ff, 194-207.
Cicero, 217.
Class War, 20, 23ff, 33, 51, 58, 76.
Clausewitz, 245n.
Communist Manifesto, 16ff, 30, 34.
Compromise, 86-88, 208-211, 241f.
Conscience, liberty of 140-143.
Conscientious Objector, 16n, 166-178, 219-221.
Croce, 25n.

Dale, 191.
Dante, 183, 233.
Determinism, Economic, 30-33.
Dietzgen, 21, 33-49, 80, 113, 179.
Direct Action, Political, 16, 20, 52.
Direct Action, Religious, 230ff.
Disraeli, 229.

England, 121-125, 141, 169.
Engles, 17n.
Ethos, 110ff.

Figgis, 124n.

Force, Use of, 20, 80-86, 100, 208f, 225-248.
Fox, 241.
Freud, 146n.
Friends of God, 197.

General Strike 20, 36, 59-64.
General Will, 112ff, 116.
Germany, 118n, 121-125, 139, 142.
Gierke, 120n, 187.
Gregory, 199.

Halliday, 94n, 245n.
Hegel, 25f, 40n, 42f, 47, 103, 142f, 157-162.
Henry VIII., 136.
Herkomer, 182n.
History, 25f, 84, 94ff, 105f, 128ff, 149.
Hobbes, 141ff, 144, 157-162, 166, 235n.
Hobhouse, L. T., 175ff.
Holiness, 189-194, 203.
Horace, 210.

Ignatius, 190n.
Immanence, 94-104.
Imperialism, 105f, 137f.
Incarnation, 92, 95, 101.
Independency, 165.
Individuality, 71, 109ff, 116ff.
Induction, scientific, 36ff.
Innes, A. Taylor, 103.
Innocent III., 199.
International, Christian, 135ff.
International, Socialist, 138.
Internationalism, 133-139.
Isidore, 131n.
Israel, 97f, 116, 133, 201f, 207.
Italy, 106.

Jaurès, 51.
Jingoism, 137.
Jones, Rufus, 200n, 203n, 205n.
Jung, 118n. 123.
Justice, 20, 74f, 100f, 154, 163, 216f.
Justin, 218n.

Kant, 37ff, 71, 126, 128, 155, 158, 187.
Kingdom of God, 77, 80, 97ff, 103f, 109f, 127f, 132f, 138, 180, 182, 187, 189, 196, 198, 208f, 220, 225, 233, 238n.
Kipling, 132.
Kropotkin, 141.

Labriola, 29.
Laski, 217n.
Law, 19f, 115f, 146f, 165, 211-225, 241, 243.
Lenin, 57, 129, 137f, 151.
Liberty, 140-178.
Locke, 140f.
Lucas, 244n.
Lucian, 107.
Luther, 156.
Lutherans, 135, 200, 205.

Maciver, 112n, 120n.
Mackintosh, R., 202n.
Maitland, 119f.
Marx, 17n, 21-33, 49, 70, 73, 80, 138, 141-145.
Mazzini, 106f, 132, 134, 141.
Mill, 140.
Milton, 140f, 214.
Mohammed, 31.
Monism, Materialistic, 38, 42-47 49, 51.
Morality, bourgeois, 54-56, 66, 74ff.
Morley, 31.
Morris, 52.
Myth, 59-64.

Napoleon, 84, 106, 123.
Nation, 94, 96ff, 201n.
Nationalism, 133-139.
Nationality, 89ff, 97, 105-139.
Nations, League of, 98f, 102, 133ff, 137.
Naturalism, 94ff.
Nietzsche, 45, 137, 162.

Occam, William of, 204n.

Oman, Dr. J., 98n, 187n, 190n, 191n.
Omnipotence, 82f, 85.
Opposites, Relativity of, 38, 44f.

Parliament, 14-21, 50f, 236.
Passive Resistance, 16n, 222n.
Patand, 53n.
Paul, 31, 97, 182n.
Persona ficta, 119ff.
Personality, 30, 32, 46, 67, 70ff, 75f, 110ff, 125ff, 160, 209, 223ff, 239.
Personality, corporate, 101ff, 108-125, 180.
Pharisees, 84f, 193, 197.
Pheidias, 117.
Pilate, 178.
Plymouth Brethren, 197.
Poland, 106.
Police, 226, 232, 246f.
Politics, 17ff, 28, ch. VII.
Polycarp, 190n.
Pouget, 53n.
Prohibition, 233.
Projection, psychological, 118n.
Prudhomme, 71.
Providence, 84, 96.
Punch, 122.

Quietism, 30, 197, 202, 233.

Rashdall, 182n.
Realism, Mediæval, 20, 118n, 183ff, 189.
Remnant, 97, 200ff, 205.
Restraint, Redemptive, 236ff.
Rights, 219-225.
Robinson, 217n.
Rousseau, 29, 112, 143.
Roy, Ed le, 62.
Russia, 16, 21, 34.

Sermon on Mount, 83f, 87, 99f, 163, 172, 183.
Shakespeare 109, 117.
Sighele, 137.
Smuts, 14.
Smyth, 204.
Socrates, 117, 147, 161 215n.
Sohm, 98n.
Sorel, 21 33-78, 137.
Sovereignty, 113ff, 157-162, 207, 211-218.
State, 56, 58, 64, 70, 88, 101ff, 108, 115, 119f, 132n, 158ff, 211ff, 222f, 238. See Church and State.
Stoicism, 31, 138, 199, 218n.
Super-personality, 108ff, 120.
Syndicalism, 33-78.

Temple, W., Bishop of Manchester, 79-104, 112, 123, 179, 185, 186n, 189 192f, 229, 234f, 237.
Tertullian, 196.
Toleration, 149-152, 173-178.
Transcendence, 39ff, 94-104.
Troeltsch, 165, 185nn, 196, 197n, 198, 200, 202n, 219n.

Ulpian, 136n.
Utopianism, 20, 40, 61, 63.

Violence, 49-54, 56-59, 64f, 68ff, 73, 76f.

War, 70, 80f, 121ff, 193f, 229, 232f, 236n, 237n, 243ff, 248.
Wellhausen, 201f.
Wiclif, 219n.
Wilson, 196n.
Woolman, 229f.

Zealots, 85, 193, 196, 220, 226.
Zeitgeist, 117.

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2 p.l., [7]-251p. 19cm. (Christian revolut series, no.XII)

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